28 minutes ago, swansont said:

“Reason” doesn’t really enter into it.

QM interpretations are not QM, they are each a framework to help with a more intuitive understanding of QM. You don’t like e.g. wave-function collapse? Fine. You have other options. It doesn’t change QM one iota.

That's the problem. Reason indeed doesn't really enter into it, as you said. That's largely the whole problem with modern QM theory.
QM is a probabilistic machine to approximate reality. As such it is useful. But these probabilistic estimates are too often treated as real physical objects, causing hundreds of billions of dollars to be spent on things that do not exist, like superposition. The particle is in one and only one state, not a superposition of states. It is fiction like 2.5 children families, for example.

1 minute ago, AThinker1 said:

That's the problem. Reason indeed doesn't really enter into it, as you said. That's largely the whole problem with modern QM theory.

Not conforming to your Reason” or logic is a “you” problem. Not evidence of a flaw in the theory

1 minute ago, AThinker1 said:

QM is a probabilistic machine to approximate reality. As such it is useful. But these probabilistic estimates are too often treated as real physical objects, causing hundreds of billions of dollars to be spent on things that do not exist, like superposition. The particle is in one and only one state, not a superposition of states. It is fiction like 2.5 children families, for example.

Superposition is not an object. Many things in physics are not real objects, and there’s no real pretense that they are, though we can get careless about it and treat them as such because it doesn’t really matter (holes, shadows are some obvious examples, but fields, too. Phonons. The list is long. But superposition is a new and somewhat bizarre one to claim) People familiar with my posts know I am quite vocal in pointing this out. <something that’s not an object in physics is not an object!> is a characterization that, in my experience, is made by people not particularly familiar with physics.

7 minutes ago, swansont said:

Theorem 1 “Assume particle 1 is indeterministic (causality broken, e.g., unpredictable state).”

Apologies. I mistakenly assumed you were familiar with your own work.

But if the premise is incorrect the conclusion is invalid.

1) Yes, assuming particle 1 is indeterministic leads to a self-contradiction. This is a proof by self-contradiction, proving that indeterminism cannot exist.

13 minutes ago, swansont said:

A particle in an undetermined state could interact with a particle in a determined state but not have sufficient energy to change the state.

2) Partial indeterminism cannot exist. If the state is not changed in any way, interaction did not occur, by definition. So the step is still valid. It is impossible to conclude that such indeterminism can be contained. It will inevitably spread. Besides, Copenhagen interprets that every elementary particle is in-deterministic anyway. Either way you look, it cannot be contained.

3) And yes, you can convince AI, especially an honest one like Grok. It can concede the point if you prove it. Done it many times. Quite fun, actually.

1 hour ago, swansont said:

Not conforming to your Reason” or logic is a “you” problem. Not evidence of a flaw in the theory

Reason, like truth is one. It is the difference between truth and error.

1 hour ago, swansont said:

Superposition is not an object. Many things in physics are not real objects, and there’s no real pretense that they are, though we can get careless about it and treat them as such because it doesn’t really matter (holes, shadows are some obvious examples, but fields, too. Phonons. The list is long. But superposition is a new and somewhat bizarre one to claim) People familiar with my posts know I am quite vocal in pointing this out. <something that’s not an object in physics is not an object!> is a characterization that, in my experience, is made by people not particularly familiar with physics.

Superposition is mathematical approximation, aka fiction, just like 2.5 children family, that does not actually exist.
QC is directly relying on this non-existent object to do magical calculations. This is a problem.

On 8/27/2025 at 6:59 PM, Sensei said:

I only questioned your statement that they are identical/the same.

Fermions obeying Fermi-Dirac statistics shows that they are identical.

4 hours ago, swansont said:

Or it could interact in such a way that one must return to a determined state (e.g. an excitation into a maximal angular momentum state only has one decay channel, so you know what state it’s in)

For single decay channels, while the outcome type is determined, the timing is still indeterministic in probabilistic models (exponential decay law), inheriting N's causality break. Thus indeterminism is still not contained.

5 hours ago, AThinker1 said:

The particle is in one and only one state, not a superposition of states.

If a particle is in a state of definite momentum, it is in a superposition of position states. And if a particle is in a state of definite position, it is in a superposition of momentum states. This is a mathematical consequence of conjugate variables.

15 minutes ago, KJW said:

If a particle is in a state of definite momentum, it is in a superposition of position states. And if a particle is in a state of definite position, it is in a superposition of momentum states. This is a mathematical consequence of conjugate variables.

You are describing observer ignorance due to information loss, accommodated by probabilistic estimates. It is useful, but should not be confused for actual reality of the particle. All aspects of the particle including momentum and position are fully deterministic in a higher dimensional space. Information loss occurs because of the way we do measurements, and does not mean that particle state is not deterministic. The analogy is a 2D shadow on the wall loses information about 3D object that caused it. But the object is still fully deterministic.

5 hours ago, swansont said:

There are counterexamples to step 2 as well. A particle in an undetermined state could interact with a particle in a determined state but not have sufficient energy to change the state. Or it could interact in such a way that one must return to a determined state (e.g. an excitation into a maximal angular momentum state only has one decay channel, so you know what state it’s in)

Thanks to your input, I will add the following note to my paper:

Addressing Criticism: A common objection is that a low-energy indeterministic particle N might not sufficiently change particle N+1's state, or interactions could return to a determined state (e.g., excitation with one decay channel). However, there is no such thing as interaction without state change. An interaction means a state change by definition. Even weak interactions propagate infinitely. Moreover weak interactions can accumulate over time causing massive outcomes (e.g., butterfly effect). As for single decay channel, the timing of such interaction would still be indeterministic (exponential decay law). Thus, the inductive step in the proof still holds.

7 hours ago, AThinker1 said:

the state is always fully deterministic in higher dimensional space, but information is lost in our lower dimensional measurements.

...

You cannot tell when neutron will decay due to observer ignorance of higher dimensional state, not due to indeterminism

There are two problems with this:

1: If a system is deterministic in an unobservable higher dimension, but not in observable reality, is it really correct to say that the system is deterministic?

2: The notion of determinism in an unobservable higher dimension seems like a hidden variable theory. Hidden variable theories have been invalidated by Bell's theorem.

2 minutes ago, KJW said:

1: If a system is deterministic in an unobservable higher dimension, but not in observable reality, is it really correct to say that the system is deterministic?

The system is still fully deterministic. Just like a 3D object projected on a 2D wall. Information is lost in 2D, but is still available indirectly. Even if observer is ignorant of the 3D object, it does not make the object indeterministic.

5 minutes ago, KJW said:

2: The notion of determinism in an unobservable higher dimension seems like a hidden variable theory. Hidden variable theories have been invalidated by Bell's theorem.

Bell's theorem does not disprove determinism, only local hidden variables, but not non-local ones. Non-local deterministic theories (e.g., Bohmian mechanics) still remain viable.

2 hours ago, AThinker1 said:

The system is still fully deterministic. Just like a 3D object projected on a 2D wall. Information is lost in 2D, but is still available indirectly. Even if observer is ignorant of the 3D object, it does not make the object indeterministic.

Bell's theorem does not disprove determinism, only local hidden variables, but not non-local ones. Non-local deterministic theories (e.g., Bohmian mechanics) still remain viable.

I'm not sure that is right. I read an interesting paper on Bohm's hidden variable theory here: https://arxiv.org/pdf/2401.04002

The conclusion says:-

We have shown that examination of the logic of von Neumann’s argument leads to the conclusion that the existence of hidden variables capable of allowing the exact prediction of all physical quantities would mean that quantum mechanics in its present form would have to be false, that is, the existence of hidden variables would contradict quantum mechanics, and their inclusion requires a vastly modified theory. Of course, this follows already from the fact that physical quantities represented by non-commuting operators must satisfy an uncertainty relation.

Another powerful argument against hidden variables has been presented by Pauli. In a letter to Fierz he wrote ([18, 19] Pauli to Fierz, Jan. 6, 1952, p. 499, no 1337):

" I want to call special attention to the thermodynamics of ensembles, consisting of the same type of subensembles (Einstein-Bose or Fermi-Dirac statistics). What is important to me is not the energy values but the statistical weights, further the indifference of the thermodynamic-statistical reasoning to the “wave-particle” alternative and Gibbs’ point that identical or only similar states behave qualitatively differently. If hidden parameters exist, not only on paper, but determine a really different behavior of different single systems (e.g.particles)— according to their “real” values—so must—completely independent of the question of the technical measurability of the parameters—the Einstein-Bose or Fermi-Dirac statistics be completely disrupted. Since there is no basis to assume that the thermodynamic weights should be determined by only half (or a part of) “reality”. Either two states are identical or not (there is no “similar”) and if the ψ function is not a complete description of single systems, states with the same ψ function will not be identical. Every argument with the goal of saving the Einstein-Bose and Fermi-Dirac statistics from the causal parameter mythology must fail because it - taking into account the usual theory in which the ψ function is a complete description of a state—declares the other half of reality to be unreal."

So basically, this paper is saying Bohm's theory is unhelpful to physics, because:

1) if it were correct, that would entail throwing out most of existing QM, i.e. the fundamental concept of observable properties being extracted from the wave function by Hermitian operators, some of which do not commute, which as it stands accords perfectly with observation. So that would take us backwards, not forwards.

2) As Pauli points out, Bohm's theory would render QM incapable of correctly predicting the differences in thermodynamic behaviour between ensembles of bosons and fermions (see section I have highlighted in red). This is a fundamental idea in particle physics, predicted by QM and observed in practice.

3) Also, as the abstract notes, Pauli described Bohm's theory as "an uncashable cheque", in that it has no observable consequences, i.e. it is useless as a scientific theory.

4 hours ago, AThinker1 said:

Bell's theorem does not disprove determinism, only local hidden variables, but not non-local ones. Non-local deterministic theories (e.g., Bohmian mechanics) still remain viable.

So now all you have to do is demonstrate nonlocality in some unambiguous fashion.

6 hours ago, AThinker1 said:

For single decay channels, while the outcome type is determined, the timing is still indeterministic in probabilistic models (exponential decay law), inheriting N's causality break. Thus indeterminism is still not contained.

But you claim it’s all one or all the other in order to claim everything is determined.

And earlier you said “Undetermined or unknown state is due to observer ignorance only. It is not due to broken causality, which in principle, is impossible” but now we’re back to broken causality. How, exactly, does being in an undetermined state break causality?

6 hours ago, exchemist said:

I'm not sure that is right. I read an interesting paper on Bohm's hidden variable theory here: https://arxiv.org/pdf/2401.04002

The conclusion says:-

We have shown that examination of the logic of von Neumann’s argument leads to the conclusion that the existence of hidden variables capable of allowing the exact prediction of all physical quantities would mean that quantum mechanics in its present form would have to be false, that is, the existence of hidden variables would contradict quantum mechanics, and their inclusion requires a vastly modified theory. Of course, this follows already from the fact that physical quantities represented by non-commuting operators must satisfy an uncertainty relation.

Another powerful argument against hidden variables has been presented by Pauli. In a letter to Fierz he wrote ([18, 19] Pauli to Fierz, Jan. 6, 1952, p. 499, no 1337):

" I want to call special attention to the thermodynamics of ensembles, consisting of the same type of subensembles (Einstein-Bose or Fermi-Dirac statistics). What is important to me is not the energy values but the statistical weights, further the indifference of the thermodynamic-statistical reasoning to the “wave-particle” alternative and Gibbs’ point that identical or only similar states behave qualitatively differently. If hidden parameters exist, not only on paper, but determine a really different behavior of different single systems (e.g.particles)— according to their “real” values—so must—completely independent of the question of the technical measurability of the parameters—the Einstein-Bose or Fermi-Dirac statistics be completely disrupted. Since there is no basis to assume that the thermodynamic weights should be determined by only half (or a part of) “reality”. Either two states are identical or not (there is no “similar”) and if the ψ function is not a complete description of single systems, states with the same ψ function will not be identical. Every argument with the goal of saving the Einstein-Bose and Fermi-Dirac statistics from the causal parameter mythology must fail because it - taking into account the usual theory in which the ψ function is a complete description of a state—declares the other half of reality to be unreal."

So basically, this paper is saying Bohm's theory is unhelpful to physics, because:

1) if it were correct, that would entail throwing out most of existing QM, i.e. the fundamental concept of observable properties being extracted from the wave function by Hermitian operators, some of which do not commute, which as it stands accords perfectly with observation. So that would take us backwards, not forwards.

2) As Pauli points out, Bohm's theory would render QM incapable of correctly predicting the differences in thermodynamic behaviour between ensembles of bosons and fermions (see section I have highlighted in red). This is a fundamental idea in particle physics, predicted by QM and observed in practice.

3) Also, as the abstract notes, Pauli described Bohm's theory as "an uncashable cheque", in that it has no observable consequences, i.e. it is useless as a scientific theory.

I am not a proponent of Bohmian mechanics. The thing I like about it is that it is fully deterministic. But it still carries a lot of nonsensical baggage from superposition fiction. A good analogy I heard is that our measurements are like a blurry picture. Does not mean the actual object is blurry, just our picture of it is.

Also the problem is that QC people now take this mathematical approximation and declare it a real thing and try to do magical parallel calculations with it, which is problematic because the thing they wish to use for their calculations does not actually exist. Hence total failure to deliver any practical results despite of billions spent.

3 hours ago, swansont said:

So now all you have to do is demonstrate nonlocality in some unambiguous fashion.

I proved total determinism. The rest, whatever it is, must obey that conclusion.

3 hours ago, swansont said:

But you claim it’s all one or all the other in order to claim everything is determined.

And earlier you said “Undetermined or unknown state is due to observer ignorance only. It is not due to broken causality, which in principle, is impossible” but now we’re back to broken causality. How, exactly, does being in an undetermined state break causality?

Nothing breaks causality, because it is impossible per the Theorem. The first theorem simply shows that partial indeterminism implies full indeterminism, and both are proven impossible by the second theorem.

7 minutes ago, AThinker1 said:

I am not a proponent of Bohmian mechanics. The thing I like about it is that it is fully deterministic. But it still carries a lot of nonsensical baggage from superposition fiction. A good analogy I heard is that our measurements are like a blurry picture. Does not mean the actual object is blurry, just our picture of it is.

Also the problem is that QC people now take this mathematical approximation and declare it a real thing and try to do magical parallel calculations with it, which is problematic because the thing they wish to use for their calculations does not actually exist. Hence total failure to deliver any practical results despite of billions spent.

I proved total determinism. The rest, whatever it is, must obey that conclusion.

Nothing breaks causality, because it is impossible per the Theorem. The first theorem simply shows that partial indeterminism implies full indeterminism, and both are proven impossible by the second theorem.

Nothing in QM "breaks causality" either though. I think that's overdramatising it. One simply has phenomena whose incidence (in space or time) is not precisely predictable: the spots on a screen as a diffraction pattern builds up, or nuclear decay processes, for instance. They have a proximate cause, but one can't predict their time/position of occurrence exactly.

12 minutes ago, exchemist said:

Nothing in QM "breaks causality" either though. I think that's overdramatising it. One simply has phenomena whose incidence (in space or time) is not precisely predictable: the spots on a screen as a diffraction pattern builds up, or nuclear decay processes, for instance. They have a proximate cause, but one can't predict their time/position of occurrence exactly.

That's one interpretation. And I appreciate that you respect causality.

Full determinism clarifies the picture. If full determinism is true, then particle is in a single state, which means superposition is a probabilistic artifact that merely seeks to compensate for observer ignorance, and not a real object that can perform magical calculations in QC.

On 8/27/2025 at 10:02 PM, AThinker1 said:

Conversational: Consistency means no contradictions—like you cannot have it both raining and not raining at the same time in the same place.

Yes it is possible, and in fact happened several times recently in my back garden with the unusual weather conditions lately.

1 hour ago, studiot said:

Yes it is possible, and in fact happened several times recently in my back garden with the unusual weather conditions lately.

Ok, you get the idea. You cannot have something to be true and false at the same time. A brick falling up and down at the same time, etc.

6 minutes ago, AThinker1 said:

Ok, you get the idea. You cannot have something to be true and false at the same time. A brick falling up and down at the same time, etc.

Again you are incorrect.

2 hours ago, AThinker1 said:

I am not a proponent of Bohmian mechanics. The thing I like about it is that it is fully deterministic. But it still carries a lot of nonsensical baggage from superposition fiction. A good analogy I heard is that our measurements are like a blurry picture. Does not mean the actual object is blurry, just our picture of it is.

Also the problem is that QC people now take this mathematical approximation and declare it a real thing and try to do magical parallel calculations with it, which is problematic because the thing they wish to use for their calculations does not actually exist. Hence total failure to deliver any practical results despite of billions spent.

I proved total determinism. The rest, whatever it is, must obey that conclusion.

Nothing breaks causality, because it is impossible per the Theorem. The first theorem simply shows that partial indeterminism implies full indeterminism, and both are proven impossible by the second theorem.

I think Pauli's statistical thermodynamics argument would knock just about any hidden variable theory on the head though, wouldn't it? If there's some hidden variable that makes some "bosons" different from others, then we would not get the Stat. TD phenomena we observe.

Furthermore, if you pull down the entire structure of QM, which you would by abolishing the (observationally successful) concept of non-commuting operators, you leave science with less than it has now, rather than more.

11 hours ago, AThinker1 said:

Bell's theorem does not disprove determinism, only local hidden variables, but not non-local ones. Non-local deterministic theories (e.g., Bohmian mechanics) still remain viable.

While non-locality can address causality, it doesn't address determinism. You claim that particles have definite values for all of it's properties. But this implies that Bell's inequalities are satisfied, contrary to the results of various experiments that test Bell's inequalities. The violation of Bell's inequalities by quantum mechanics indicates the violation of realism, the notion that measurement outcomes are well defined prior to and independent of the measurements. However, because quantum states are described by wavefunctions, realism need not be satisfied by quantum mechanics.

1 hour ago, exchemist said:

Furthermore, if you pull down the entire structure of QM, which you would by abolishing the (observationally successful) concept of non-commuting operators, you leave science with less than it has now, rather than more.

Probabilistic estimates are fine and useful. Just don't promote them into actual underlying reality, because by doing so you'd violate direct causality and determinism, which violates (insults) reason itself, and is therefore false.

QM and QC must be pursued on fully deterministic foundation. For example, since particle state is always fully deterministic, superposition is a probabilistic math trick and not an actual physical object that you can use to do calculations with.

52 minutes ago, KJW said:

While non-locality can address causality, it doesn't address determinism. You claim that particles have definite values for all of it's properties. But this implies that Bell's inequalities are satisfied, contrary to the results of various experiments that test Bell's inequalities. The violation of Bell's inequalities by quantum mechanics indicates the violation of realism, the notion that measurement outcomes are well defined prior to and independent of the measurements. However, because quantum states are described by wavefunctions, realism need not be satisfied by quantum mechanics.

Non local realism seems to be a thing.

13 hours ago, AThinker1 said:

The proof is real. Try find an error in it.
As for undetermined state: I agree. Undetermined or unknown state is due to observer ignorance only. It is not due to broken causality, which in principle, is impossible.

I used AI to check my logic. The ideas are all mine. :)

Thanks for the question.

There was no proof. You can't find an error in it because it was a chain of fuzzy statements. If I say, "this person is a 27% flamboyant", there's no way to prove that wrong. It's neither true nor false. It's fuzzy. The terms are ill-defined. The "error", if you will, is in misusing the terms, skipping definitions, etc.

14 hours ago, AThinker1 said:

All aspects of the particle including momentum and position are fully deterministic in a higher dimensional space.

There is no proof of this either. It's impossible to say anything about determinism or the lack of it if there is no rule of evolution or updating. Additional dimensions don't do anything to the deterministic character if the evolution equatioins are stochastic.

14 hours ago, KJW said:

2: The notion of determinism in an unobservable higher dimension seems like a hidden variable theory. Hidden variable theories have been invalidated by Bell's theorem.

I was thinking very much the same thing. Claiming that hidden dimensions make physical systems deterministic would have those play the role of hidden variables.

3 hours ago, AThinker1 said:

Non local realism seems to be a thing.

Non-locality is irrelevant. Realism, whether local or non-local, satisfies Bell's inequalities and therefore fails to satisfy quantum mechanics. It should be noted that the context of Bell's theorem in this discussion is not "spooky action at a distance" but rather the nature of quantum states. That is why non-locality is irrelevant and why realism is significant.

4 hours ago, AThinker1 said:

Probabilistic estimates are fine and useful. Just don't promote them into actual underlying reality,

No problem. Physics doesn’t pretend to speak to an underlying reality. Physics describes how the universe behaves.

4 hours ago, AThinker1 said:

because by doing so you'd violate direct causality and determinism, which violates (insults) reason itself, and is therefore false.

This is just a bullshit argument. As joigus says, it’s fuzzy. Vague. Not rigorous.

As I said before, it’s a you problem. A lot of people don’t find QM to be intuitive but that doesn’t mean it’s wrong.

4 hours ago, joigus said:

There was no proof. You can't find an error in it because it was a chain of fuzzy statements. If I say, "this person is a 27% flamboyant", there's no way to prove that wrong. It's neither true nor false. It's fuzzy. The terms are ill-defined. The "error", if you will, is in misusing the terms, skipping definitions, etc.

Please point out which definitions were skipped, and which terms are fuzzy or ill-defined.

Your critique seems to be 27% flamboyant and fuzzy. ;)

Please be specific. Thanks. 🙏

4 hours ago, joigus said:

There is no proof of this either. It's impossible to say anything about determinism or the lack of it if there is no rule of evolution or updating. Additional dimensions don't do anything to the deterministic character if the evolution equatioins are stochastic.

Theorems 1 and 2 prove that indeterminism, ie lack of direct causality, cannot exist.

4 hours ago, joigus said:

I was thinking very much the same thing. Claiming that hidden dimensions make physical systems deterministic would have those play the role of hidden variables.

Again only local hidden variables are claimed to be invalidated by the Bell's theorem.

Non-local variables are still valid, as also full determinism is still valid under Bell's theorem.

Thanks for your response.

3 hours ago, swansont said:

This is just a bullshit argument. As joigus says, it’s fuzzy. Vague. Not rigorous.

As I said before, it’s a you problem. A lot of people don’t find QM to be intuitive but that doesn’t mean it’s wrong.

Which part seems fuzzy to you?
If you promote probabilities into the status of actual physical object and claim that exact causes for choosing a particular particle state upon measurement don't exist, you have violated direct causality and direct determinism with your probabilism and used reason to deny reason's existence. See proof of Theorem 2.

So, it is quite literally an insult to reason, because you are using reason to deny reasons existence via denying direct causality.

Probabilism is a Band-Aid for an ignorant observer, and it is useful, but it cannot replace direct causality.

Copenhagen denies the existence of direct causality, and thus denies the existence of reason itself. An insult to reason -- literally, because it denies reason's existence as per Theorem 2.

Theorem proof states that reason is obviously part of reality. If reality is indeterministic, (lacks causality and consistency), it would make reason impossible because it needs causality and consistency to exist. And if you use reason to deny reason's existence, that's a self contradiction that proves that indeterminism is impossible, and therefore reality must be fully deterministic.

Which word seems fuzzy here? Will be glad to help.

Edited August 30Aug 30 by AThinker1

4 hours ago, AThinker1 said:

Please be specific. Thanks. 🙏

You missed the point. It's quite pointless to try to be specific about something that doesn't even start to make sense. You're not using the words "proof" or "theorem" in their usual sense.

4 hours ago, AThinker1 said:

Theorems 1 and 2 prove that indeterminism, ie lack of direct causality, cannot exist.

No, they don't. I've proved many theorems. I know what is like to prove a theorem, and the different techniques: direct proof, reductio ad absurdum, mathematical induction, etc.

Yours is not one. No. Nein. нет. いえ.

4 hours ago, AThinker1 said:

Again only local hidden variables are claimed to be invalidated by the Bell's theorem.

Non-local variables are still valid, as also full determinism is still valid under Bell's theorem.

Your variables are neither local nor non-local as you have proposed no particular model. An interaction involving additional dimension in the simplest form involving functions and finite-order derivatives would be local. You would need specific non-local couplings involving infinite-order derivatives to be able to claim the interactions are non-local.

You don't do any of that, so. Your claim is empty. I can ellaborate on that, but I will essentially tell you the same again, and again, ang again...

4 hours ago, AThinker1 said:

Which part seems fuzzy to you?

You keep saying this, as if you were making sense. It doesn't magically start to make sense when you say it for the eleventh time.