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Eise

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Everything posted by Eise

  1. And how would you like to solve this mystery? Scientific investigation (neurology)? But given that determinism is an assumption of being able to do science, how can you expect a none-deterministic explanation? In other words, you shift your 'explanation' of '(a tiny bit of) free will' to a mystery. That is not acceptable, not for science, and not for philosophy. Fully embracing determinism however 'evaporates' the problem. We then only have to carefully investigate what we mean, when we are assuming free will. 'Acting according your preferences' is the meaning that works in relevant contexts, and is not inconsistent with determinism, and so not with naturalism and science.
  2. Are 'choices' and 'decisions' determined? Don't you think there is a neural correlate to decisions and choices? If not, where do they come from? And do not forget that actions often are based on choices and decisions. You do not get away so easy...
  3. And I do not understand why you do not see that this is a contradiction. 'Everything' includes playing dogs and humans sending space probes to Mars. So the playing dogs and we also obey the laws of physics, so how can these 'intervene'? Let's make a formal argument: Your premises: Everything in the universe obeys the laws of physics. Dogs and humans can intervene in the deterministic flow of the universe Conclusion: Dogs and humans do not exist in this universe. So hidden in your position is dualism: there is an aspect of reality, as illustrated with your playing dogs and humans sending a space probe to Mars, that is not subject to the laws of physics. And this is simply a gap in your explanation. Where does this "degree of freedom" come from? It cannot lie in the 'deterministic part' of the universe, because that is excluded by you ("For me they both cannot coexist simultaneously."). It obviously depends on the definition of 'free will' you are using. In your definition, sure, they are incompatible. But as said above, using your definition, and still allowing for some degree of free will, is inconsistent. In my definition determinism is a necessary condition of free will to exist. My claim is that my definition fits to our experience (we can act according our personal preferences) is not derived from the ideological ballast of Christianity about free will (to explain the existence of evil in the world) is useful in the contexts where the question if an action was free or not is relevant doesn't suffer from all kinds of (modal) logical problems ('could have done otherwise') is consistent with a naturalistic world view
  4. Wasn't it you who said we can use different definitions in different contexts? I gave examples of contexts in which the question if we did something from free will or not, is relevant, and with more or less problems, can be answered (there are of course border cases in which question is not easily answered; also unrealistic science fiction scenarios). For the workings of neurons and their connections the question is irrelevant.
  5. Me neither, not under Martillo's definition. But randomness is even contradictory with my definition of free will. It breaks (however lightly) the connection between me and my actions. Well, it doesn't make much sense to define something in a way that is useless in a context where it is used most: in the practice of blaming and praising, of responsibility, ethics, justice, psychotherapy, etc. A neurologist doesn't need the concept at all to study the nervous system. The only fiction is the illusion of libertarian free will, that determinism is not valid for human actions. If previous conditions are not completely determining our actions, then what does? Randomness is no option.
  6. No, I state you don't know what you yourself are posting. Therefore you should answer my question: how can there exist a 'degree of freedom' in a deterministic world? I think it is the same that Studiot wants to know.
  7. And where does this 'degree of freedom' stems from? Randomness? I think you have not thought through what you are writing here.
  8. It shows the distinction between a free and coerced action. I did not look at the video, and I do not understand what you want to say here: that some form of free will still exists? But how are they, or humans, able to 'escape determinism'? And if they don't then they have no free will at all, according your definition of free will.
  9. Nope. Say, you give a robber your money under threat of a pistol. You made a choice, but it was not free. The robber created a situation in which you did something you would never do based on your own motivations. So one can say you act according your will, but not your free will. Your action was coerced. Actions done under free will are not random. Randomness, one could say, is the opposite of free will, it goes in the same direction as 'unconditioned decisions'. And why should this whole thought process not being determined, working like a (very complex) clockwork? My definition of free will has no problem with that. Leidenfrost effect... One of my sons did a science project about it.
  10. So that is like 'unicorn'. the word is in every dictionary (I assume), even the concept exists (there are stories with unicorns in it). But unicorns do not exist! Same with your definition of free will: it might be that such a definition exists, that there are (philosophical) stories woven around it, but that doesn't mean that it reflects some aspect of reality. And so here I am fully with @iNow: If your actions would be 'independent of any previous condition', they would be absurd, having nothing to do with the situation you are in. Here you seem to contradict yourself: I more ore less read: 'sometimes decisions "uncaused by any previous condition" occur, which means they are caused (conditioned) by previous conditions". That makes no sense. So free will is always a "conditioned" free will: conditioned by external circumstances, but also by your own (true) beliefs, values, motivations, reasons, etc. And if you can act according to them, your action is free, so you have free will. Change of personality is not an obstruction of free will. Both Dr Jeckyll and Mr Hyde can be free in their actions. The free will lies in the relation between your personality an your actions. You cannot choose who you are, but you can choose what to do. The decisive criterion is if you recognise your actions really as your actions: they are according your own (true) beliefs, values, motivations, reasons. How these are implemented in your body and causally lead to your actions is not a decisive criterion. Maybe Dr Jeckyll does not recognise Mr Hyde's actions as his, because it really was another person. The point with my definition of free will is that it fits to our experience of free will, has (nearly?) no 'metaphysical ballast', and is not in conflict with determinism (quite the opposite!). It doesn't suffer from the conceptual inconsistency of "uncaused by any previous condition", or 'being able to do otherwise".
  11. Also using Brave at work, no problem. And it suppresses really all ads...
  12. Hi @iNow: you did not give examples of definitions, only contexts. Could you give the definitions of free will fitting to the contexts you mentioned?
  13. Sure, but I think we should define our concepts as close to our experience as possible. The even more simplified definition would be 'to be able to do what you want'. Why should we choose some ideology loaden definition if we in daily life more often than not know if we were coerced to do an action, or do it because of our own motivations? Why should we take definitions like could have done otherwise uncaused by any previous condition be better? Especially because they make philosophically no sense. Do you have a better suggestion for a definition of free will?
  14. According to compatibilists, there is no debate between determinism and free will. More the opposite: without determinism, free will could impossibly exist. Of course they are! But does that mean we have no free will? Right. There is no self, no action, no behaviour, no decision on the level of atoms, molecules or neurons. 'Free will' however can only be defined on the level where relevant phenomena exist: of persons, their wishes and (true) beliefs. The simplest definition: being able to act according your wishes and beliefs. Now how is this definition not compatible with determinism? Can you, @Anirudh Dabas, explain this? Yep, no good at all. So if evolution was able to select for conscious and acting organisms, there must be causal impact of consciousness. Philosophical zombies do not exist. These findings are not relevant if you are a determinist (for all practical purposes, we forget for the moment about quantum physics), then neurology does nothing else than discovering what the mechanisms 'behind the determinism' in our bodies is. Determinism is more or less the default assumption of doing science. PS Do not use 'predetermined', or 'predestined' when you mean determinism. These have only meaning in a theological context. A 'predetermined' event will happen, independent of any other events or our actions. Fatalism does not logically follow from determinism; it does however from predeterminism.
  15. I thought the real savings are in all the systems needed to keep humans alive.
  16. It couldn't. Orbiting earth means that the space shuttle did not escape earth's gravity. Why else would it keep in its orbit? Apollo could travel to the point where the gravitation of the earth and moon exactly cancel. Getting over that point means that it 'falls' to the moon. But the moon itself neither escapes earth's gravity, otherwise it would fly away. Escaping earth's gravity for space vehicles means that gravity fields of other objects (planets, moon, sun, ...) have (much) more impact than the gravity field of the earth.
  17. Just another read: Superdeterminism is unscientific, by Mateus Araújo. And obviously such discussions become so fiercely that people even refuse to discuss it further. See Sabine Hossenfelder's blog, where Mateus Araújo after a while is refused further reactions.
  18. Well, I finished 'Superdeterminism: A Guide for the Perplexed', and it leaves me just as perplexed as I was before. Also 'Rethinking Superdeterminism' by Hossenfelder and Palmer did not help. H seems to state that the influence of the orientation of the polarisers is still local (but how does this fit to her remark that "fundamentally everything in the universe is (subtly) connected with everything else"?). I simply do not get it. Anybody here that can explain H's and P's position?
  19. Well, if this experience can be put into an experiment, or a clear observation that can be shared by others, then we we would have something. Until then not so much. As long as the question is 'potential', we can wait until it becomes s scientific question. One personal, subjective experience is not enough for that. It is considered. The option you mention is one, as exchemist already said. Another one is the idea of eternal inflation, i.e. a continuous inflation, that spawns universes again and again, and our universe is just one of these universes. Also, I wonder why you put this in the 'philosophy' forum. This mostly seems to be speculation about cosmology.
  20. @studiot: sure. But I do not like when people give ChatGPT answers, as if they were their own. Honest would be a 'Let me ChatGPT that for you'.
  21. Well, if you suppose that after every interaction between particles, they are entangled, then yes, of course. But then, the history of those particles is not ended: they will interact with a lot of more particles, so 'diluting the entanglement' after this 'first' interaction beyond recognition. And that makes superdeterminism for me unacceptable. How could then the measurements in entanglement experiments work together in such a perfect way that it suggests that local realism is invalid? Due to all interactions, all parts of the experiment and the experimenters themselves consist of particles that can have wildly different histories, so are, FAPP, random.
  22. OK, I am trying to read (and understand) Superdeterminism: A Guide for the Perplexed, by Sabine Hossenfelder. Until now, I do not find it convincing, but maybe some of you (Genady, Joigus, Markus?) would like to read, comment and discuss it here? Here I have already a problem: Bold by me. Bell's inequalities are based on: locality realism statistical independence Every classical theory should 'obey' Bell's inequality. QM does not, so at least one of the suppositions must be dropped for QM. Superdeterminism would be dropping statistical independence. But at the same time Hossenfelder gives up on locality, and adds 'this is just how nature is'. Sounds like giving up science. I also found this blog, by Scott Aaronson, which argues ferociously against Hossenfelder's position. A lot of reactions on it.
  23. Yes, ChatGPT is not so bad... I think most postings of @amaila3 are just copies from ChatGPT.
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