The physical and mental are the same?

[MonDie]

I was contemplating the mind-body problem. I don't know the current arguments. You can tear apart my argument if you would like to. Here it goes.

 

It might be more consilient to think of "mental substance" and "material (physical) substance" as the same thing. For example, we typically think of the experience of color and the accompanying brain phenomena as two separate things. I'm proposing that they are the same thing. There seems to be two problems with this idea. I thought of a strong solution to the first problem, but my solution to the second problem is weaker.

 

The first problem is how we are aware of time.

It seems like a useful metaphor to think of the brain as a program that edits its own code. For example, when you stub your toe, your brain rewrites some code. As a result of the rewritten code, you will avoid stubbing your toe in the future. In our evolution, fit functioning of the code-rewriting ability was selected for. However, there seems to be a problem, and I'll do my best to articulate it.

What I described above is simply cause and effect. You stub your toe, and the effect is that your brain rewrites the code. The effect of the rewritten code is that you behave differently in the future. The laws of cause and effect that your brain is obeying are the same laws that all other matter obeys. Furthermore, if substance exists within moments, how could any substance be aware of time, which involves being aware that there is something beyond the present moment? Finally, it is not fit to be aware of time. Biological fitness only involves perpetuation-promoting responses, not awareness.

The solution is that we are not actually aware of time itself, we are only aware of a concept that we call "time." Here is a comparison. When you see the color red, you aren't seeing the electromagnetic radiation. Rather, the electromagnetic radiation hits your eyes, the brain begins a series of cell signalling, and your brain runs code titled "red." Likewise, your brain seems to have code titled "time." It is the code for dealing with issues involving time. However, awareness of that code isn't actually awareness of time itself, it's only awareness of "time."

However, this idea wouldn't lead us to care about non-living matter, namely whether or not some non-living matter is in a good or bad state. "Good" and "bad" have no meaning without comparisons. Making comparisons requires a conceptual understanding of the things being compared. For example, if I think that my current mental state is better than my previous mental state, it implies that I have a concept of time and past mental states. It also implies that I have a concept of my identity throughout time. Because it was favorable to our perpetuation that we knew how to manipulate the environment, the potential for conceptual understandings was coded into our brains by natural selection. That is how we came to know what good and bad are. Of course, we could apply our concepts of good and bad mental states to non-living matter, believing that non-living matter should be of a good mental state. However, the aim seems trivial because the non-living matter, lacking the ability to make comparisons, cannot think that its mental state is good or bad.

 

The second problem is the spatial problem.

The argument implies that there's no barrier between the state of brain matter and the state of surrounding non-conscious matter. However, we must distinguish between the mental state and the conscious state. As I use the term, "consciousness" involves recording information about structure and history. Since the surrounding non-conscious matter doesn't record its state, information about its state is only recorded if it interacts with the brain matter via the senses.

Here is the really weird part. Without any boundary between substances, there is only one mental state. That one mental state encompasses every consciousness. However, since there are barriers between the consciousnesses, the consciousnesses are not aware of the functioning of one another. The thoughts of one consciousness are only recorded within that individual consciousness. Your mental state includes all consciousnesses, but your consciousness (you) cannot record the thoughts of another consciousness, no matter how hard it tries to.

In order to make this argument stronger, I would probably have to go into the nature of attention as a part of conscious thought. However, that seems like it would be quite difficult.

Edited December 2, 2012 by Mondays Assignment: Die

[MonDie]

It might be more consilient to think of "mental substance" and "material (physical) substance" as the same thing. For example, we typically think of the experience of color and the accompanying brain phenomena as two separate things. I'm proposing that they are the same thing. There seems to be two problems with this idea. I thought of a strong solution to the first problem, but my solution to the second problem is weaker.

 

This is an innappropriate application of Occam's razor.

 

In the sciences, a form of Occam's razor is used, and it goes something like this:

When two hypothesese make such similar predictions that there is currently no way to distinguish between them, it is more likely that the simpler explanation will turn out to be true when they finally can be distinguished.

This has been proven empirically.

 

Your claim is different because it is totally outside the domain of empiricism. Occam's razor has not been shown to apply to metaphysical claims. There is no way to test whether or not it applies to metaphysical claims because there is no way to test metaphysical claims. Thus the idea that Occam's razor can be applied to metaphysical claims is itself a metaphysical claim. So, although we might refute your claim on logical grounds, we have no other way to determine the probability of its truth.

 

In conclusion, the claim that they are the same and the claim that they are different are both claims for which the probabilities are unknowable. You might as well be claiming that there is a metaphysical god, or that we have a metaphysical obligation to abstain from sex. Furthermore, Occam's razor is actually useful in empiricism, where it is a means to some other end. Even if Occam's razor did apply to this claim, we'd still have no way to test it. Thus your contemplation was for nothing other than the realization that it was for nothing.

 

Now, please, complete your "assignment." We will be pleased to be rid of you.

Edited December 5, 2012 by Mondays Assignment: Die

[Prometheus]

Are you talking to yourself again?

 

Many do think of mental states as states as physical states, read up on Daniel Dennett if you're interested. As for our perceptions of a thing not being the same as the thing itself makes sense to me. I'm just not sure how far we can take the analogy of 'coding' in the brain - whether the brain is entirely computational or has some non-computational components - Roger Penrose has interesting thoughts on this (i just wish i understood more of them). I didn't understand the second bit, something about different consciousnesses existing in one brain (which is a theory put forward before).

 

About the metaphysical claims: it might be impossible to test whether 'mental' substances, whatever they are, exist - but surely if the mind is entirely a function of physical components then it should be possible to empirically test such this hypothesis, in theory if not in practice at least?

[PeterJ]

I can assure you that Occam's razor is as important in metaphysics as it is in physics, and also that metaphysical theories can be tested. Some can be tested in physics and logic, and some in logic.only. For example, Nihilism is testable in physics and logic, while Materialism is testable only in logic (and experience) but not in physics.

 

If by 'test' we mean test in physics, then it is not possible to test whether 'mind is entirely a function of physical components', This is because It is not possible to test the theory that there is such a thing as 'mind'. There is no possible physical evidence that coudl establish the existence of minds, as we see from the 'other minds' problem.

 

So physics can have nothing to say about minds, although of course physicists are entitled to their opinions. It is a quite common opinion that by reduction mind and brain are the same thing, and I feel the OP is on the right track for making this idea work. But the question remains of what it is to which they reduce. It simply does not work to say that one reduces to the other so identity theories have some motivation. They don't work either, but they may be heading in the right direction. .

 

Better to say that mind and matter reduce to something else. This idea can be made to work. All others leave us with an intractable problem of consciousness. So mind and brain would not be identical,, as is more or less obvious, but would be a broken symmetry.

 

Dan Dennett and Roger Penrose are worth reading, as Prometheus says, but neither solve any problems. I don't know why students of consciousness studies spend so much time reading people who don't solve any problems. It doesn't happen much in physics.

 

 

 

 

,

[Prometheus]

I didn't realise that people have written who have conclusively solved the problem of consciousness. You will have to point me to those books/articles.

 

As for testing whether there is such thing as mind, by denying that you can you have already assumed that mind is something immaterial. It would be better to do it the other way round surely? Test the hypothesis that the mind is 'nothing but' the brain - that its entirely reducible to physical phenomena. If it can be proved, no problems. If it can't be solved this way, then we can begin to 'immaterial' explanations.

[ydoaPs]

Are you talking to yourself again?

 

Many do think of mental states as states as physical states, read up on Daniel Dennett if you're interested.

 

No. Bad. That is not Dennett's view. Dennett is a functionalist, not a type-identity theorist. Type-identity theory is that mental states are brain states. Functionalism, on the other hand, is that mental states are what brain states do. In fact, Dennett is more radical than many functionalists in that he denies qualitative experience as actual experience. For Dennett, your 'self' is just the main character of the story your "Joycean Machine" is writing. It can't get any more clear than how he said it in his paper "The Self as a Center of Narrative Gravity" where he says, "The chief fictional character at the center of that autobiography is one's self. And if you still want to know what the self really is, you're making a category mistake". As for qualitative consciousness, his view is that it isn't something to be explained, rather the belief that one has qualitative consciousness needs to be explained. He uses the example of the zombie to make his point.

 

A zombie, in philosophy, is a human that is no different than any other human except that it has no qualitative consciousness. His example uses the zombie twin. If you are conscious, your zombie twin is a molecule for molecule duplicate of you which acts identically to you should you be in that situation. If you are asked "Do you have qualitative consciousness?", you answer honestly "Yes". However, this means that your zombie twin will as well. Your zombie twin honestly believes it has qualitative consciousness. So, says Dennett, not only is there no third person difference between you and your zombie twin, but there is no first person difference as well.

 

By all means, read a lot of Dennett, but don't misrepresent him. And especially don't misrepresent him to that extent.

 

There are, however, people who do think that all matter has a mental component. This view is called "Panpsychism" and is held by people such as Galen Strawson.

[Prometheus]

By all means, read a lot of Dennett, but don't misrepresent him. And especially don't misrepresent him to that extent.

 

 

I'm happy to stand corrected, but the difference between type-identity theory and functionalism doesn't seem so great. Presumably they both are entirely reducible to physical matter? That mental states are something the brain does rather than something it is would not change this.

[immortal]

If its all in the mind then how can the mental and the physical can be different. Cartesian duality of the mental and the physical is not feasible, either cognitive science will reduce mind entirely to the brain or a new science will map the physical entirely to a metaphysical mind. Penrose is right in saying that humans can solve problems for which no algorithm exists and hence the thought process of humans has to be non-computable, there is nothing in the current physics which can account for a non-computable process and he takes a top-down approach. Instead of arguing that platonic values are embedded in space-time at planck scales if he had argued that platonic values exists in a platonic realm and mathematicians just discover the absolute truths already existing there then that would have been the the correct theory of the emperors new mind. If strong AI is found to be impossible then the existence of a metaphysical mind is inevitable.

[ydoaPs]

 

I'm happy to stand corrected, but the difference between type-identity theory and functionalism doesn't seem so great.

It's actually a pretty huge difference. Per type-ID theory, only things with brains can be conscious. So, any attempt at strong AI is doomed to fail. It also means that a race of extraterrestrials far superior to us in intelligence wouldn't be conscious.

 

For functionalsim, mental states are literally a function of brain states; it's just not isomorphic. Any one mental state can be realized by any number of brain states, but any given brain state can only realize one mental state. Mental states aren't the same as brain states. It's a materialist attempt at a solution to the mind-body problem, yes, but to say "mental states are physical states" is off the mark. Per functionalism, they're more like information states.

 

Three great papers on the functionalist narrative are Dennett's "The Self as a Center of Narrative Gravity", Velleman's "Self as Narrator", and Ishmael's "Saving the Baby".

[MonDie]

There are, however, people who do think that all matter has a mental component. This view is called "Panpsychism" and is held by people such as Galen Strawson.

 

This is close to what I was proposing in the OP. Thank you for introducing me to the word "qualia" (singular quale).

 

I was proposing that matter, energy, time, everything actually is qualia. The problem is that most qualia follow the laws of cause and effect without leaving behind any trace of the past. Someone might wonder how a qualia comprised world could follow natural laws without the qualia being aware of those natural laws. The mistake is in assuming that natural laws are irreducible things. Natural laws seem to be abstract concepts, thus they are reducible.

 

Although everything is qualia, not everything is consciousness. As a result of natural selection, the brain's qualia (matter) responds to certain physical interactions by forming concepts, and these concepts correspond with what exists inside and outside the brain. This is consciousness.

Even though consciousness is restricted to the brain, it's still possible that "your" present mental state includes the qualia of the carpet or the door. However, since the carpet and the door aren't conscious (i.e. unlike the brain, they don't write things down), there is no way for your consciousness (you/your brain) to have an intuitive understanding of the carpet and the door. Your consciousness can only record features of the door if you direct your senses to the door. Keep in mind that attention is an aspect of consciousness. Your consciousness can only direct its attention to parts of itself.

I am trying to determine whether this idea is logically consistent. This reduces consciousness to a mere physical phenomenon. If the argument is logically consistent, it leads to the conclusion that we are all "zombies" within the mental state of the universe.

 

I once assumed that physical things must be something other than qualia. I'm proposing that physical things actually are the only metaphysical thing that certainly exists, they are qualia. The alternative is that physical things are something other than qualia, and that other thing is beyond human intuition.

 

I feel the OP is on the right track for making this idea work. But the question remains of what it is to which they reduce. It simply does not work to say that one reduces to the other so identity theories have some motivation. They don't work either, but they may be heading in the right direction. .

 

I was proposing that everything reduces to qualia. I just learned that term, "qualia."

 

Why doesn't it work to suggest that one reduces to the other?

Edited December 6, 2012 by Mondays Assignment: Die

[ydoaPs]

 

This is close to what I was proposing in the OP. Thank you for introducing me to the word "qualia" (singular quale).

 

I was proposing that matter, energy, time, everything actually is qualia. The problem is that most qualia follow the laws of cause and effect without leaving behind any trace of the past. Someone might wonder how a qualia comprised world could follow natural laws without the qualia being aware of those natural laws. The mistake is in assuming that natural laws are irreducible things. Natural laws seem to be abstract concepts, thus they are reducible.

 

Although everything is qualia, not everything is consciousness. As a result of natural selection, the brain's qualia (matter) responds to certain physical interactions by forming concepts, and these concepts correspond with what exists inside and outside the brain. This is consciousness.

Even though consciousness is restricted to the brain, it's still possible that "your" present mental state includes the qualia of the carpet or the door. However, since the carpet and the door aren't conscious (i.e. unlike the brain, they don't write things down), there is no way for your consciousness (you/your brain) to have an intuitive understanding of the carpet and the door. Your consciousness can only record features of the door if you direct your senses to the door. Keep in mind that attention is an aspect of consciousness. Your consciousness can only direct its attention to parts of itself.

I am trying to determine whether this idea is logically consistent. This reduces consciousness to a mere physical phenomenon. If the argument is logically consistent, it leads to the conclusion that we are all "zombies" within the mental state of the universe.

 

I once assumed that physical things must be something other than qualia. I'm proposing that physical things actually are the only metaphysical thing that certainly exists, they are qualia. The alternative is that physical things are something other than qualia, and that other thing is beyond human intuition.

 

I was proposing that everything reduces to qualia. I just learned that term, "qualia."

 

Why doesn't it work to suggest that one reduces to the other?

In that case, you may want to go old school and look into the work of Bishop Berkeley (pronounced Bark-lee, despite how the town (and thus the school located there) named after him is pronounced).

Edited December 6, 2012 by ydoaPs

[MonDie]

Thanks for the suggestion. I don't think I'm thinking the same thing as Berkley, but reading his work might facilitate ideas.

 

Abstraction might be a key concept. Maybe conceptual representations of the abstract enable internal communication, just as they enable interpersonal communication.

 

If the assumption logically leads to a conclusion about the physical boundaries of consciousness, it might be testable. To test it, we'd need to make various prosthetic brain parts, then ask whether the effects of the parts on the brain are interpretted as conscious (intentional) or unconscious (beyond their control).

Then again, I am interpretting the imagined results with the assumption that the mental and physical are the same. But, under such skepticism, one shouldn't accept that other consciousnesses exist at all.

 

---

 

I just formulated a strong argument for what I'm proposing.

 

Most people think that we can infer the presence of a mind on the basis of physical phenomena. They see a human acting alive, and they assume the human has a mind. This is inference of a mind on the basis of empirical evidence.

However, people also assume that there can be physical things that lack mental activity. They see rocks, and they assume there is no mental activity in the rocks. This assumes cartesian dualism. However, if cartesian dualism is true, the presence of mental activity cannot be inferred from empirical observations.

As you can see, these two beliefs are logically inconsistent. What I'm proposing seems to be the only idea that would imply that mental activity can be inferred from empirical observations. I considered what PeterJ said, that both the mental and physical reduce to something else. However, empiricism focuses on the physical, not that "something else." Thus my idea is the only idea that can make us logically consistent.

 

It's true that is a question science cannot answer, and any decision is based on assumption. However, empiricism has always operated with assumptions. For example, it operates on the assumption that the natural world follows natural laws. Somebody could argue that God is tricking us into thinking the natural world follows natural laws. We wouldn't be able to refute their claim, but we might observe this same person using empiricism in everyday life. We would tell them, "Hey! It's one or the other! You're being logically inconsistent!"

 

I rest my case.

 

---

 

I had another interesting thought. According to this idea, your consciousness can be physically connected to another person's consciousness by means of sound waves (speech) and electromagnetic radiation (visual cues). It's real telepathy!

Edited December 7, 2012 by Mondays Assignment: Die

[Prometheus]

. Any one mental state can be realized by any number of brain states, but any given brain state can only realize one mental state. Mental states aren't the same as brain states. It's a materialist attempt at a solution to the mind-body problem, yes, but to say "mental states are physical states" is off the mark. Per functionalism, they're more like information states.

 

 

But,by functionalism, if mental states aren't the same as brain states, would that not imply 'something' else that mental states are? Unless mental states are simply mental states and no further reduction is sought.

[MonDie]

EDIT: Prometheus, your post didn't appear immediately. That's weird. By the way, I think you're right.

 

---

 

I finally came up with a good representation of the idea. If you didn't understand it before, you will understand it know. I also identified the specific part that seems to be self-contradictive, but I'm still grappling with it.

I haven't taken a course in physics, so this model probably has no realistic application.

 

Unconscious, Abstract Phenomena

Imagine a rollercoaster. A rollercoaster is an abstract thing. It's made of various parts.

Imagine that there is a man in the cart. There is a sign under a lever, and it says, "Pull This Lever." The lever must be pulled ever 5 seconds for the rollercoaster to function, but the man doesn't know this. However, he has a short-term memory problem. He forgets what he's doing every 5 seconds. Consequently, he pulls the lever every 5 seconds, and the rollercoaster keeps on truckin'. Thus he makes the rollercoaster go without even knowing how the rollercoaster works. This man is a metaphor for a particle. I think this is how particles could create abstract phenomena without being "aware" of the phenomena in any abstract sense.

 

Consciousness Through Abstraction

Perhaps what we call "awareness" is actually a specific kind of awareness. It's awareness of phenomena in an abstract sense. It's like there's a blueprint for the rollercoaster inside of your brain. Here is how I think this might happen.

Imagine that you have a bunch of guys with short-term memory problems. In front of them, there are signs that say, "If you hear a letter, shout X!" When you've got a bunch of these guys together, you get a chain reaction that's something like this:

x > x > x > x >... etc.

However, the brain might have more complex "signs." The signs are like, "If you hear A!, shout B!. If you hear B!, shout S!" It might be the case that the signs all give the same message, and it's a complicated message. On the other hand, maybe each sign is unique. Either way, you get these guys spelling out words.

a > b > s > t > r > a > c > t

Then there's the unconscious matter right outside the brain.

x > x > x > x > a > b > s > t > r > a > c > t > x > x > x > x >

Those Xs can be thought of as "the door and the carpet" that I spoke of in previous posts. Technically, they may be part of your present mental state. We have no reason to think that they wouldn't be part of your mental state. The thing is, they're just a bunch of Xs. They have nothing thoughtful to contribute to conscious thought. 5 Xs are as worthless as 500 Xs. The "abstract" is what's going on in your brain. That's conscious thought.

 

Isolated Consciousnesses

Imagine that there is another consciousness in the room, but it's spelling something different. It's spelling "rollercoaster." Now you've got this:

xxxxx rollercoaster xxxx abstract xxxx

Because these consciousnesses are separated by the streams of "x > x > x >... etc.", they cannot interact.

 

Here is one problem you might think up. These unanimous streams will occur within the brain. If the brain has: abs xxx stract, you technically have two consciousnesses. One consciousness is abs, and the other is stract. However, if there are multiple pathways, these disconnects might be overrided by the alternative, connective paths.

 

The Paradox

I stated that, even though your mental state may include "the door," the door simply has nothing to contribute to conscious thought. However, this idea can be extended to show that another person's brain is also part of your mental state. We realize that the other brain cannot directly impact your brain. Nonetheless, it's still part of your mental state in the same way that "the door and the carpet" are. Extend the idea even further, your mental state is actually the mental state of the universe. The thing is, "you" are your consciousness, and your consciousness has no way of coming to this realization.

 

To solve the problem, you might assert that mental activity can be restricted by locality. But that doesn't work because there is a slippery slope. If this locality principle extends to the subatomic level, each particle is its own mind, thus there is no abstract thought.

The slippery slope produces an all or onething dichotomy. While one option probably doesn't work, the other just might.

 

---

 

EDIT:

 

I thought some more about the empiricism issue. More appropriately, people shouldn't make judgements on issues they cannot judge. My argument could have been used to say, "Hey! Tons of people believe in a god, so why don't we make it a science!"

However, there's nothing wrong with basing empirical research on an if statement. All empirical research is.

If the natural world follows natural laws, we can observe natural phenomena to formulate hypothesese (Natural Science).

If each person has a mind of a similar nature, introspection can aid in the formulation of hypothesese (Psychology).

We cannot judge those ifs without getting entangled in metaphysics, but that doesn't discount the fact that the methods generate accurate predictions about what we should observe (empiricism).

In this case: If the mental and the physical are the same, we can use philosophy to formulate hypothesese about the boundaries of consciousness (maybe not perfectly stated).

 

I can assure you that Occam's razor is as important in metaphysics as it is in physics

 

I am not convinced.

Edited December 9, 2012 by Mondays Assignment: Die

[PeterJ]

I didn't realise that people have written who have conclusively solved the problem of consciousness. You will have to point me to those books/articles.

 

As for testing whether there is such thing as mind, by denying that you can you have already assumed that mind is something immaterial. It would be better to do it the other way round surely? Test the hypothesis that the mind is 'nothing but' the brain - that its entirely reducible to physical phenomena. If it can be proved, no problems. If it can't be solved this way, then we can begin to 'immaterial' explanations.

 

I suppose you wouldn't thank me for pointing you at the Buddhist sutras or the Upanishads. For this view consciousness (as defined in consciousness studies) would not really exist. Nor would corporeal phenomena. The literature covering this solution is vast and growing daily. You could try googling Edward Barkin - Relative Phenomenalism for an old JCS article that's very good.

 

Unfortunately it would not be possible to scientifically prove that mind is nothing but brain. It would not even be possible to demonstrate that there is such a thing as mind. How can we sensibly say that something whose existence we cannot establish reduces to something else? Why would we do that? To suppose that there is a mind is unnecessary in physics. The only mind that can be established is our own so we are not doing physics when we make up our theories of mind. Some would say we're not even doing science. Not me, but then I prefer a heterodox definition of science.

 

Dennett is correct according to the view of Edward Barkin, who gives an outline of the theory of 'dependent origination' in that article. The Self would be a personal construct. Indeed, the Buddha makes this clear, and it is very old news for meditative practitioners. A bower-bird's nest is how Dennet characterises it. Trouble is, he does not explain the bower-bird.

Edited December 11, 2012 by PeterJ

[Prometheus]

I wonder whether Gould's non-overlapping magisteria could be applied to the mind instead of religion. Just a thought.

 

I don't understand the bower-bird reference, could you explain please.

[ydoaPs]

I wonder whether Gould's non-overlapping magisteria could be applied to the mind instead of religion.

Probably. You can apply vacuous crap to just about anything.

[MonDie]

In that case, you may want to go old school and look into the work of Bishop Berkeley (pronounced Bark-lee, despite how the town (and thus the school located there) named after him is pronounced).

Most Christians explain away the evils of the world by saying that God gave us free will. But, according to Berkley, if I impale you a child with a burning rod, I am only imapling/burning the child mediately; it is God who is impaling/burning the child immediately.

To put a Berkeleyian twist on an old meme, "Why's God punching you? Why's God punching you? Why's God punching you?"

Edited December 12, 2012 by Mondays Assignment: Die

[PeterJ]

I wonder whether Gould's non-overlapping magisteria could be applied to the mind instead of religion. Just a thought.

 

I don't understand the bower-bird reference, could you explain please.

 

Sorry. Dennett likens the 'self' to a bower birds nest. This bird collects bits and pieces from all over to create and decorate its nest; old bottle tops, bits of silver paper and scraps of rags, sticks, neatly arranged stocks of nuts and seeds, etc etc. He;s saying we collect all sorts of flotsam and jetsom to create the self, and that other than this there is nothing there. Or that;s my memory of his idea. In this he adopts an ancient view, by which the self is a construct overlaid on whatever is there underneath or behind it. Thus the Dalai Lama writes that we should not think that the self is to be overcome in practice, but that there is no self there in the first place.

 

Monday Assignment Die, you said - "I considered what PeterJ said, that both the mental and physical reduce to something else. However, empiricism focuses on the physical, not that "something else." Thus my idea is the only idea that can make us logically consistent. I considered what PeterJ said, that both the mental and physical reduce to something else. However, empiricism focuses on the physical, not that "something else." Thus my idea is the only idea that can make us logically consistent."

 

Empiricism does not focus on the physical. It focuses on whatever it discovers. I'd rather say that science focuses on the physical and so restricts its empirical enquiry to the physical. But the only way you can tell that you are conscious is empiricism, and the reason for proposing that mind and matter reduce to 'something else' is empiricism, and the only way to establish the truth about consciousness is empiricism.

 

Occam's Razor as applied to metaphysics says that mind and matter is one two many hypothetical entitites for a reductive theory. As they cannot be reduced one to the other then a unification of some sort is implied.

[ydoaPs]

Empiricism does not focus on the physical. It focuses on whatever it discovers. I'd rather say that science focuses on the physical and so restricts its empirical enquiry to the physical.

 

The only reason science "restricts its empirical enquiry[sic] to the physical" is that Empiricism gives us no reason to do anything else. If there were a knowable supernatural, science would deal with it as well.

[MonDie]

But we have tested for the mind in one sense. We understood the mind before we understood the brain, and we used the hypothesis that the mind and brain are coordinated to map out the brain.

Sure, when we want to look at any psychological phenomena in depth, we start talking in biological terms. However, to use the general replacement of traditional psychological explanations with modern biological explanations to argue that mind-brain coordination has never been tested for would be a bit ad-hoc.

 

But there is another problem. Those scientists of the past might have been zombies. A zombie is only aware of "the mind." But it seems like we're talking about the existence of the vivid mind, the vividness that each of us think we experience.

Edited December 12, 2012 by Mondays Assignment: Die

[Prometheus]

Probably. You can apply vacuous crap to just about anything.

 

I take it you're not a fan of non-overlapping magisteria then? Does that mean to say you believe everything, at least in principle, can be understood empirically? If so, would you then see mathematical truths as empirical truths?

[MonDie]

I thought "vacuous crap" was a reference to religion.

 

---

 

I've been thinking about the "zombie" concept. Why would a zombie understand that the vivid mind cannot be tested for? If the zombie truly doesn't experience vivid mental phenomena, it has no reason to think there is something about the mind that makes it untestable. It seems like the zombie would only think otherwise if there were some sort of trick inside the brain. Unless someone shows me how that trick works, I'm going to go with the more reasonable explanation, which is that they aren't actually zombies.

 

Does this mean the mind can be tested for? Well, at least for the people who can understand what the we're talking about?

Edited December 13, 2012 by Mondays Assignment: Die

[PeterJ]

 

The only reason science "restricts its empirical enquiry[sic] to the physical" is that Empiricism gives us no reason to do anything else. If there were a knowable supernatural, science would deal with it as well.

Yes okay, this is the thinking behind the approach. But you cannot argue that empiricism gives us no reason to look beyond the physical. If this were so then consciousness studies could not exist and the 'observer effect' would have to be called something else. You can search the entire universe and never find an observer whose existence can be established by reference only to the physical. It is empiricism that allows you to know that there is an observer, and empiricism that tells us that consciousness cannot be dismiised as an ancient legend, as used to be argued by Skinner and Watson et al. Their view was overcome by empiricism.

 

It may be true that some people would like to restrict their own empiricism to the physical, but it would be impossible. Without an empircally established observer there can be no empirically established physical world. There is no in principle reason why both the the observer and teh observed should not be studied empirically,

 

Btw, this is not an argument for an 'unknowable supernatural'. Nothing supernatural is required for a wider view of empiricism. Indeed, nothing supernatural is needed for anything.