One solution is that a situation is not a “thing” to which the conditions apply. Physical objects as opposed to concepts.

The issue with concepts, as npts2020 alludes, is that we can imagine impossible things. Another issue is these concepts being too vaguely defined, leaving way too much wiggle room.

Re: "Nothing":

Let "S" be a statement.

If S is true for zero seconds, S is never true.

If S is never true, S is true for zero seconds.¹

***

Let us consider the following statement:

S1. All things are absent.

***

If S1 is true for zero seconds, S1 is never true.^2,3 S1 is true for zero seconds.^4,5 Therefore, S1 is never true.^6,7

We conclude the following: It is never the case that "all things are absent."⁸

***

Notes:

1. A necessary condition for a statement to be true is the following: The statement must be true for a duration greater than zero seconds.

2. Suppose S1 is true. Then it is true for a duration greater than zero.

3. Suppose S1 is true for a positive duration. Then S1 is true.

4. S1 cannot be true for a duration greater than zero seconds.

5. If S1 is true for a positive duration, time flow occurs. If time flow occurs, time exists. If time exists, the statement "all things are absent" is false. If the statement "all things are absent" is false, S1 is false. Therefore, if S1 is true for a positive duration, S1 is false! [Contradiction!])

6. The premise "S1 is true" leads to a contradiction. (It leads to the conclusion that "S1 is false.")

7. If S1 is true, S1 is true for a positive duration. If S1 is true for a positive duration, S1 is false. Therefore, if S1 is true, S1 is false! (Contradiction!)

8. It is not possible for S1 to be true.

***

Re: "Nothing":

Let "S" be a statement.

If S is false for zero seconds, S is never false.

If S is never false, S is false for zero seconds.¹

***

Let us consider the following statement:

S2. A thing exists.

***

If S2 is false for zero seconds, S2 is never false.^2,3 S2 is false for zero seconds.^4,5 Therefore, S2 is never false.^6,7

We conclude the following: It is never the case that "no thing exists."⁸

***

Notes:

1. A necessary condition for a statement to be false is the following: The statement must be false for a duration greater than zero seconds.

2. Suppose S2 is false. Then it is false for a duration greater than zero.

3. Suppose S2 is false for a positive duration. Then S2 is false.

4. S2 cannot be false for a duration greater than zero seconds.

5. If S2 is false for a positive duration, time flow occurs. If time flow occurs, time exists. If time exists, the statement "a thing exists" is true. If the statement "a thing exists" is true, S2 is true. Therefore, if S2 is false for a positive duration, S2 is true! [Contradiction!])

6. The premise "S2 is false" leads to a contradiction. (It leads to the conclusion that "S2 is true.")

7. If S2 is false, S2 is false for a positive duration. If S2 is false for a positive duration, S2 is true. Therefore, if S2 is false, S2 is true! (Contradiction!)

8. It is not possible for S2 to be false.

***

Let us consider the following statements:

A. Time flow does not occur.

B. A is true.

C. A is true for a positive duration.

D. Time flow occurs.

E. Statement A can never be true.

***

I claim that statement E is true.

***

Proof:

If A is true, B is true.¹ If B is true, C is true^.2 If C is true, D is true.³ If D is true, A is false.⁴ Therefore, if A is true, A is false! (Contradiction!)⁵

Clearly, A can never be true.⁶

Since A can never be true, it follows that E is true.

***

Notes:

1. Suppose time flow does not occur. Then the statement "time flow does not occur" is true.

2. If A is true, it is true for a positive duration.

3. If A is true for a positive duration, time flow occurs.

4. Suppose time flow occurs. Then the statement "time flow does not occur" is false.

5. The premise "A is true" leads to a contradiction. (It leads to the conclusion that "A is false.")

6. It is not possible for A to be true.

***

Three statements:

A. Time flow does not occur.¹

B. Time flow occurs.²

C. Consciousness exists.

***

If statement B is true, C is true.³ B is true. Therefore, C is true.

***

If statement B is always true, C is always true. B is always true.^4,5,6,7 Therefore, C is always true.^8,9

***

Notes:

1. The premise "A is true" leads to a contradiction. (It leads to the conclusion that "A is false.")

2. The premise "B is true" does not lead to a contradiction. (It does not lead to the conclusion that "B is false.")

3. The phenomenon we call "time flow" is consciousness-dependent. (I discuss the relationship between time flow and consciousness in my paper "Temporal Passage.")

4. The premise "B is false" leads to a contradiction. (It leads to the conclusion that "B is true.")

5. If B is false, B is false for a positive duration. If B is false for a positive duration, time flow occurs. If time flow occurs, B is true. Therefore, if B is false, B is true! (Contradiction!)

6. It is not possible for statement B to be false.

7. Time flow must occur.

8. Consciousness always exists.

9. It can never be the case that "consciousness does not exist."

***

Five messages:

I

Let us suppose the following:

- A is a statement that is true.

- B is a statement that is never true.

- D(A) is the duration over which A is true.

- D(B) is the duration over which B is true.

***

D(A) cannot equal D(B).^1,2

D(A) must be greater than D(B).³

***

Notes:

1. The "duration over which B is true" is zero seconds.

2. The "duration over which A is true" cannot be zero seconds.

3. D(A) must be greater than zero seconds.

***

II

Let us suppose the following:

- A is a statement that is false.

- B is a statement that is never false.

- D(A) is the duration over which A is false.

- D(B) is the duration over which B is false.

***

D(A) cannot equal D(B).^1,2

D(A) must be greater than D(B).³

***

Notes:

1. The "duration over which B is false" is zero seconds.

2. The "duration over which A is false" cannot be zero seconds.

3. D(A) must be greater than zero seconds.

***

III

Let us suppose the following:

- A is a statement that is true.

- B is a statement that is never true.

- D(A) is the duration over which A is true.

- D(B) is the duration over which B is true.

***

What distinguishes A from B?

D(A) is longer than D(B).

***

IV

Let us suppose the following:

- A is a statement that is false.

- B is a statement that is never false.

- D(A) is the duration over which A is false.

- D(B) is the duration over which B is false.

***

What distinguishes A from B?

D(A) is longer than D(B).

***

V

Let "S" be a statement.

If S has been true for zero seconds, S has never been true.

If S has never been true, S has been true for zero seconds.

If S has been false for zero seconds, S has never been false.

If S has never been false, S has been false for zero seconds.

Adhanom Andemicael

Whaaaaaat ????

Philosophical assertions, that are solely based in one's head and not on observational evidence, typically only make sense to the person asserting such absurdities ...

On 9/23/2026 at 9:37 PM, MigL said:

Whaaaaaat ????

Philosophical assertions, that are solely based in one's head and not on observational evidence, typically only make sense to the person asserting such absurdities ...

I'm not sure what you mean.

***

Minds make observations... But what do observations represent?

We can disagree about what observations represent.

***

Below, I present a perspective on observations and the nature of reality.

***

Re: "Being true" and "remaining true":

A statement cannot have a first moment at which it is true, since it has been true for only zero seconds at that initial moment.^1,2 However, a statement can be said to be true at all subsequent moments after the initial one. (I refer to this initial moment as t-0.) At these subsequent moments, the statement has been true for a duration greater than zero seconds. Every moment at which the statement is true is preceded by an infinite number of other moments at which the statement is true; and these moments get closer and closer to t-0.

As indicated above, however, t-0 cannot be considered a moment at which the statement is true (the statement is not true at the time t-0). Let us choose any moment after t-0 and call that moment "now." The statement "remains true" over an infinite number of moments between t-0 and "now." It is true "now" as a result of this process of "remaining true"--as a result of having "remained true" until "now." "Being true" "now" is therefore preceded by an earlier process of "remaining true."

I wish to stress that our treatment of "being true" as a notion distinct from "remaining true" is based on an erroneous assumption. The assumption is that "being true" is in some sense more fundamental than "remaining true." In this view, a statement that currently "remains true" must have "been true" earlier; but a statement that currently "is true" need not have "remained true" earlier. A statement may "be true" now without having "remained true" prior to now. In effect, in this view, the initial moment, t-0, is treated as a moment at which the statement "is true": It is assumed that the statement can "be true" at t-0 as well as at all subsequent moments. As explained above, however, the statement cannot "be true" at the initial moment, t-0.

The traditional view maintains that "being true" is more fundamental than "remaining true." We now know, however, that every "now" (after t-0) is preceded by a process of "remaining true." One could just as easily argue, therefore, that it is "remaining true" which is more fundamental than "being true."

Clearly, "being true" is not possible without a process of "remaining true": A statement cannot "be true" if it does not "remain true." "Remaining true" is therefore essential for "being true"--and it is just as fundamental as "being true." In addition, "being true" "now" implies both prior "being true" and prior "remaining true." There is only one explanation that accounts for these facts in a self-consistent manner. "Being true" must be a process--the process of "remaining true."

***

In the analysis above, I make reference to the moment "now." "Now" refers to any one of the infinite number of "nows"/"moments" that come after t-0. The reader should note that there are an infinite number of points ("nows") in the continuum between t-0 and any given "now." This infinite series of points/"nows" is a duration greater than zero.

Let us choose a particular "now" out of the infinite series of "nows" and call it "N." The statement described above "remains true" over the infinite series of "nows" between t-0 and N. "Being true" at N is therefore preceded by a process of "remaining true." The statement can be defined as "being true" at the "now" N (i.e., at the "moment" N)--but only if the statement has "remained true" for the duration between t-0 and N. (I reiterate here that "N" represents any one of the infinite number of "nows"/"moments" that are subsequent to t-0).


Notes:

1. A statement that has "been true" for zero seconds has never "been true."
2. For clarification, please see Part I of my paper "Temporal Passage." (I've attached that paper below.)






***








Re: "Being false" and "remaining false":



A statement cannot have a first moment at which it is false, since it has been false for only zero seconds at that initial moment.¹ However, a statement can be said to be false at all subsequent moments after the initial one. (I refer to this initial moment as t-0.) At these subsequent moments, the statement has been false for a duration greater than zero seconds. Every moment at which the statement is false is preceded by an infinite number of other moments at which the statement is false; and these moments get closer and closer to t-0.

As indicated above, however, t-0 cannot be considered a moment at which the statement is false (the statement is not false at the time t-0). Let us choose any moment after t-0 and call that moment "now." The statement "remains false" over an infinite number of moments between t-0 and "now." It is false "now" as a result of this process of "remaining false"--as a result of having "remained false" until "now." "Being false" "now" is therefore preceded by an earlier process of "remaining false."

I wish to stress that our treatment of "being false" as a notion distinct from "remaining false" is based on an erroneous assumption. The assumption is that "being false" is in some sense more fundamental than "remaining false." In this view, a statement that currently "remains false" must have "been false" earlier; but a statement that currently "is false" need not have "remained false" earlier. A statement may "be false" "now" without having "remained false" prior to now. In effect, in this view, the initial moment, t-0, is treated as a moment at which the statement "is false": It is assumed that the statement can "be false" at t-0 as well as at all subsequent moments. As explained above, however, the statement cannot "be false" at the initial moment, t-0.

The traditional view maintains that "being false" is more fundamental than "remaining false." We now know, however, that every "now" (after t-0) is preceded by a process of "remaining false." One could just as easily argue, therefore, that it is "remaining false" which is more fundamental than "being false."

Clearly, "being false" is not possible without a process of "remaining false": A statement cannot "be false" if it does not "remain false." "Remaining false" is therefore essential for "being false"--and it is just as fundamental as "being false." In addition, "being false" "now" implies both prior "being false" and prior "remaining false." There is only one explanation that accounts for these facts in a self-consistent manner. "Being false" must be a process--the process of "remaining false."

***

In the analysis above, I make reference to the moment "now." "Now" refers to any one of the infinite number of "nows"/"moments" that come after t-0. The reader should note that there are an infinite number of points ("nows") in the continuum between t-0 and any given "now." This infinite series of points/"nows" is a duration greater than zero.

Let us choose a particular "now" out of the infinite series of "nows" and call it "N." The statement described above "remains false" over the infinite series of "nows" between t-0 and N. "Being false" at N is therefore preceded by a process of "remaining false." The statement can be defined as "being false" at the "now" N (i.e., at the "moment" N)--but only if the statement has "remained false" for the duration between t-0 and N. (I reiterate here that "N" represents any one of the infinite number of "nows"/"moments" that are subsequent to t-0).


Notes:

1. A statement that has "been false" for zero seconds has never "been false."












***












A necessary condition for a statement to be true is the following: The statement must be true for a duration greater than zero seconds.

A necessary condition for a statement to be false is the following: The statement must be false for a duration greater than zero seconds.

***

Please note the following:

- The Platonic realm is a temporal realm.
- "Platonic time" flows.
- "Platonic time" exists outside of spacetime.


***





I


Let "S1" be the statement "2+2=4."

***

A necessary condition for statement S1 to be true is the following: S1 must be true for a duration greater than zero seconds.


***

Three statements:

A1. 2+2=4.
B1. Spacetime exists.
C1. Consciousness exists.

***

The statement "2+2=4" is true even if spacetime and consciousness do not exist. (A1 is true even if B1 and C1 are not true.)¹

***

Suppose neither consciousness nor the Platonic realm exists. Then the statement "2+2=4" cannot be true.^2,3

***

II


Let "S2" be the statement "2+2=5."

***

A necessary condition for statement S2 to be false is the following: S2 must be false for a duration greater than zero seconds.

***

Three statements:

A2. 2+2=5.
B2. Spacetime exists.
C2. Consciousness exists.

***

The statement "2+2=5" is false even if spacetime and consciousness do not exist. (A2 is false even if B2 and C2 are not true.)⁴


***

Suppose neither consciousness nor the Platonic realm exists. Then the statement "2+2=5" cannot be false.^5,6,7,8

***



Notes:

1. In the Platonic realm, S1 is true for a positive duration.

2. If consciousness and the Platonic realm do not exist, time flow does not occur. If time flow does not occur, S1 cannot be true for a positive duration.
If S1 cannot be true for a positive duration, S1 cannot be true. Therefore, if consciousness and the Platonic realm do not exist, S1 cannot be true.

3. S1 must be true. Since this statement must be true, we conclude the following: Consciousness and the Platonic realm cannot both be absent.

4. In the Platonic realm, S2 is false for a positive duration.

5. If consciousness and the Platonic realm do not exist, time flow does not occur. If time flow does not occur, S2 cannot be false for a positive duration.
If S2 cannot be false for a positive duration, S2 cannot be false. Therefore, if consciousness and the Platonic realm do not exist, S2 cannot be false.

6. S2 must be false. Since this statement must be false, we conclude the following: Consciousness and the Platonic realm cannot both be absent.

7. Consciousness always exists.

8. The Platonic realm might not exist.









***








Two messages:







I


Let us consider the following four propositions:

P1. If a statement is true now, it must have been true before now.
P2. If a statement is true now, it must continue to be true after now.
P3. If a statement is false now, it must have been false before now.
P4. If a statement is false now, it must continue to be false after now.

***

My paper "Temporal Passage" suggests that these four propositions are true.

***





II


Let us consider the following two statements:

S1. If the mind exists now, it must have existed before now.
S2. If the mind exists now, it must continue to exist after now.

***

My paper "Temporal Passage" demonstrates that these two statements are true. (See below.)


***

Abstract

This article explains that time flow is a subjective, mind-dependent phenomenon. The paper describes the nature of the subjective "present" of consciousness, and defines the mechanism that brings about this present's motion from past to future.

The first section of the article demonstrates that existence is a dynamic process and shows that time arises from this process. The second section presents a geometric analysis of the present's motion. The third section contrasts space with time. In the last section, consciousness and time are discussed within the context of Einstein's theory of relativity.

Temporal Passage

Does time pass? Philosophers such as Smart and Mellor assert that the flow of time is an illusion.¹ These scholars argue that nothing can move through time. They claim that dates simply coexist, statically, like points in a space. However, other thinkers, including Prigogine and Davies, are unwilling to dismiss the flow of time as an illusion.² They feel that our impression of temporal passage must correspond to a real flow.

Any model of temporal passage must provide a mechanism to allow the present to move from past to future. Although various theorists have tried to explain the phenomenon of time flow, their models provide no such mechanism.³

In this paper, I put forward a new theory of time. I describe the nature of the present and define the mechanism that brings about its motion.

The first section of the paper demonstrates that existence is a dynamic process and shows that time arises from this process. The second section presents a geometric analysis of the present's motion. The third section contrasts space with time. In the last section, consciousness and time are discussed within the context of Einstein's theory of relativity.

I

I must begin, however, with an analysis of existence. A material entity can certainly exist. However, in order to exist, it has to endure for a length of time greater than zero. In the big bang description of the origin of time, time exists at all moments after the Big Bang but not at the Big Bang itself.⁴ (I refer to this moment of the Big Bang as T-0.) Consequently, there is no first moment of time in this description: Every moment of time is preceded by an infinite number of other moments that are still closer to T-0.

Similarly, a material entity cannot have a first moment of existence, since it has a total lifetime of only zero seconds at that initial moment. (A total lifetime of zero seconds means no lifetime at all, and implies non-existence.) However, the entity can be said to exist at all subsequent moments after the initial one. (I refer to this initial moment as t-0.) At these subsequent moments the entity has a lifetime greater than zero seconds. As in the big bang description, every moment of existence is preceded by an infinite number of other moments of existence; and these moments get closer and closer to t-0.

As indicated above, however, t-0 cannot be considered a moment of existence (the entity does not exist at the time t-0). Let us choose any moment after t-0 and call that moment "now." The entity persists over an infinite number of moments between t-0 and "now." It exists "now" as a result of this persistence--as a result of having endured until "now." Existence "now" is therefore preceded by an earlier process of persistence.

I wish to stress that our treatment of "existence" as a notion distinct from "persistence" is based on an erroneous assumption. The assumption is that existence is in some sense more fundamental than persistence. In this view, an entity that currently persists must have existed earlier; but an entity that currently exists need not have persisted earlier. An entity may exist "now" without having persisted prior to "now." In effect, in this view, the initial moment, t-0, is treated as a moment of existence: Existence is assumed possible at t-0 as well as at all subsequent moments. As explained above, however, existence cannot be defined at the initial moment, t-0.

The traditional view maintains that existence is more fundamental than persistence. We now know, however, that every "now" (after t-0) is preceded by a process of persistence. One could just as easily argue, therefore, that it is persistence which is more fundamental than existence.

Clearly, existence is not possible without persistence: An entity cannot exist if it does not endure. Persistence is therefore essential for existence--and it is just as fundamental as existence. In addition, existence "now" implies both prior existence and prior persistence. There is only one explanation that accounts for these facts in a self-consistent manner. Existence must be a process--the process of persisting.

In the analysis above, I make reference to the moment "now." "Now" refers to any one of the infinite number of "nows"/"moments" that come after t-0. The reader should note that there are an infinite number of points ("nows") in the continuum between t-0 and any given "now." This infinite series of points/"nows" is a duration greater than zero.

Let us choose a particular "now" out of the infinite series of "nows" and call it "N." The entity described above persists over the infinite series of "nows" between t-0 and N. Existence at "N" is therefore preceded by a process of persistence. The entity can be defined as "existing" at the "now" N (i.e., at the "moment" N)--but only if the entity has persisted for the duration between t-0 and N. (I reiterate here that "N" represents any one of the infinite number of "nows"/"moments" that are subsequent to t-0).

Persistence is a type of motion. The persisting entity described above can be pictured as moving rightward across a horizontal line. As the entity moves, it arrives at successive points (i.e., "nows") on the line. The entity is defined as existing at each point (i.e., "now") on the timeline. However, the entity's existence along the line cannot be described as a series of separate "snapshots."

Let us consider a given point on the timeline (Point-B) that is situated to the right of the initial point (Point-A). Let us suppose that the entity starts at A and moves across the timeline. Eventually the entity arrives at Point-B. When it is at B, the entity has a temporal extension. However, at the initial point, the entity has no temporal extension. When at B, the entity has a history. It has been in existence for a length of time greater than zero seconds.

A snapshot existence at Point-B would be, by definition, an existence that is completely self-contained at Point-B--an existence defined at B without reference to an earlier process of persistence. However, as I have explained, the entity's existence at B is defined because the entity has a history when it is at B. The entity's existence at B is defined because the entity has been in existence for a length of time greater than zero when it is at B.

We can assert that the entity exists at B. However, its existence there is not a self-contained "snapshot." In fact, there is no point on the timeline at which the entity exists as a "snapshot." There are no "self-contained existences" anywhere on the timeline.

If the entity described above were to exist but not persist, it would exist for a total duration of one moment. One moment, however, is by definition only zero seconds long. And zero seconds is no length of time at all. We must realize that if we say the entity exists for no length of time, we are stating that it never exists. All things that exist necessarily exist for some length of time--however short this length may be.

Let me define duration as the "length of time for which an entity exists." Let us suppose that the entity I describe above is a brick. And let us suppose that this brick endures for a period of ten seconds. Certainly, this ten-second period is a duration. The brick itself, however, is obviously not a duration. If it were a duration, the brick would have been definable as a "length of time for which an entity exists." Although the brick is not a length of time, it endures for a length of time (i.e., for a duration). Since the brick is not a length of time, it is temporally non-dimensional.

The "present moment" is the presence of consciousness (i.e., the presence of mind). It is a subjective phenomenon. The reader must understand that the present (i.e., the mind) is an "entity" in the same sense that the brick described above is an "entity." Like all entities, the present (i.e., the mind) persists/endures. The persisting present can be visualized as a point in rightward motion along a horizontal timeline. As the present moves along the line, it arrives at successive points/"nows" on the line.

The reader must realize that the "present" and the "now" are two entirely different things. The present is an "entity." The "now," however, is not an "entity": The "now" is a "location." It is the location that the present occupies when the present persists. (As the present moves--as the present persists--it arrives at and occupies successive "nows" on the timeline.) This movement of the present along the timeline visually depicts the persistence of consciousness. The "present" and the "nows" that make up the timeline are therefore aspects of subjective, mental time. (There is a second type of time: Einstein's objective, physical time. I discuss this second type of time in sections III and IV of this paper.)

Let us say the present persists (i.e., endures) for a period of ten seconds. This ten-second period is, of course, a length of time. The present moment itself, however, is not a length of time. The present persists for a duration. The present itself, however, is not a duration.

I see no conceptual difficulty in defining the present moment as temporally non-dimensional. (The present moment is an "entity" in the same sense that the brick is an "entity." The brick is not a "length of time," and is temporally non-dimensional. The present is likewise non-dimensional.) However--and this is a crucial point--in order to exist, this one present moment has to maintain its existence for a length of time (i.e., for a length greater than zero seconds).

It is now clear why time passes. If the present exists, the present has to endure. If the present endures, time has to pass. Therefore, if the present exists, time has to pass.

Time passes, therefore, for the simple reason that the present exists.⁵

II

In the previous section, I discussed the nature of existence and described the mechanism of persistence, which enables the present to move. In this section I present an analysis of the present's motion.

In figure 1, Point-P (i.e., the present) moves rightward along a timeline. This rightward motion visually depicts P's persistence.⁶ As it moves along the line, P is located at each point on the line for a duration of exactly zero. However, P may come to a halt at a point on the timeline (say at Point-C). If P comes to a halt at C, P is located at C for a duration greater than zero.

Let us consider any given point to the left of C. P does not only reach that point, P also goes beyond that point. P is therefore in a "state of motion" at all points on the line to the left of C. Since P is in a state of motion at these points, P is in a state of persistence at these points. Since P is persisting when it passes these points, P's existence is defined at these points.

In the description above, P behaves in an anomalous way when it reaches C: P reaches C but does not go beyond C. P is not in a "state of motion" at C: P is "at rest" at C. As already remarked, P's persistence is represented visually as rightward motion. Since existence is persistence, P's existence is also represented as rightward motion. If P were in a "state of motion" at C, P's existence would be defined at C. However, P is not in a "state of motion" at C; P is "at rest" at C. P's existence, therefore, cannot be defined at C: P does not exist at C.

_________________

A B C

Fig. 1. As P moves along the timeline, P is located at each point on the line for exactly one moment (i.e., for a duration of exactly zero). If P comes to a halt at C, P cannot be said to be in existence at C.

As regards the movement of the present moment, there are four possible scenarios (see figure 2). If P begins at A and moves across the timeline, it could:

1. come to a halt at some point (any point) before C (we will call this point "B");
2. come to a halt at C;
3. come to a halt at some point (any point) after C (we will call this point "D"); or
4. continue moving across indefinitely, never coming to a halt.

In scenarios 1 and 2, P does not exist at C. In scenarios 3 and 4, P does exist at C. P exists after C in scenarios 3 and 4. Existence at C, therefore, implies existence after C.

We conclude the following:

If the present moment exists "now" (at C), it must continue to exist after "now" (after C). P may continue existing for a finite length of time (CD) or an infinite length of time (C-Infinity).

Scenario 1: ________________

A B C

Scenario 2: ________________

A B C

Scenario 3: _______________________

A B C D

Scenario 4: _______________________________________ Infinity

A B C D

Fig. 2. Four possible scenarios for P's motion across the timeline.

In figure 3, Point-P cannot exist at the initial point, A. Point-P has a total lifetime of zero seconds at A. (A total lifetime of zero seconds means no lifetime at all and implies non-existence.) However, P can exist at all points on the line to the right of A: P has a total lifetime greater than zero seconds at these points.

Let us say that P exists at a point on the line. This point cannot be the first point on the line, since existence is not possible at the first point. Point-P must be located at a point to the right of A. Let us refer to P's location as Point-B. There is a continuum of points to the left of B extending back to A. P must have been located at these points before arriving at B. P must have existed at these points before existing at B. Existence at B therefore implies existence before B.

We conclude the following:

If the present moment exists "now" (at B), it must have existed before "now" (before B). P must have existed over the interval AB.

________________

A B C

Fig. 3. P cannot exist at the initial point, A. If P exists "now" (at B), P must have existed before "now" (before B).

To sum up:

1. If the present moment exists now, it must have existed before now.
2. If the present moment exists now, it must continue to exist after now.⁷

III

In the previous section, I described the motion of the present in considerable detail. I now turn to a discussion of space and explain how space differs from time.

Spatial distances are made up of points that exist concurrently. Duration, in contrast, is made up of points that exist non-concurrently. Clearly, "duration" is an entirely different notion from "space." Duration is not an "entity" like space. Duration arises when the present persists--when the present endures; and it allows us to speak of earlier and later "nows."⁸ Spatial distances, in contrast, do not emerge from a persisting present and do not accommodate the notion of "earlier and later."

In section I, I defined duration as the "length of time for which an entity exists." However, duration can also be defined as a "period of elapsed or elapsing time."

If we were to characterize the distance between two points, A and B, as a "duration of one year," we would be claiming the following: "The time that elapses when an individual relocates from A to B is precisely one year. One cannot relocate from A to B in an elapsed period that is less than one year. One cannot relocate from A to B in an elapsed period that is greater than one year."

Let us consider two points in the fourth physical dimension--the point "January 1, 2010 AD" (Point-X) and the point "January 1, 2011 AD" (Point-Y). It is, of course, possible for an individual to relocate from X to Y in exactly one year of elapsed time. But this period can be reduced. An observer may accelerate to a velocity much higher than that of the earth, and eventually decelerate. This physical scenario, as we know from Einstein's relativity, permits relocation from 2010 to 2011 in an elapsed period that is less than one year.

The time from the beginning to the end of a duration does not vary.⁹ This is true by definition. However, in the example above, the time between X and Y varies. Clearly, X and Y cannot be endpoints of a duration. (If X and Y were endpoints of a duration, the time between them would not vary.¹⁰) We are forced to the following conclusion: The separation between January 1, 2010 and January 1, 2011 is not a duration--it is not an "elapsing period of time."

The distance between these dates is actually a type of space. If we wish to understand the relationship between these dates, we need to understand the nature of the spatial separation between them. A spatial distance is like a duration in that it is a continuum of points. However, a spatial distance differs from a duration in that a spatial distance is made up of a concurrently existing group of points. There are no non-concurrent points in a space. Non-concurrent points together do not define a space: They define a duration.

Let us consider two points, X and Y. If X and Y are concurrent, they must exist as points in a static space. One can take many paths through this space to get from X to Y. Since the lengths of these various paths can vary, the time it takes to get from X to Y can also vary. (It varies depending on the length of the path taken.) If X and Y are not concurrent, however, they cannot exist as part of a space. If they do not exist as part of a space, there can be no spatial separation between them. Clearly, in the absence of a spatial separation, the only possible "distance" that can be defined between X and Y is duration.

The distance between dates such as January 1, 2010 and January 1, 2011 is the "time" that is described by Einstein's theory of relativity. However, this distance, as I indicate above, is not a duration, but is, instead, a type of space. Being spatial in nature, Einstein's "time" can never flow. We should never confuse this type of spatial "time" with duration, which does flow.

IV

In the previous section, I contrasted static (spatial) "time" and dynamic (temporal) time. In this section, I briefly discuss the relationship between these two types of time.

Dynamic time is the subjective time of the mind. This is the time that I represent as rightward motion along a horizontal timeline. Subjective time (i.e., the timeline) is a single, independent dimension.

Static time is the objective time of Einstein's relativity. This time does not exist as an independent dimension. Static time is simply the fourth dimension of a unified 4-dimensional structure known as "spacetime."

An individual mind, as we know, perceives a succession of concrete, 3-dimensional slices out of this abstract 4-dimensional structure. Let us consider two individuals: Ann and Betty. Ann and Betty observe a succession of 3-dimensional slices of spacetime. Ann perceives a given 3-dimensional slice at the moment "now." I call this moment "A1." Ann perceives another 3-dimensional spacetime slice a little while later at the "now" A2. A2 and A1 are not the same "now." The now A2 occurs after the now A1 during the course of Ann's subjective time flow.

Betty perceives a 3-dimensional slice at a moment "now." I call this moment "B1." Betty perceives another 3-dimensional spacetime slice a little while later at a "now" B2. B2 and B1 are not the same "now." The now B2 occurs after the now B1 during the course of Betty's subjective time flow.

As we know, according to the theory of relativity, simultaneity is relative. Spacetime points that are simultaneous in one reference frame are, in general, not simultaneous in other reference frames.¹¹

In the example above, the points A1, A2, B1, and B2 are not spacetime points or slices. They are "moments" (i.e., "nows") that arise within the context of the two subjective time flows.¹² In the example, we say that A2 occurs after A1 because A2 occurs after A1 during the course of Ann's subjective time flow. Similarly, we say that B2 occurs after B1 because B2 occurs after B1 during the course of Betty's subjective time flow. We can see that Ann's subjective "nows" (A1 and A2) can be temporally coordinated with one another and that Betty's subjective "nows" (B1 and B2) can be temporally coordinated with one another. However, since there is no objective/universal flow of time, Ann's nows (A1 and A2) cannot be coordinated temporally with Betty's nows (B1 and B2).¹³

Since Ann's "nows" cannot be coordinated with Betty's "nows," Ann's "nows" must be regarded as temporally independent of Betty's "nows."¹⁴ Ann's time stream must be regarded as temporally independent of Betty's time stream. Thus, Ann and Betty's streams exist independently of each other.¹⁵ However, as we can see in the example above, their streams do not exist independently of physical (i.e., static) time. The two observers' minds maintain contact with 4-dimensional physical reality.

From the example above, we can see that Ann and Betty experience the world as a dynamic succession of 3-dimensional events (i.e., slices).¹⁶ The reader must realize, however, that spacetime itself does not unfold. This 4-dimensional structure remains static at all times.

Summary

In this paper, I argue that the present can move, and I define the mechanism that brings about its motion. This mechanism is persistence (i.e., existence)--a dynamic process. In addition, I describe the motion of the present, demonstrating that existence "now" implies both prior existence and continued existence. This moving present brings about time flow. I then contrast this dynamic time with Einstein's static time. Finally, I suggest that the relationship between these two different kinds of time gives rise to our impression of an unfolding universe.

The question of time's passage has been a long-standing source of debate among scientists and philosophers. I hope the arguments presented in this paper contribute to a better understanding of the nature of time.

Notes

1) J. J. C. Smart, "Time and Becoming," in Time and Cause, ed. P. van Inwagen (Dordrecht: Reidel Publishing Company, 1980), 3-15; D. H. Mellor, Real Time (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981), 5-7.

2) Ilya Prigogine, From Being to Becoming: Time and Complexity in the Physical Sciences (San Francisco: W. H. Freeman and Company, 1980); Paul Davies, About Time: Einstein's Unfinished Revolution (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1995), 275.

3) See Prigogine, From Being to Becoming, xi-xix; M. M. Schuster, "Is the Flow of Time Subjective?," Review of Metaphysics 39 (1986): 695-714.

4) Davies, About Time, 187.

5) Time passes because our non-physical, subjective mental states persist for brief durations. The duration of each state can, in principle, be arbitrarily short; but it cannot logically be zero. Each mental state is a "present" of time; each present persists for a very brief period of time.

6) The passage of time is simply the existence of the present moment, and is necessarily a one-way affair. Persistence (i.e., existence) is an activity that has no "opposite" process. Thus, a "reversal of the passage of time" is not a definable concept.

"South" may be considered the opposite of "north"; but what could we consider to be the opposite of persistence? It is true that we can distinguish between persistence and non-persistence (i.e., non-existence). But non-persistence/non-existence cannot really be considered the "opposite" of persistence: There is neither directionality nor motion involved in non-persistence.

7) The flow of a person's consciousness can be thought of as a sequence of mental states. Each state in the sequence necessarily persists for a duration greater than zero. This sequence of states cannot be represented by a continuous timeline. (A continuous timeline implies that one mental state persists for the duration of the line.) The sequence of states has to be represented by a timeline that has discontinuities on it (i.e., a line that has points missing from it). These "gaps" on the line serve to separate the individual mental states.

In a certain sense, the discontinuities or "gaps" between states can be ignored. We can ignore them because "memory" is present within an individual's mental states on the line. The presence of memory within individual states allows one to experience mental life as a coherent succession of states.

A discontinuity on the timeline can never be experienced by a person. This is because only one point is missing at the "gap" between states (i.e., because the gap between states has zero length). An experience cannot "occur" if it does not persist for a duration greater than zero. An "experience of discontinuity," therefore, cannot "occur," by definition. (See Paul Davies, About Time: Einstein's Unfinished Revolution (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1995), 40-42.)

8) Duration gives rise to the relation "earlier-later."

9) Note: Relativistic "time dilation" effects do not in any way affect the steady, normal flow of (subjective) time.

10) An elapsed duration (say, one second) is a fixed quantity. The endpoints of a one-second duration are precisely one second apart regardless of the frame of reference. Being an absolute quantity, this period does not get shorter or longer depending on the reference frame.

11) Albert Einstein, Relativity: The Special and General Theory, trans. Robert W. Lawson (New York: Crown Publishers, 1961), 26.

12) Let us suppose Ann is in a reference frame, R1. In this reference frame, Ann experiences a particular sequence of subjective "nows": n1, n2, n3, n4. In addition, in this frame she observes a particular sequence of spacetime slices: s1, s2, s3, s4.

Let us suppose Ann is in a reference frame, R2. In R2, Ann experiences the same sequence of subjective "nows" (i.e., n1, n2, n3, n4) that she experiences in R1. However, she does not observe the same sequence of spacetime slices. (According to Einstein's theory of relativity, an observer's view of spacetime is different in different reference frames.)

13) In a relativistic universe, there can be no objective/universal flow of time. Time flow has to be subjective and mind-dependent. Vesselin Petkov discusses this point in a paper entitled, "Does the Theory of Relativity Relativize Existence As Well?" (This paper was presented at the Montreal Inter-University Seminar on the History and Philosophy of Science, Montreal, Canada, January 29, 2002.)

14) The two series of "nows" are unrelated to one another temporally. Ann's subjective nows do not occur "before," "after," or "simultaneously with" Betty's subjective nows.

15) Events in separate time streams cannot be coordinated with one another. Temporal conflicts therefore cannot arise between events in separate time streams. This suggests that self-consistent time travel scenarios are possible.

We tend to believe that backward time travel (e.g., from the 20th to the 19th century) is impossible. But our ideas regarding time travel and causality are rooted in the incorrect assumption that the "present" and the "flow of time" are objective phenomena. We need to be clear about the fact that "time flow" and the "present" are subjective. And we should reconsider the possibility of time travel from this new perspective.

16) See Paul Davies, About Time: Einstein's Unfinished Revolution (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1995), 59.

Clarification of the "Temporal Passage" Paper

I would like to clarify a few points:

In sections I and II of the paper, I discuss time from a "point-endurantist" perspective. I do not consider four-dimensionalism until sections III and IV.¹ The purpose of the brick example in section I is to introduce the reader to the notion of a "persisting present"--i.e., a persisting mind. (The mind is an entity that persists.² However, it is difficult to visualize a "persisting mind." It is somewhat easier to visualize a persisting physical entity, such as a brick.)

Persistence is a dynamic process (i.e., a dynamic activity); spacetime, however, is a static, geometric structure. Since the persisting mind is dynamic, it cannot exist within spacetime.

Although spacetime is static, the mind perceives this 4-dimensional structure as unfolding. In section IV, I suggest that the relationship between dynamic (subjective) time and static (objective) time gives rise to our impression of an unfolding universe.

In my view, the fourth dimension of spacetime--the so-called "time" dimension--is a type of spatial entity. We should not confuse this fourth dimension with duration. Duration (i.e., temporal passage) is not a dimension of spacetime. It seems to me that the phenomenon of time flow has to take place outside the framework of Minkowski's static, 4-dimensional structure.

Time, Mind and Superspace

When quantum theory is applied to spacetime, the notion of "superspace" arises. Paul Davies discusses the concept of superspace in his book Other Worlds.³ On page 103 of his book, he writes:

"If we now picture all the possible worlds... as a sort of gigantic, multi-dimensional superworld, in which all the alternatives are placed in parallel on an equal footing, then we can regard the world which is found to be 'real' on observation to be a three-dimensional projection from, or section through, this superworld."

He describes the superspace concept again a little later in his book. On page 106, he writes:

"Quantum mechanics implies that we must consider not one spacetime, but an infinity of them, with different shapes and topologies. These spacetimes all fit together after the fashion of waves, each interfering with the other. The strength of the wave is a measure of how probable it is that a space of that particular shape is found to represent the actual universe when an observation is made."

In the Everett (i.e., the many-universes) interpretation of quantum theory, superspace is described as having a concrete physical existence. However, I prefer an interpretation of superspace that is more in keeping with the philosophical views of Bohr and Heisenberg. The three-dimensional projections that a mind observes are, of course, real. However, neither four-dimensional spacetime nor superspace is physically real.

We do not have to adopt the view that parallel worlds exist concretely. We can regard the worlds that inhabit superspace as mathematical possibilities rather than as actualities.

Notes and References

1. Andrew Lamb uses the terms "point-endurantist" and "four-dimensionalist" in his writings. (See his paper "Temporal Dynamics: A Phenomenologically Based Alternative to Four-Dimensionalist and 'Point-Endurantist' Views of Time" [Southern Journal of Philosophy 39 (2):235-259 (2001)].)

2. The subjective "present" of consciousness persists for a finite period of time and then ceases to persist (i.e., ceases to exist). In my paper "Temporal Passage," I represent the present's persistence visually as rightward motion along a timeline. When the present (i.e., Point-P) ceases to persist, it comes to a halt at a point on the timeline.

3. Paul Davies, Other Worlds: Space, Superspace and the Quantum Universe (New York: Penguin Group, 1988)

Time and Mind

Persistence

By definition: A persisting entity does the following two things:

1. It moves through time in the forward direction.

2. It maintains its length, width, height, mass, etc. (Note: A persisting entity maintains its physical characteristics while it moves through time.)

Objects in the real world do neither of the above two things. Real-world objects do not "persist."

The Dimensionality of the World

Entities in the physical world are not 3-dimensional; they are 4-dimensional. (They exist within a 4-dimensional spacetime structure.) The mind perceives 3-dimensional slices of these 4-dimensional objects.

The 3-dimensional slices that make up a 4-dimensional object coexist in parallel with one another.

The Mind

The mind can be described as an "entity." Although it is an "entity," it is not physical. Since the mind is not physical, it cannot exist within spacetime. (In order for an entity to exist within spacetime, the entity has to have physical dimensions. Since consciousness has no physical dimensions, consciousness cannot properly be said to exist within spacetime.)

The Present

The mind is an entity that persists.

The "present" is the mind.

The "present" is therefore an entity that persists.¹

I indicate above that persistence is a type of motion. In my paper "Temporal Passage," I represent the mind's persistence visually as rightward motion across a timeline.

Subjective Time

The flow of consciousness can be thought of as a sequence of mental states. Each state in the sequence necessarily persists for a duration greater than zero. (The duration of each state can, in principle, be arbitrarily short; but it cannot logically be zero.)

The Big Bang Theory

The Big Bang is not an "event in time." Time does not exist at the big bang singularity. In the mathematical representation of spacetime, space and time exist after the big bang singularity, but not at the singularity itself.

Notes

1. To claim that the "present" persists is simply to assert that the mind persists.

Adhanom Andemicael

19 minutes ago, Adhanom Andemicael said:

A statement cannot have a first moment at which it is true, since it has been true for only zero seconds at that initial moment.^1,2 However, a statement can be said to be true at all subsequent moments after the initial one.

What is the definition of a moment? A moment has a finite duration, so saying “moment at which it is true” is improper, since it must be “moment during which it is true”

But there must be a first moment, since we can number them.

A statement cannot "be true" if it does not "remain true."

Many statements are true for only a finite period of time.

A huge problem here is that you are not using precise definitions, and you can’t proceed with a valid argument. Too much room for confusion and equivocation.

13 minutes ago, swansont said:

What is the definition of a moment? A moment has a finite duration, so saying “moment at which it is true” is improper, since it must be “moment during which it is true”

But there must be a first moment, since we can number them.

Many statements are true for only a finite period of time.

A huge problem here is that you are not using precise definitions, and you can’t proceed with a valid argument. Too much room for confusion and equivocation.

By "moment," I mean a single point. (I do not mean a "short, finite duration.")

A single point has zero duration.

Three_Figures.pdfThree_Figures.pdf***

Re: My last post:

The three figures in my paper "Temporal Passage" seem to have gotten distorted.

I'm attaching the three figures to this message as a PDF file.

1 hour ago, swansont said:

What is the definition of a moment? A moment has a finite duration, so saying “moment at which it is true” is improper, since it must be “moment during which it is true”

But there must be a first moment, since we can number them.

Many statements are true for only a finite period of time.

A huge problem here is that you are not using precise definitions, and you can’t proceed with a valid argument. Too much room for confusion and equivocation.

I wrote: "A statement cannot 'be true' if it does not 'remain true.'"

***

Let "S" be a statement.

S cannot be true for just one moment (i.e., one point).

If S has been true for just one moment (one point), S has been true for zero seconds. If S has been true for zero seconds, S has never been true. Therefore, if S has been true for just one moment (one point), S has never been true.

2 hours ago, Adhanom Andemicael said:

"South" may be considered the opposite of "north"; but what could we consider to be the opposite of persistence? It is true that we can distinguish between persistence and non-persistence (i.e., non-existence). But non-persistence/non-existence cannot really be considered the "opposite" of persistence: There is neither directionality nor motion involved in non-persistence.

More piffle.

If you want to find out what might be considered the opposite of persistence I suggest you go and study the subject of damping.

But then you have yet to answer my question about nothing, after four years of deliberation.

You must have put a lot of time into that.

But what if time is an emergent phenomenon ?
What if time does not exist before the emergence of geometric space-time ?
How can you be sure something that's true now, was true before 'now' existed ?

What observations are you basing this on, other than your own mind's ramblings ?

Seems your time was well wasted ...

1 hour ago, studiot said:

More piffle.

If you want to find out what might be considered the opposite of persistence I suggest you go and study the subject of damping.

But then you have yet to answer my question about nothing, after four years of deliberation.

To persist is to remain in existence. To remain in existence is to move along a timeline in the future direction. Therefore, to persist is to move along a timeline in the future direction.

The opposite of persistence (call it "anti-persistence") involves motion along a timeline in the past direction.

I know very little about "damping"? Does "damping" involve moving along a timeline in the past direction? (... I'm assuming it doesn't.)

41 minutes ago, MigL said:

You must have put a lot of time into that.

But what if time is an emergent phenomenon ?
What if time does not exist before the emergence of geometric space-time ?
How can you be sure something that's true now, was true before 'now' existed ?

What observations are you basing this on, other than your own mind's ramblings ?

Seems your time was well wasted ...

"Time flow" and "Einstein's fourth dimension" are two different things.¹

***

The phenomenon we call "time flow" is not an emergent phenomenon.

***

"Einstein's fourth dimension" might be an emergent phenomenon.

***

Notes:

1. The 4th dimension in Einstein's manifold does not "flow," "elapse," or "pass."

2 hours ago, studiot said:

More piffle.

If you want to find out what might be considered the opposite of persistence I suggest you go and study the subject of damping.

But then you have yet to answer my question about nothing, after four years of deliberation.

I'd like to correct a typo.

I wrote: "I know very little about "damping"?" The question mark in this sentence is a typo. I meant to write: "I know very little about 'damping.'"

1 hour ago, Adhanom Andemicael said:

I know very little about "damping"? Does "damping" involve moving along a timeline in the past direction? (... I'm assuming it doesn't.)

Yes.

My answer is as helpful or unhelpful as your response.

Look here to see what other members say when they don't know about something.

https://www.scienceforums.net/topic/140630-the-2026-nobel-chemistry-prize-and-the-fermi-paradox/

Damping is a well studied physical and mathematical phenomenon that involves both growth and decay; persistence and non persistence , that can be worked both ways in time.

But you apparently, and knowing next to nothing about the subject, dismiss it by assumption.

And mentioning nothing, you still haven't offered an answer to my earlier question about nothing.

Interestingly the so called Hairy ball theorem is the reason why real 3 dimensional spherical EM (light) waves cannot exist, all due to a requirement for nothing.

Edited yesterday at 09:32 PM1 day by studiot

4 hours ago, Adhanom Andemicael said:

By "moment," I mean a single point. (I do not mean a "short, finite duration.")

A single point has zero duration.

How many moments in a second? In a minute?

Both would be infinite. You can string together an arbitrary number of moments and no time would pass.

4 hours ago, Adhanom Andemicael said:

wrote: "A statement cannot 'be true' if it does not 'remain true.'"

***

Let "S" be a statement.

S cannot be true for just one moment (i.e., one point).

If S has been true for just one moment (one point), S has been true for zero seconds. If S has been true for zero seconds, S has never been true. Therefore, if S has been true for just one moment (one point), S has never been true.

“I am twelve years old” is a statement that does not remain true. You claim the statement has never been true, thus I was never twelve years old.

55 minutes ago, swansont said:

How many moments in a second? In a minute?

Both would be infinite. You can string together an arbitrary number of moments and no time would pass.

“I am twelve years old” is a statement that does not remain true. You claim the statement has never been true, thus I was never twelve years old.

Let us consider the following statement:

A. After I persisted for twelve years, I became twelve.

***

Statement A remains true.

1 minute ago, Adhanom Andemicael said:

Let us consider the following statement:

A. After I persisted for twelve years, I became twelve.

***

Statement A remains true.

You wrote: "How many moments in a second? In a minute?

Both would be infinite. You can string together an arbitrary number of moments and no time would pass."

Yes.

1 hour ago, studiot said:

Yes.

My answer is as helpful or unhelpful as your response.

Look here to see what other members say when they don't know about something.

https://www.scienceforums.net/topic/140630-the-2026-nobel-chemistry-prize-and-the-fermi-paradox/

Damping is a well studied physical and mathematical phenomenon that involves both growth and decay; persistence and non persistence , that can be worked both ways in time.

But you apparently, and knowing next to nothing about the subject, dismiss it by assumption.

And mentioning nothing, you still haven't offered an answer to my earlier question about nothing.

Interestingly the so called Hairy ball theorem is the reason why real 3 dimensional spherical EM (light) waves cannot exist, all due to a requirement for nothing.

"Time flow" (i.e., time) and "Einstein's fourth dimension" are two different things.

"Einstein's fourth dimension" is often referred to as a "time" dimension. However, this dimension is not a time dimension. It is a type of spatial dimension.¹

A phenomenon that moves through this fourth dimension isn't "moving through time." It's moving through a static (spatial) dimension.

***

Re: Your question about "nothing":

Which question is that?

Please tell me the date you posted the question.

Notes:

1. The 4th dimension in Einstein's manifold is static. This dimension cannot be regarded as "time."

1 hour ago, Adhanom Andemicael said:

Let us consider the following statement:

A. After I persisted for twelve years, I became twelve.

Statement A remains true.

We can consider it, but to what purpose? No matter how statements you come up with that are always true, they do not rebut the fact that some are not, which shows your logic to be flawed.

1 hour ago, Adhanom Andemicael said:

You wrote: "How many moments in a second? In a minute?

Both would be infinite. You can string together an arbitrary number of moments and no time would pass."

Yes

So a moment cannot describe anything with a duration.

“Every moment at which the statement is true is preceded by an infinite number of other moments at which the statement is true; and these moments get closer and closer to t-0.” is not true, because moments do not get you closer to this “t-0”

It’s almost like you are treating two moments as consecutive, and that doesn’t work, mathematically. There will always be an infinite number of these moments in between any two times.

No. Time is time.
It is converted into an orthogonal 'distance' by multiplying by the speed of causality, c , and making it complex, to facilitate its usage in the interval between events.

That's the problem with people who think they are Philosophers, as opposed to reall Philosophers who actually understand the purpose of Philosophy ( such as @Eise ).
The workings of the world around you cannot be based on models built solely in your head, they need to be grounded in observational evidence, otherwise they are 'beliefs', with no base in reality.

33 minutes ago, swansont said:

We can consider it, but to what purpose? No matter how statements you come up with that are always true, they do not rebut the fact that some are not, which shows your logic to be flawed.

So a moment cannot describe anything with a duration.

“Every moment at which the statement is true is preceded by an infinite number of other moments at which the statement is true; and these moments get closer and closer to t-0.” is not true, because moments do not get you closer to this “t-0”

It’s almost like you are treating two moments as consecutive, and that doesn’t work, mathematically. There will always be an infinite number of these moments in between any two times.

Perhaps some word sequences (i.e., statements) that we intuitively label "true," actually cannot be labeled "true." Perhaps the property of "being true" can be applied to some word sequences (i.e., statements), but not to others. If that is the case, there is no flaw in the logic.

***

I am not treating two moments as consecutive.

What I am saying can be understood by thinking of the positive real numbers (PRNs).

Between any two PRNs there are an infinite number of PRNs.

There is no "first PRN."

There is no "smallest PRN."

Every PRN is preceded by an infinite number of other PRNs.

Zero isn't a PRN.

***

When I say "and these moments get closer and closer to t-0," I simply mean the following:

- Every PRN is preceded by an infinite number of other PRNs.

- PRNs get arbitrarily small.

***

(Note: In my analysis, "t-0" corresponds to the number zero. "Nows" correspond to the positive real numbers.)

1 hour ago, Adhanom Andemicael said:

Perhaps some word sequences (i.e., statements) that we intuitively label "true," actually cannot be labeled "true." Perhaps the property of "being true" can be applied to some word sequences (i.e., statements), but not to others. If that is the case, there is no flaw in the logic.

***

I am not treating two moments as consecutive.

What I am saying can be understood by thinking of the positive real numbers (PRNs).

Between any two PRNs there are an infinite number of PRNs.

There is no "first PRN."

There is no "smallest PRN."

Every PRN is preceded by an infinite number of other PRNs.

Zero isn't a PRN.

***

When I say "and these moments get closer and closer to t-0," I simply mean the following:

- Every PRN is preceded by an infinite number of other PRNs.

- PRNs get arbitrarily small.

***

(Note: In my analysis, "t-0" corresponds to the number zero. "Nows" correspond to the positive real numbers.)

Let us consider the following statements:

S1. At the moment n1, I am twelve.

S2. I am twelve.

S3. I am twelve now.

***

Statement S1 remains true for a duration greater than zero seconds.

***

S2 and S3 don't seem to specify a particular now/moment. These two statements seem ambiguous.

***

S2 and S3 might be examples of word sequences that cannot be labeled "true."

8 hours ago, swansont said:

How many moments in a second? In a minute?

Both would be infinite. You can string together an arbitrary number of moments and no time would pass.

“I am twelve years old” is a statement that does not remain true. You claim the statement has never been true, thus I was never twelve years old.

Let us consider the following statements:

A. I've never "remained twelve" for a positive duration.

B. I've never "been twelve."

C. I've persisted for 13 years.

D. I've existed for 13 years.

***

Statements A and B are equivalent.¹

Statements C and D are equivalent.

B and C do not contradict each other.

Notes:

1. To say "I've never been twelve" is to say "I've never remained twelve for a positive duration."

10 hours ago, MigL said:

That's the problem with people who think they are Philosophers, as opposed to reall Philosophers who actually understand the purpose of Philosophy ( such as @Eise ).

Are you challenging me?? I hope you understand that I will not read Adhanom Andemicael's monster postings. But yes, he seems extremely bewitched by language. I'll make a few remarks that might help, even if I have not much hope.

It is important to get what 'indexicals' are. These are words which meanings are completely dependent on the context in which a sentence is said (or written). Examples: 'I', 'now', 'today', 'here' etc. It is easy to formulate sentences that are empirically correct, but have no meaning at all without taking the context into account, e.g. "I am here now". You will agree that the sentence is true, but without knowing where I am, what time it is (you may read the sentence when I am not here anymore, but somewhere else (also indexicals)). So to make it meaningful we need a spacetime diagram with exact space- and time-coordinates where I said "I am here now". As an example in conventional language: "Eise was/is at Zürich central station at October 3rd, 2026 CE at 11:22". In these terms I could have uttered "I am here now" the whole trip to Zürich, being correct all the time, but its meaning changing every time. But you can draw a spacetime diagram with my world line, and mark every event where I am saying "I am here now".

One other problem is the use of the metaphoric meaning of "time flows" Nope. Time does not flow: time is what makes flowing possible. Every change in our physical universe is dependent on the fact that there is something like time. I was traveling by train to Zürich, i.e. a change in spacial coordinates; particles decay after a certain time. (As an aside: one can turn around this dependency: we know of time because we experience changes).

A spacetime diagram is a spacial (2-dimensional) depiction of events living in space and time. But you cannot draw time on a piece of paper (I do not get a line when I put a pencil on paper for a certain time). So time is drawn as a line, an axis on the paper, with generally the speed of light as conversion factor, for good reasons. In special relativity c is the conversion factor between space an time in the Lorentz transformations. In this depiction it is clear what a 'moment' literally is: a point. (But realise this is an abstraction: physically everything takes some time, or it disappears behind the Heisenberg uncertainty principle...)

20 hours ago, Adhanom Andemicael said:

The mind is an entity that persists.

Nope. It is a process.

20 hours ago, Adhanom Andemicael said:

The "present" is the mind.

Nope. "The present" is an indexical.

20 hours ago, Adhanom Andemicael said:

The "present" is therefore an entity that persists.

Indexicals are no entities. They are references which meanings are wholly context dependent, see above.

47 minutes ago, Eise said:

Are you challenging me??

Of course.
Challenging you to bring some sanity to this thread.
Thank you.

40 minutes ago, Eise said:

It is important to get what 'indexicals' are. These are words which meanings are completely dependent on the context in which a sentence is said (or written). Examples: 'I', 'now', 'today', 'here' etc. It is easy to formulate sentences that are empirically correct, but have no meaning at all without taking the context into account, e.g. "I am here now". You will agree that the sentence is true, but without knowing where I am, what time it is (you may read the sentence when I am not here anymore, but somewhere else (also indexicals)). So to make it meaningful we need a spacetime diagram with exact space- and time-coordinates where I said "I am here now".

Most interesting since I have never heard of indexicals, though I understood your excellent explanation immediately.

Is this really an English word ? as I cannot find it in my Oxford ?

Or rather I can but not as a noun with your meaning; it is described as an adjective relating to an index.

+1

I refer to your claim that 'nothing' cannot exist

On 6/10/2026 at 6:35 PM, Adhanom Andemicael said:

Can "nothing" exist?

A necessary condition for "nothing" to exist is the following: "Nothing" must persist for a duration greater than zero.

Note however: "Nothing" cannot persist for a duration greater than zero.^7,8,9 The answer to the question posed above is therefore "no."

We must conclude that "nothing" cannot exist.

To which I replied

On 6/10/2026 at 11:11 PM, studiot said:

What is nothing ?

For instance is a hole nothing ?

Yet a hole is mathematically the difference between a ball and a donut so if a hole is nothing then why is there a such a difference ?

Or more colourfully

Would you use a toilet seat without a hole in the middle ?

Questions to which I have yet to receive a reply.

Since you can't do mathematics I tried to offer a physical example.

I also offered you the hairy ball theorem more recently. and again received no reply.

Edited 8 hours ago8 hr by studiot

1 hour ago, studiot said:

Is this really an English word ?

Sure. See Wikipedia, especially here. And it is not the first time I mentioned this concept here. Try google with "indexicals site:www.scienceforums.net" (Yes, google finds more than the search function of the forum software).

Oh, Studiot, and here is another citation from IEP, that might interest you:

In response to the linguistic turn exemplified by theory , critics of the dynamic theory suggest that the temporal indexical sentence, “It is now raining,” has no truth-value because the reference of the word now is unspecified. If the sentence has no truth-value, it cannot change its truth-value. However, the sentence is related to a sentence that does have a truth-value, namely the associated complete sentence or eternal sentence, the sentence with its temporal indexical replaced by some date expression that refers to a specific time, and with the other indexicals replaced by names of whatever they refer to. Typical indexicals are the words: then, now, I, this, here, them. Supposing it is now midnight here on May 1, 2025, and the speaker is in San Francisco, California, then the indexical sentence, “It is now raining,” is intimately associated with the more complete or context-explicit sentence, “It is raining at midnight on May 1, 2025, in San Francisco, California.” Only these latter, non-indexical, non-context-dependent, so-called complete sentences have truth-values, and these truth-values do not change with time, so they do not underlie any flow of time, according to the critic of the fifth dynamic theory.

Italics by me.

1 hour ago, MigL said:

2 hours ago, Eise said:

Are you challenging me??

Of course.
Challenging you to bring some sanity to this thread.
Thank you.

You're welcome.

Edited 6 hours ago6 hr by Eise

15 hours ago, Adhanom Andemicael said:

Perhaps some word sequences (i.e., statements) that we intuitively label "true," actually cannot be labeled "true." Perhaps the property of "being true" can be applied to some word sequences (i.e., statements), but not to others. If that is the case, there is no flaw in the logic.

That seems pretty weak.

We’re talking about statements that can be called true, which means they can be false, as well. If a twelve-year-old said they were twelve, would that statement be false? Your definition says it is, which is ridiculous

I think the problem is that your premise is flawed. It leads to a contradiction, being twelve and also not twelve

There's no breeding ground for philosophical mischief quite like semantics.