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Split from AI sentience


Eise

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12 minutes ago, iNow said:

This conclusion (cannot be a byproduct of something if it can also have a causal impact on other things) strikes me as nonsequitur.

Yes, it is, when it we are talking a byproduct. But I related it to epiphenomena. So, yes, forget that.

My point is that this capability of animals to anticipate the future dependent on their possible action is consciousness. And if you recognise an action as your own, i.e. you do it because of reasons you see as your own, then you are acting according your free will.

29 minutes ago, iNow said:

So, a better statement might be: "Free will, as used commonly by the vast majority of people in our population, and as its used by essentially everyone who is not an active and practicing philosopher, does not exist."

Nice hyperbole.

No, it would suffice if you say that there is no soul that is controlling the brain. Because that is in fact what you are saying, nothing more. So anybody who believes we need a soul to have free will be irritated, the rest can just go on.

And don't you think that many not-philosophically-inclined people will say what free will is: 'Being able to do what you want'. And that is the simplest description of compatibilist free will.

It is the naive philosophy of neuroscientists that make them say that they discovered*  that we have no free will. (See my disclaimer.) I also remember Simon van der Meer (Nobelprice winning physicist), who said that free will is possible because of  the 'noise in the brain' (pointing at Heisenberg's uncertainty principle). Another victim of naive philosophy.

45 minutes ago, iNow said:

do you mean to assert (even implicitly) that consciousness cannot exist without a functioning brain?

It cannot exist without some very complex structure in which it is implemented. I do not believe that computers are conscious (yet), but maybe they once will be. I see no principal impossibility for that, at most (huge) practical difficulties. So the fact is that only of some organisms, with complex brains, especially human animals, we know they have consciousness.

*No, they did not discover that, it is in the basic assumption of science that every event has a cause.

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15 minutes ago, Eise said:

And don't you think that many not-philosophically-inclined people will say what free will is: 'Being able to do what you want'. And that is the simplest description of compatibilist free will.

Fair enough. Perhaps you're correct. I do wonder how someone going through opiod-withdrawal might respond, though, or even the people surrounding them and trying to care for them while their personal will is displaying itself to be anything but free.

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5 minutes ago, iNow said:

Fair enough. Perhaps you're correct. I do wonder how someone going through opiod-withdrawal might respond, though, or even the people surrounding them and trying to care for them while their personal will is displaying itself to be anything but free.

Sure, one can say a lot more about it, and there are some difficult border cases. But I think that would go too far now. 

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20 minutes ago, Eise said:

And don't you think that many not-philosophically-inclined people will say what free will is: 'Being able to do what you want'. And that is the simplest description of compatibilist free will.

Do bullies (racist/criminals/et al) want to bully? I'm not saying that some of us (bullies/racist/criminals/et al) can't change (have free will), but it does call into question if its an automatic right of passage. 

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1 hour ago, Eise said:

Sure, one can say a lot more about it, and there are some difficult border cases. But I think that would go too far now. 

It's the border cases that help us test our propositions and assumptions. The opiod-withdrawal example makes clear my case that our freedom is an illusion and our will dictated by things completely outside of our control, even without invoking the ridiculous notion of souls.

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35 minutes ago, iNow said:

It's the border cases that help us test our propositions and assumptions. The opiod-withdrawal example makes clear my case that our freedom is an illusion and our will dictated by things completely outside of our control, even without invoking the ridiculous notion of souls.

The twelve step program was started by someone...

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16 hours ago, iNow said:

It's the border cases that help us test our propositions and assumptions. The opiod-withdrawal example makes clear my case that our freedom is an illusion and our will dictated by things completely outside of our control, even without invoking the ridiculous notion of souls.

Well, normally one starts with the simple cases. If even these do not work, you know from the beginning that it is no use. When these work, you can go and try to apply one's ideas to more difficult cases, border cases being one of a kind of difficult cases.

Another problem is that borderlines may be vague: in clear cases, it is not difficult to see the difference between orange and red. But if we see a spectrum there is no clear borderline for which light counts as orange, and where it becomes red. Famous in this respect is the 'paradox of the heap'.

I think both consciousness and free will belong to the category of 'vague concepts': it is not all or nothing. Has a worm consciousness? A dog free will?

Same with the free will of a person: the more a person acts from his own reasons, not influenced by the reasons of others, the freer he is.

Now to your example. The opiod-addict has a problem: where he knows what to do, the urge for taking opiods is so strong, that it overrules all other motivations, even those that rationally would be the best motivations. The addict knows he should stop, but he is not able to translate this knowledge in an action (not taking opiods anymore). So he wants to stop, but cannot. So he is not free: he cannot do what he wants.

Another way of seeing this: the functioning of the brain has changed in such a way that it does not function anymore in such a way that it does not work correctly anymore. It is similar to persons with brain damage: when e.g. the capability to anticipate results from possible actions has lessened, the person is less free, in the extreme case the person cannot act freely anymore at all.

I am not sure why you think that opiod-addiction would show that free will is an illusion. That free will (and consciousness) are dependent on the brain is an open door (for naturalists). If the brain is distorted in such a way that a person's will is not influenced by his motivations and world view, then of course such a person is not free anymore. But that does not say anything about a person with a healthy brain: he can act according his motivations and world view. Seems to me the only thing one can conclude is that there is no independent soul controlling the brain. That would mean again, that you have not argued against free will, but against the existence of the soul. Which is also an open door for naturalists.

 

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OK, I had some brain disfunctioning myself when writing that sentence...

2 hours ago, Eise said:

Another way of seeing this: the functioning of the brain has changed in such a way that it does not function anymore in such a way that it does not work correctly anymore.

Should have been something like:

Another way of seeing this: the functioning of the brain has changed in such a way that the person is not able anymore to base actions on his reasons.

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3 hours ago, Eise said:

The addict knows he should stop, but he is not able to translate this knowledge in an action (not taking opiods anymore). So he wants to stop, but cannot. So he is not free: he cannot do what he wants.

Correct. And since you concede that the addict is not free, it seems arbitrary and selective that you do not also agree that the non-addict who is also subject to underlying forces completely outside of their control (chemistry, hydration, microbiome, salinity levels, immune response, temperature, and related environmental variables both external and internal) is equally unfree. 

You seem completely comfortable calling them unfree when coerced by another person. 

You seem completely comfortable calling them unfree when coerced by addictive substances like meth or opioids. 

It’s striking and exceedingly arbitrary to me that you cannot seem to bring yourself to equally find comfort in calling them unfree when coerced by more standard everyday stimuli and factors such as those I’ve been referencing. 

I suggest the line you’re drawing is subjective and unnecessary to the point of rendering your conclusion invalid. 

3 hours ago, Eise said:

that does not say anything about a person with a healthy brain: he can act according his motivations and world view.

For the reasons already stated, this is the root of our disagreement, as even his motivations and worldview within a "healthy brain" are subject to and dictated by the underlying forces described. 

Edited by iNow
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46 minutes ago, iNow said:

For the reasons already stated, this is the root of our disagreement, as even his motivations and worldview within a "healthy brain" are subject to and dictated by the underlying forces described. 

What of those who decide against the underlying forces? 

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7 minutes ago, dimreepr said:

What of those who decide against the underlying forces? 

You've proposed an impossible situation that is untethered to reality and asked me to comment. Shall I offer a response equally impossible and untethered?

This query is equivalent to asking what would happen if an object with mass can travel at or faster than the speed of light. Based on current understandings, it's not possible so it's not worth speculating IMO.

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4 minutes ago, iNow said:

You've proposed an impossible situation that is untethered to reality and asked me to comment. Shall I offer a response equally impossible and untethered?

This query is equivalent to asking what would happen if an object with mass can travel at or faster than the speed of light. Based on current understandings, it's not possible so it's not worth speculating IMO.

I guess it depends on your definition of impossible and reality.

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It really doesn't. No. What I stated is fundamental and factual. You may as well ask me how to approach a system where entropy decreases absent the input of additional energy from an external source. It's nonsensical. There is nothing "you" can do to "decide" how to feel absent the underlying forces and mechanisms I'm discussing.

Edited by iNow
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18 hours ago, iNow said:

You seem completely comfortable calling them unfree when coerced by another person. 

Yep.

18 hours ago, iNow said:

You seem completely comfortable calling them unfree when coerced by addictive substances like meth or opioids. 

The problem with addiction is that it creates an overwhelming motivation, overruling all more reasonable motivations. And the crucial point is that the addict is not able anymore to act according his convictions. At the moment he wants to be clean, but he cannot, he cannot act for reasons he acknowledges as his own.

19 hours ago, iNow said:

And since you concede that the addict is not free, it seems arbitrary and selective that you do not also agree that the non-addict who is also subject to underlying forces completely outside of their control (chemistry, hydration, microbiome, salinity levels, immune response, temperature, and related environmental variables both external and internal) is equally unfree. 

Let's take one example, e.g. dehydration. This is something I can feel. Say, I become more and more tired because of that. So either I notice, and I can, freely, act upon it by choosing to drink. So in this case my dehydration is just sense input, on which I act. Or I do not notice, and therefore do not behave anymore like I normally do. That makes me less free: my brain does not work anymore as it usually does, so its functioning is impaired. In my tiredness I am not as able as I normally am to reflect on my reasons to act. So my basic capability to choose between different options to act is impaired, which make me less free. (The example, btw, means that I am partially in control of my hydration level: I can decide to drink or not.)

If one uses your definition of free will (acting independent of causal factors, which i of course impossible according to you), you cannot e.g. between an accident and an intentional act: both are, on basic level, all simply determined. 

Further, you really seem to have trouble with what 'emergent' means: it means that on higher description level, we get phenomena that simply do not exist at lower level. As an example, take a funny effect that often occurs in traffic jams. Every car on itself drives forward (or stands still). So the movement is always forward. But the interesting thing is that the places where cars stand still, the congestions, move backwards. Look at this funny experiment:

(It is only 39 seconds). Is it an illusion that the congestion moves backwards, because the cars move forwards? Consistently, you should say nothing goes backwards:

19 hours ago, iNow said:

For the reasons already stated, this is the root of our disagreement, as even his motivations and worldview within a "healthy brain" are subject to and dictated by the underlying forces described. 

On higher description level of humans, we have persons, reasons, will, beliefs, knowledge, actions etc. Only on this level we can define what free will means: acting according one's own reasons. This may give us the illusion that we think, decide and act independent of the brain, where in fact the brain does this. But the higher level description of is perfectly valid, which is not with e.g your scale: the scale doesn't flip because of its reasoning.

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9 hours ago, Eise said:

the crucial point is that the addict is not able anymore to act according his convictions

Once more, you seem to think that non-addicts can. As we recognized with reply #1 to one another, we arrive at different conclusions here.

9 hours ago, Eise said:

Let's take one example, e.g. dehydration. This is something I can feel. Say, I become more and more tired because of that. So either I notice, and I can, freely, act upon it by choosing to drink. So in this case my dehydration is just sense input, on which I act. Or I do not notice, and therefore do not behave anymore like I normally do. That makes me less free: my brain does not work anymore as it usually does, so its functioning is impaired. In my tiredness I am not as able as I normally am to reflect on my reasons to act. So my basic capability to choose between different options to act is impaired, which make me less free.

Exactly. Now, just extend this to include the copious other variables and inputs beyond just dehydration, several of which I've cited.

9 hours ago, Eise said:

Further, you really seem to have trouble with what 'emergent' means: it means that on higher description level, we get phenomena that simply do not exist at lower level.

Meaning of words is context dependent. I'm using emergent in context appropriately. I acknowledge that usage is not universal and that you're apparently using a different meaning. This does not allow us to conclude, however, that your meaning is the only correct one and my meaning is in any way wrong or troubled.

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12 hours ago, Eise said:

Yep.

The problem with addiction is that it creates an overwhelming motivation, overruling all more reasonable motivations. And the crucial point is that the addict is not able anymore to act according his convictions. At the moment he wants to be clean, but he cannot, he cannot act for reasons he acknowledges as his own.

Let's take one example, e.g. dehydration. This is something I can feel. Say, I become more and more tired because of that. So either I notice, and I can, freely, act upon it by choosing to drink. So in this case my dehydration is just sense input, on which I act. Or I do not notice, and therefore do not behave anymore like I normally do. That makes me less free: my brain does not work anymore as it usually does, so its functioning is impaired. In my tiredness I am not as able as I normally am to reflect on my reasons to act. So my basic capability to choose between different options to act is impaired, which make me less free. (The example, btw, means that I am partially in control of my hydration level: I can decide to drink or not.)

If one uses your definition of free will (acting independent of causal factors, which i of course impossible according to you), you cannot e.g. between an accident and an intentional act: both are, on basic level, all simply determined. 

Further, you really seem to have trouble with what 'emergent' means: it means that on higher description level, we get phenomena that simply do not exist at lower level. As an example, take a funny effect that often occurs in traffic jams. Every car on itself drives forward (or stands still). So the movement is always forward. But the interesting thing is that the places where cars stand still, the congestions, move backwards. Look at this funny experiment:

(It is only 39 seconds). Is it an illusion that the congestion moves backwards, because the cars move forwards? Consistently, you should say nothing goes backwards:

On higher description level of humans, we have persons, reasons, will, beliefs, knowledge, actions etc. Only on this level we can define what free will means: acting according one's own reasons. This may give us the illusion that we think, decide and act independent of the brain, where in fact the brain does this. But the higher level description of is perfectly valid, which is not with e.g your scale: the scale doesn't flip because of its reasoning.

I have a question regarding the aspect of "own reasons". What in that context, would you consider to be boundary condition. You and iNow have discussed drug addiction, for example, and it seems that there is a distinction between "normal" or pristine and the addicted framework. However, decisions, whatever they are, are contextual an addict may state that they want to be clean, but faced with the immediate (physiological an other) consequences, decides against it. Similarly, you state you are in control of your hydration level, but again the context would affect your decision. E.g. if you need to go out of your way to acquire water, or if it just in front of you. So is the decision not to drink because it is too far away/expensive/whatever your own reason, or is it an externality?

Or in other words:

12 hours ago, Eise said:

So my basic capability to choose between different options to act is impaired, which make me less free

Unless I am misunderstanding something there is presumably a most free state, one, in which decisions are ones own independent of factors that are not recognized ones own. Is that correct?

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On 4/25/2019 at 9:04 PM, iNow said:
On 4/25/2019 at 11:26 AM, Eise said:

the crucial point is that the addict is not able anymore to act according his convictions

Once more, you seem to think that non-addicts can. As we recognized with reply #1 to one another, we arrive at different conclusions here.

Yes. You take the easy target of a mystical definition of free will, namely a non-naturalistic one. So, yes, I think we can, but according a definition of free will that on one side fits to a naturalistic world view, and on the other side as an empirical basis presupposes nothing more than the way we experience free will: that what will happen depends on my choices, and that my choices depend on my own reasons. E.g. in penal justice, the question if somebody is guilty is, amongst others, dependent on the question if the accused did what he did voluntary, i.e. from free will. The question never arises if his soul is an independent entity, but is e.g. dependent on the question if the accused is able to act for reasons, or was forced to act on basis of the reasons of somebody else, i.e. was coerced.

On 4/25/2019 at 9:04 PM, iNow said:

Meaning of words is context dependent. I'm using emergent in context appropriately.

I don't think so. An emergent property of a system is a property that does not exist on the level of the components of the system. Wikipedia:

Quote

In philosophy, systems theory, science, and art, emergence occurs when an entity is observed to have properties its parts do not have on their own. These properties or behaviors emerge only when the parts interact in a wider whole. 

Consciousness and free will are such emergent properties. I think your example of aurora borealis is not a very good one. What e.g. is an emergent property here that does not occur at the level of the molecules involved?

On 4/25/2019 at 9:04 PM, iNow said:

This does not allow us to conclude, however, that your meaning is the only correct one and my meaning is in any way wrong or troubled.

Formally you are right. But I would say you are beating a dead horse, at least for naturalists. And I think that the usability of the concept I give, and its consistence with a naturalistic world view, makes it the better one. Do you seriously think that an accused can defend himself by saying he, in your meaning of the concept, has no free will, so he cannot be punished for something he could not help doing? "My honour, I was forced by my brain" is not a very good defense, don't you think?

 

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