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Eise

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Everything posted by Eise

  1. It shows the distinction between a free and coerced action. I did not look at the video, and I do not understand what you want to say here: that some form of free will still exists? But how are they, or humans, able to 'escape determinism'? And if they don't then they have no free will at all, according your definition of free will.
  2. Nope. Say, you give a robber your money under threat of a pistol. You made a choice, but it was not free. The robber created a situation in which you did something you would never do based on your own motivations. So one can say you act according your will, but not your free will. Your action was coerced. Actions done under free will are not random. Randomness, one could say, is the opposite of free will, it goes in the same direction as 'unconditioned decisions'. And why should this whole thought process not being determined, working like a (very complex) clockwork? My definition of free will has no problem with that. Leidenfrost effect... One of my sons did a science project about it.
  3. So that is like 'unicorn'. the word is in every dictionary (I assume), even the concept exists (there are stories with unicorns in it). But unicorns do not exist! Same with your definition of free will: it might be that such a definition exists, that there are (philosophical) stories woven around it, but that doesn't mean that it reflects some aspect of reality. And so here I am fully with @iNow: If your actions would be 'independent of any previous condition', they would be absurd, having nothing to do with the situation you are in. Here you seem to contradict yourself: I more ore less read: 'sometimes decisions "uncaused by any previous condition" occur, which means they are caused (conditioned) by previous conditions". That makes no sense. So free will is always a "conditioned" free will: conditioned by external circumstances, but also by your own (true) beliefs, values, motivations, reasons, etc. And if you can act according to them, your action is free, so you have free will. Change of personality is not an obstruction of free will. Both Dr Jeckyll and Mr Hyde can be free in their actions. The free will lies in the relation between your personality an your actions. You cannot choose who you are, but you can choose what to do. The decisive criterion is if you recognise your actions really as your actions: they are according your own (true) beliefs, values, motivations, reasons. How these are implemented in your body and causally lead to your actions is not a decisive criterion. Maybe Dr Jeckyll does not recognise Mr Hyde's actions as his, because it really was another person. The point with my definition of free will is that it fits to our experience of free will, has (nearly?) no 'metaphysical ballast', and is not in conflict with determinism (quite the opposite!). It doesn't suffer from the conceptual inconsistency of "uncaused by any previous condition", or 'being able to do otherwise".
  4. Also using Brave at work, no problem. And it suppresses really all ads...
  5. Hi @iNow: you did not give examples of definitions, only contexts. Could you give the definitions of free will fitting to the contexts you mentioned?
  6. Sure, but I think we should define our concepts as close to our experience as possible. The even more simplified definition would be 'to be able to do what you want'. Why should we choose some ideology loaden definition if we in daily life more often than not know if we were coerced to do an action, or do it because of our own motivations? Why should we take definitions like could have done otherwise uncaused by any previous condition be better? Especially because they make philosophically no sense. Do you have a better suggestion for a definition of free will?
  7. According to compatibilists, there is no debate between determinism and free will. More the opposite: without determinism, free will could impossibly exist. Of course they are! But does that mean we have no free will? Right. There is no self, no action, no behaviour, no decision on the level of atoms, molecules or neurons. 'Free will' however can only be defined on the level where relevant phenomena exist: of persons, their wishes and (true) beliefs. The simplest definition: being able to act according your wishes and beliefs. Now how is this definition not compatible with determinism? Can you, @Anirudh Dabas, explain this? Yep, no good at all. So if evolution was able to select for conscious and acting organisms, there must be causal impact of consciousness. Philosophical zombies do not exist. These findings are not relevant if you are a determinist (for all practical purposes, we forget for the moment about quantum physics), then neurology does nothing else than discovering what the mechanisms 'behind the determinism' in our bodies is. Determinism is more or less the default assumption of doing science. PS Do not use 'predetermined', or 'predestined' when you mean determinism. These have only meaning in a theological context. A 'predetermined' event will happen, independent of any other events or our actions. Fatalism does not logically follow from determinism; it does however from predeterminism.
  8. I thought the real savings are in all the systems needed to keep humans alive.
  9. It couldn't. Orbiting earth means that the space shuttle did not escape earth's gravity. Why else would it keep in its orbit? Apollo could travel to the point where the gravitation of the earth and moon exactly cancel. Getting over that point means that it 'falls' to the moon. But the moon itself neither escapes earth's gravity, otherwise it would fly away. Escaping earth's gravity for space vehicles means that gravity fields of other objects (planets, moon, sun, ...) have (much) more impact than the gravity field of the earth.
  10. Just another read: Superdeterminism is unscientific, by Mateus Araújo. And obviously such discussions become so fiercely that people even refuse to discuss it further. See Sabine Hossenfelder's blog, where Mateus Araújo after a while is refused further reactions.
  11. Well, I finished 'Superdeterminism: A Guide for the Perplexed', and it leaves me just as perplexed as I was before. Also 'Rethinking Superdeterminism' by Hossenfelder and Palmer did not help. H seems to state that the influence of the orientation of the polarisers is still local (but how does this fit to her remark that "fundamentally everything in the universe is (subtly) connected with everything else"?). I simply do not get it. Anybody here that can explain H's and P's position?
  12. Well, if this experience can be put into an experiment, or a clear observation that can be shared by others, then we we would have something. Until then not so much. As long as the question is 'potential', we can wait until it becomes s scientific question. One personal, subjective experience is not enough for that. It is considered. The option you mention is one, as exchemist already said. Another one is the idea of eternal inflation, i.e. a continuous inflation, that spawns universes again and again, and our universe is just one of these universes. Also, I wonder why you put this in the 'philosophy' forum. This mostly seems to be speculation about cosmology.
  13. @studiot: sure. But I do not like when people give ChatGPT answers, as if they were their own. Honest would be a 'Let me ChatGPT that for you'.
  14. Well, if you suppose that after every interaction between particles, they are entangled, then yes, of course. But then, the history of those particles is not ended: they will interact with a lot of more particles, so 'diluting the entanglement' after this 'first' interaction beyond recognition. And that makes superdeterminism for me unacceptable. How could then the measurements in entanglement experiments work together in such a perfect way that it suggests that local realism is invalid? Due to all interactions, all parts of the experiment and the experimenters themselves consist of particles that can have wildly different histories, so are, FAPP, random.
  15. OK, I am trying to read (and understand) Superdeterminism: A Guide for the Perplexed, by Sabine Hossenfelder. Until now, I do not find it convincing, but maybe some of you (Genady, Joigus, Markus?) would like to read, comment and discuss it here? Here I have already a problem: Bold by me. Bell's inequalities are based on: locality realism statistical independence Every classical theory should 'obey' Bell's inequality. QM does not, so at least one of the suppositions must be dropped for QM. Superdeterminism would be dropping statistical independence. But at the same time Hossenfelder gives up on locality, and adds 'this is just how nature is'. Sounds like giving up science. I also found this blog, by Scott Aaronson, which argues ferociously against Hossenfelder's position. A lot of reactions on it.
  16. Yes, ChatGPT is not so bad... I think most postings of @amaila3 are just copies from ChatGPT.
  17. Well, literally not refuted, but superfluous: one of the reasons to believe there are multiple universes would drop away. Hmm... But in different universes what is 'appropriate' might differ, no? With that the conversion factors would be different, so I would say your 'just' is not well placed here. This is the only number of dimensions that makes equal the numbers of independent rotations and independent boosts, for example. That is not a cause. But I think TheVat's question is not answerable.
  18. It is not. Nobody knows if e.g. the constants of nature can be different. So without any viable theory from which follows a 'chance distribution' of their values, it is an empty speculation. But it serves as a great escape route for string theory. Obviously, the different ways that the 6 space dimensions we cannot observe must be curled up so small that we do not notice them, counts about 10500 possibilities. Put this together with the idea of eternal inflation, which spawns endlessly bubble-universes, every bubble with its own set of constants (or even laws) of nature, then the possibility of a universe that allows for complex chemistry, and so for life will be close to one. And of course we find we are living in a universe that allows for that: we are here. In this way we do not need an explanation for the perceived 'fine-tuned' universe. However, the multiple universes are supposed to be causally separated from each other. So there is no way this idea can be empirically tested, and the question becomes if an idea may be called scientific, if it principally cannot be tested.
  19. Good one and a great song! "Philosophy is useless, theology is worse"* *Citation does not mean (totally) agreement
  20. Yes, very good point +1 I agree too. I had another picture, instead of proving Euclid's fifth axiom: Plato's cave. But instead of seeing projections of eternal ideas, we have a glimpse on a dynamic reality that lies beneath our observations in space and time. You, @Markus Hanke, amplified this idea when you explained the singlet state in the thread-we-do-not-mention: distance (or space-time interval) between the measurements simply does not appear in the state of an entangled pair. So what we observe is the projection of a 'beneath quantum physics reality' on space-time. My view is more or less Kantian: it might be that we are encountering the 'Ding-an sich' (thing-in-itself), meaning we cannot look further because of our limitation to observing events in space-time. Space and time may not be the fixed categories Kant originally thought, but our observations will still always be in space-time. We may try to tickle as much as we want beyond our limited cognitive capabilities, and maybe we will discover more 'EPR-Bell-Kochen-Specker-Clauser-Zeilinger' (in)equalities. But probably these will just astonish us just more, maybe will exclude the one or the other interpretation of QM, but not a model of reality as it is under the hood. We are touching the limit of empirical science here: it is so to speak the 'micro-equivalent' of the observable universe. But not because of a practical limit, but because of our cognitive limitations.
  21. But that would be plain vanilla determinism. Causal determinism is the default assumption of natural science, and QM seems to be the exception. But generally the assumption holds very well: again and again we find laws of nature that show how events are causally connected to each other. So for me the 'proof' that determinism is a correct assumption, is that we can formulate how events are related, not just that they are related. Showing that (space-like separated) measurements of entangled particles in principle could be explained deterministically is far from formulating how this happens. With other words, to be convincing, it should be showed that e.g very different ways of switching the direction of the polarisators (researcher manually turns them, a mechanism turns them, (based on a pseudo random generator, or based on a quantum randomness generator, or based on the radio noise of two remote quasars), or using 2 pair of polarisators with an optical switch in front of them, etc), all lead to the same correlations between the measurements. I have no problem with the idea that everything is determined. But I have a problem that such different ways of 'choosing' the polarisation orientations always result in the same correlations. What kind of (hidden?) laws of nature can manage that? In this article, the author comes not very far in my opinion: Louis Vervoort, Bell’s Theorem: Two Neglected Solutions: So plain vanilla determinism would do the trick? Simple causal and local determinism? [9] is 't Hooft's book on cellular automaton solution. In bold: what? The author even gives a (very) short outline of Spinoza, to show this point, but Spinoza is talking about plain vanilla determinism. My position is that determinism is OK (with QM as the exception), but pre-determinism is not. Superdeterminism smells very strong like pre-determinism. And yes, I tried to read 't Hooft's book, but as I expected, the technicalities are above my head. However, my impression is that there is not even an 'Ansatz' of a theory that could explain how such differently determined pathways to orient the polarisators all lead to the same result. Showing that (some interpretations of) QM allow for this, is wholly different as hypothesising a mechanism for it, (that could be tested?)
  22. I am not convinced (yet?) that these are viable models. It nearly seems that such models are 'Lost in Math'. It is nearly literally the details. In a Bell like experiment, we have so many small details, that should be perfectly orchestrated if it can mimic non local interactions, again and again, consistently. But of course, it can be that I am 'lost in math', in another sense: I, pity enough, do not understand the math deep enough, so I should keep my mouth shut... Which of course I mostly have to do. As a non specialist, I have to wait till the discussions under the experts reach an empirically supported consensus. But I will keep on reading 't Hooft's book (at least the first part...). But if you, (or @Genady), is able to give a less mathematical taste of how these 'superdeterministic' interpretations can explain how the Big Bang determines the details of Bell like experiments, in such a way that we get consistent results, I would be very glad. E.g., as a comparison, consider deterministic chaos: even if the world would be completely deterministic, we loose all predictability after some time. But at the same time I have to believe that superdeterminism is able to exactly produce the correlations we see in complicated experiments, after billions of years? That is, in my eyes, a heavy burden for the 'super' in 'superdeterminism'. I can imagine that. But, as written above, I cannot imagine how this explains Bell like experiments. Lack of imagination? Yeah, well, Bohm claimed that, and the Bell inequalities show that with local hidden variables one cannot reproduce entanglement. von Neumann obviously had a 'proof' that no hidden variable classical theory (local and non local) can reproduce the results of QM, and Bell was astonished that de Broglie/Bohm came up with a working model. He discovered that the von Neumann proof was wrong, and in the end he came with his inequalities, which still allows for non local hidden variable interpretations of QM.
  23. I will try to look into it, I hope it is not over my head. Of course I started with ChatGPT... I will look into 't Hooft's book, but if I get the essence...I don't know. One question I have already: do these 'cells' live in our normal spacetime, or in some abstract (mathematical) space, or even 'on the edge of the universe' (thinking about black holes and entropy)?
  24. I read a lot, and never saw even an Ansatz for a 'mechanism'. But if you know more, I am glad if you have some (serious) references.
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