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Prof Reza Sanaye

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Everything posted by Prof Reza Sanaye

  1. As a matter of fact , Dear Zapatos , it is the other way around. The controversy is over the issue of this vaccine having BEEN PRODUCED SO SO QUICKLY AS COMPARED WITH OTHERS . . . .. It MAY make it much less acceptable . ..
  2. Fortunately/Unfortunately , we have gotten the extraordinary success of QT , too . .. . ..
  3. No , No , Dear Friend . .. Space is zillions of times more intuitive/intuitionistic as compared with what is called "time" ....
  4. Things : One first thing is make at least a little bit clearer whether the "politix-involved" theory discussed here is [ to what extent ] acceptable . . . Why or in what way is it a point worth discussing ? ( Studiot) This is also a reply to studiot. Even Trump wouldn't say such a thing . . . .
  5. You are belittling all the huge amounts of the intensity of manpower, money and effort that had been put into producing other VERY important vaccines. I still believe it is worth it comparing other vaccine developments' time-taking and this one's. It tells us things , , ... , , , . , ., . , ..
  6. One good point to be discussed here is how long have other significantly successful vaccines taken to be "developed" before being rolled out onto the public ?? ??
  7. Dear Alex Mercer ! Why do you think we teach and learn philosophy of mathematics ??
  8. Area54 ! Many many thanx for your getting involved . . .. Quote from Area 54 : " The nature of time is rooted in our own body(first sentence of the article) ....No it is not. The first sentence of the article clearly demonstrates this. " { end of Quote } Excuse me . . . .What you have typed in there is named Paradox . . . . ''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''' Quote from Area 54 : " The relevant words are highlighted. Human awareness of time is not time. Human perceptions of time are not time. Case closed. " { end of Quote } This is a very clear example of time being either human-dependent or , otherwise , illusory. Quote from Stanford Encyclopedia : The very expression ‘the perception of time’ invites objection. Insofar as time is something different from events, we do not perceive time as such, but changes or events in time. But, arguably, we do not perceive events only, but also their temporal relations. So, just as it is natural to say that we perceive spatial distances and other relations between objects (I see the dragonfly as hovering above the surface of the water), it seems natural to talk of perceiving one event following another (the thunderclap as following the flash of lightning), though even here there is a difficulty. For what we perceive, we perceive as present—as going on right now. Can we perceive a relation between two events without also perceiving the events themselves? If not, then it seems we perceive both events as present, in which case we must perceive them as simultaneous, and so not as successive after all. There is then a paradox in the notion of perceiving an event as occurring after another, though one that perhaps admits of a straightforward solution. When we perceive B as coming after A, we have, surely, ceased to perceive A. In which case, A is merely an item in our memory. Now if we wanted to construe ‘perceive’ narrowly, excluding any element of memory, then we would have to say that we do not, after all, perceive B as following A. According to Prof. Rovelli , the apparent existence of time — in our perceptions and in physical descriptions, written in the mathematical languages of Newton, Einstein and Erwin Schrödinger — comes not from knowledge, but from ignorance. ‘Forward in time’ can only mean in the direction in which entropy increases, and in which we gain information. (( https://www.nature.com/articles/d41586-018-04558-7 ))
  9. Appreciations ! Dear Moderator swansont ! I gather that now I may by the name of write a bit more on this split page under the title of Time and time perception ..................... Main theme I was developing was that U cannot so easily disentangle time per se from time perception. An ORIGINAL RESEARCH ARTICLE by the name of Feel the Time. Time Perception as a Function of Interoceptive Processing written by six highly qualified scholars shows us that The nature of time is rooted in our own body(first sentence of the article) Address : https://www.frontiersin.org/articles/10.3389/fnhum.2018.00074/full Constellations of impulses arising from the flesh constantly create our interoceptive perception and, in turn, the unfolding of these perceptions defines human awareness of time. This study explored the connection between time perception and interoception and proposes the Interoceptive Buffer saturation (IBs) index. IBs evaluates subjects’ ability to process salient stimuli from the body by measuring subjective distortions of interoceptive time perception, i.e., the estimated duration of tactile interoceptive stimulations. Thirty female healthy subjects were recruited through consecutive sampling and assessed for common variables related to interoceptive alterations: depressive symptoms (Beck Depression Inventory, BDI-II), eating disorders (EDI-3) risk, and anxiety levels (State Trait Anxiety Inventory, STAI). Interoceptive cardiac accuracy (IAc) was assessed as well. Imagery , to , have a significant role to play in giving birth to the idea of time. Readers may refer to "Phenomenology of Perception" by Maurice Merleau-Ponty and to (( https://elifesciences.org/articles/33904 )). This link is also helpful in realizing how we have subliminally derived Time Existence from Time Perception : https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC5964239/ I quote now from Stanford encyclopedia : One of the earliest, and most famous, discussions of the nature and experience of time occurs in the autobiographical Confessions of St Augustine. Augustine was born in Numidia (now Algeria) in 354 AD, held chairs in rhetoric at Carthage and Milan, and become Bishop of Hippo in 395. He died in 430. As a young adult, he had rejected Christianity, but was finally converted at the age of 32. Book XI of the Confessions contains a long and fascinating exploration of time, and its relation to God. During the course of it Augustine raises the following conundrum: when we say that an event or interval of time is short or long, what is it that is being described as of short or long duration? It cannot be what is past, since that has ceased to be, and what is non-existent cannot presently have any properties, such as being long. But neither can it be what is present, for the present has no duration. (For the reason why the present must be regarded as durationless, see the section on the specious present, below.) In any case, while an event is still going on, its duration cannot be assessed. Augustine’s answer to this riddle is that what we are measuring, when we measure the duration of an event or interval of time, is in the memory. From this he derives the radical conclusion that past and future exist only in the mind. While not following Augustine all the way to the mind-dependence of other times, we can concede that the perception of temporal duration is crucially bound up with memory. It is some feature of our memory of the event (and perhaps specifically our memory of the beginning and end of the event) that allows us to form a belief about its duration. This process need not be described, as Augustine describes it, as a matter of measuring something wholly in the mind. Arguably, at least, we are measuring the event or interval itself, a mind-independent item, but doing so by means of some psychological process. Whatever the process in question is, it seems likely that it is intimately connected with what William Friedman (1990) calls ‘time memory’: that is, memory of when some particular event occurred. That there is a close connection here is entailed by the plausible suggestion that we infer (albeit subconsciously) the duration of an event, once it has ceased, from information about how long ago the beginning of that event occurred. That is, information that is metrical in nature (e.g. ‘the burst of sound was very brief’) is derived from tensed information, concerning how far in the past something occurred. The question is how we acquire this tensed information. It may be direct or indirect, a contrast we can illustrate by two models of time memory described by Friedman. He calls the first the strength model of time memory. If there is such a thing as a memory trace that persists over time, then we could judge the age of a memory (and therefore how long ago the event remembered occurred) from the strength of the trace. The longer ago the event, the weaker the trace. This provides a simple and direct means of assessing the duration of an event. Unfortunately, the trace model comes into conflict with a very familiar feature of our experience: that some memories of recent events may fade more quickly than memories of more distant events, especially when those distant events were very salient ones (visiting a rarely seen and frightening relative when one was a child, for instance.) A contrasting account of time memory is the inference model. According to this, the time of an event is not simply read off from some aspect of the memory of it, but is inferred from information about relations between the event in question and other events whose date or time is known. The inference model may be plausible enough when we are dealing with distant events, but rather less so for much more recent ones. In addition, the model posits a rather complex cognitive operation that is unlikely to occur in non-human animals, such as the rat. Rats, however, are rather good at measuring time over short intervals of up to a minute, as demonstrated by instrumental conditioning experiments involving the ‘free operant procedure’. In this, a given response (such as depressing a lever) will delay the occurrence of an electric shock by a fixed period of time, such as 40 seconds, described as the R-S (response-shock) interval. Eventually, rate of responding tracks the R-S interval, so that the probability of responding increases rapidly as the end of the interval approaches. (See Mackintosh 1983 for a discussion of this and related experiments.) It is hard to avoid the inference here that the mere passage of time itself is acting as a conditioned stimulus: that the rats, to put it in more anthropocentric terms, are successfully estimating intervals of time. In this case, the strength model seems more appropriate than the inference model. 4. The specious present The term ‘specious present’ was first introduced by the psychologist E.R. Clay, but the best known characterisation of it was due to William James, widely regarded as one of the founders of modern psychology. He lived from 1842 to 1910, and was professor both of psychology and of philosophy at Harvard. His definition of the specious present goes as follows: ‘the prototype of all conceived times is the specious present, the short duration of which we are immediately and incessantly sensible’ (James 1890). How long is this specious present? Elsewhere in the same work, James asserts ‘We are constantly aware of a certain duration—the specious present—varying from a few seconds to probably not more than a minute, and this duration (with its content perceived as having one part earlier and another part later) is the original intuition of time.’ This surprising variation in the length of the specious present makes one suspect that more than one definition is hidden in James’ rather vague characterisation. There are two sources of ambiguity here. One is over whether ‘the specious present’ refers to the object of the experience, namely a duration in time, or the way in which that object is presented to us. The second is over how we should interpret ‘immediately sensible’. James’ words suggest that the specious present is the duration itself, picked out as the object of a certain kind of experience. But ‘ immediately sensible’admits of a number of disambiguations. So we could define the specious present as: the span of short-term memory; the duration which is perceived, not as duration, but as instantaneous; the duration which is directly perceived — i.e. not through the intermediary of a number of other, perhaps instantaneous, perceptions; the duration which is perceived both as present and as extended in time. If James means the first of these, that would certainly explain his suggestion that it could last up to a minute. But this does not seem to have much to do specifically with the experience of presentness, since we can certainly hold something in the short-term memory and yet recognise it as past. James may be thinking of cases where we are listening to a sentence: if we did not somehow hold all the words in our conscious mind, we would not understand the sentence as a whole. But it is clear that the words are not experienced as simultaneous, for then the result would be an unintelligible jumble of sounds. (2) is illustrated by the familiar fact that some movements are so fast that we see them as a blur, such as when we look at a fan. What is in fact taking place at different times is presented as happening in an instant. But this is not standardly what is meant by the specious present. (3) is a construal that is found in the literature (see, e.g., Kelly 2005), but it is not obvious that that is what James had in mind, since James is concerned with the phenomenology of time perception, and whether or not an experience constitutes a direct or indirect perception of an interval does not seem to be a phenomenological matter. (Besides which, as Kelly points out, we might think it odd to suppose that past parts of the interval could be directly perceived.) That leaves us with (4): a duration which is perceived both as present and as temporally extended. This present of experience is ‘specious’ in that, unlike the objective present (if there is such a thing — see The metaphysics of time perception below) it is an interval and not a durationless instant. The real or objective present must be durationless for, as Augustine argued, in an interval of any duration, there are earlier and later parts. So if any part of that interval is present, there will be another part that is past or future. But is it possible to perceive something as extended and as present? If we hear a short phrase of music, we seem to hear the phrase as present, and yet — because it is a phrase rather than a single chord — we also hear the notes as successive, and therefore as extending over an interval. If this does not seem entirely convincing, consider the perception of motion. As Broad (1923) puts it, ‘to see a second-hand moving is quite a different thing from "seeing" that a hour-hand has moved.’ It is not that we see the current position of the second hand and remember where it was a second ago: we just see the motion. That leads to the following argument: (1) What we perceive, we perceive as present. (2) We perceive motion. (3) Motion occurs over an interval. Therefore: What we perceive as present occurs over an interval. Still, there is more than an air of paradox about this. If successive parts of the motion (or musical phrase, or whatever change we perceive) are perceived as present, then surely they are perceived as simultaneous. But if they are perceived as simultaneous, then the motion will simply be a blur, as it is in cases where it is too fast to perceive as motion. The fact that we do not see it as motion suggests that we do not see the successive parts of it as simultaneous, and so do not see them as present. But then how do we explain the distinction to which Broad directs our attention? One way out of this impasse is to suggest that two quite distinct processes are going on in the perception of motion (and other kinds of change). One is the perception of successive states as successive, for example the different positions of the second hand. The other is the perception of pure movement. This second perception, which may involve a more primitive system than the first, does not contain as part the recognition of earlier and later elements. (Le Poidevin 2007, Chapter 5.) Alternatively, we might attempt to explain the phenomena of temporal experience without appeal to the notion of the specious present at all (see Arstila, 2018). 5. Past, present and the passage of time The previous section indicated the importance of distinguishing between perceiving the present and perceiving something as present. { end of quote from stanford Encyclopedia } Finally , The following links very cogently prove the falsifiability of the entity of Time ( as Absolute Per Se ) : https://www.bbc.com/future/article/20191203-what-we-get-wrong-about-time https://www.nature.com/articles/d41586-018-04558-7
  10. Most Respectable Moderator : I dont wanna break rules on these forums in any way. Be assured of that. However , here I cannot act according to your will. I cannot return to the so-called OP. Time and time perception , I surmise , cannot be disentangled from one another,,,,No , they plainly simply can-Not. The next best thing for me to do--I am almost sure--is to keep silent so that I might possibly not break the rules and regulations .. .. ..
  11. The truth of the matter is that reality would not be that tight a tissue. It does not hesitate until you take the most shocking phenomena or dismiss our own imagination's most possible figures. Perception isn't a science; it's not an act, it's not an intentional takeover; it's the context from which all actions come and are meant to emerge. Hhhmm ??
  12. Seems Yes. You say : " Time perception is time perception, not time. " This indicates that there is an entity in itself fixed , which can/should then be perceived/experienced by living beings. I quote from Intl Encyclopedia of philosophy ( by your kind permission) : Phenomenology and Time-Consciousness " Edmund Husserl, founder of the phenomenological movement, employs the term “phenomenology” in its etymological sense as the activity of giving an account (logos) of the way things appear (phainomenon). Hence, a phenomenology of time attempts to account for the way things appear to us as temporal or how we experience time. Phenomenology offers neither metaphysical speculation about time’s relation to motion (as does Aristotle), nor the psychological character of time’s past and future moments (as does Augustine), nor transcendental-cognitive presumptions about time as a mind-dependent construct (as does Kant). Rather, it investigates the essential structures of consciousness that make possible the unified perception of an object that occurs across successive moments. In its nuanced attempts to provide an account of the form of intentionality presupposed by all experience, the phenomenology of time-consciousness provides important contributions to philosophical issues such as perception, memory, expectation, imagination, habituation, self-awareness, and self-identity over time.Within the phenomenological movement, time-consciousness is central. The most fundamental and important of all phenomenological problems, time-consciousness pervades Husserl’s theories of constitution, evidence, objectivity and inter-subjectivity. " {quote ended} May be. But would U comment a little bit more, PLZ ??
  13. Let us also remember that time experience in various animals are VERY different from one another ,,,,,,,,,,,,, This IS relevant to this topic . . . .
  14. https://muse.jhu.edu/article/389505/summary https://ndpr.nd.edu/reviews/the-imagination-in-humes-philosophy-the-canvas-of-the-mind/ https://philpapers.org/archive/DORH-2.pdf https://iep.utm.edu/hume-ima/ To mention only four reliable sources on Hume's thoughts on imagination . . . . . If they really truly solve the issue at discussion here . . ..
  15. Ok. I shall act according to older members' will to discontinue .. .. .. .... . . . .. . .. .They might as well know better than me as to what has and what has not to be written on these open forums . . ... BTW : I am NOT talking tongue in cheek ;;;;'''''''''';;;;;;;;''''''''
  16. As iNow is saying , we have other myths of flood(s) in yet other civilizations , too . . .. ..We cannot very readily brush them under the carpet . .. .
  17. As per Scottish philosopher David Hume, nothing we envision is totally unlikely. We will describe the skills required to bring these images to life—to allow them as technologies—once we have the capacity to shape images in our minds. Our imagination produces only representations of hope based on our observations of the world surrounding us. It's true that anything that is unlikely is often unthinkable.
  18. It is not nonsense , Sir . . .... I put a "sense" Q to you ... .. . Wave functions are supposed to collapse . .. Can't understand why a very well-read man like you feels necessary to get so furious at this idea . . . .
  19. Quote from Prometheus : " My instinct is that at some point the vast complexity of the world will require that AI systems parse things down into simpler units of understanding in order for them to navigate it. Does anyone have any opinions one way or another? " I have gotten an opinion , but I'm afraid another way .. .. Your respectable "instinct" adjudicates that universal complexity has to be parsed and divisible for it to be(come) understandable ,,,, Simply because your "instinct" has been reared in the reductivistic rut ;;;;;;;;;; Hhhmmm ??
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