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@martillo: Confessing you were wrong is worth a point. Thanks for that.

Yes, it does. You are confusing libertarian free will with libertarianism. Wikipedia: I said: But I know, you have a problematic relation with words.

I once wrote a small exposé about philosophy. I think it is necessary to copy it here completely:

Sorry, made an error with quoting

It can't. Philosophy can help by giving a workable definition of free will, only then, theoretically, it possibly could turn into an empirical question. Do not forget: philosophy doesn't answer empirical questions, for that we have the sciences. Philosophy can help to clarify concepts, find possible alternatives, unmask false arguments, reconstruct presuppositions etc. Really? I studied philosophy, and as said above, philosophy can help clarify questions and concepts, and so make one a little bit more rational. But philosophers are at least as biased as scientists are. Even philosophers are still humans... Newton spent his time mainly on alchemy and theology. And he also made a major contribution to natural philosophy. Just as relevant as your remark. With that 'physically possible' you put yourself into trouble. A determinist would say that given the initial conditions and the laws of nature there will be only one thing physically possible. Except if you think that the possibility is given because of quantum physics (which indeed makes the future unpredictable. But are your actions the result of the throwing of a quantum die? You could use the Quantum Decision-Maker, makes life much easier...) +1. A bit of humour is always enlightening You know what is discussed in modern academic philosophy, don't you? No, you don't. I reveal you at least one philosophical secret: philosophers tend to give arguments for their statements. If you thought to refer to the borg... Nope, Swansont's avatar is not a borg. Ah! Those stupid philosophers! Reflecting on thinking (in sciences, about culture, in ethics) they should stick to some dogmas? (sorry, I realise I become cynical, but you should know me by now, and that I already wrote several postings about what (modern) philosophy is. The times they are a'changin, and therefore philosophy too. Yes, and a mass that is twice another mass falls twice as fast. Aristotle said so, and he was (also) a physicist! That would be possible, isn't it? In this case, it is all about definitions. Yup. But if you do not like to dive into the rabbit hole, why do you do as if you know what is in there? For those I did not make angry, I wrote a short overview here: @dimreepr: the examples I gave at the end might interest you.

I've been ill the last 2 weeks, still not quite healthy. I would like to give just a short overview of different positions in the free will debate, independent of the whole contents of this thread, just in the hope to clarify a little. Conceptually, there are 2 main view points: compatibilism and incompatibilism. Incompatibilism states that determinism and free will do not go together, so one of them is, at least partially, false. Dependent on what is supposed to be false, there are 2 main positions: Determinism is false: this is mainly libertarian free will. What we choose or decide to do, i.e. how we act, is at least partially, independent on previous causes. The mind has some kind of independence from the physical world Free will does not exist at all, it is an illusion played on us by the brain. The extremes of both are dualism (the soul has causal influence on the physical world) in the first case, and what is sometimes called 'hard determinism' (we are 'slaves' of the causal processes in the brain) in the second. Compatibilism of course says that free will and determinism are compatible. It is important to see that compatibilism does not say that (a little bit of) free will is possible in a determined world. It is not some vague compromise between determinism and free will. I think that most compatibilists go even so far that they say that determinism is a necessary condition for free will (I belong to this 'camp'). If, e.g. it turns out that quantum processes play an essential role in brain process, this would be a disturbing factor in our expression of free will, not an opening for free will in an otherwise determined world. It is also necessary to say that these or not just positions, but that for all these positions arguments are given: they are reasoned, grounded positions. So here my first point: Somebody who says 'yes, we have free will!', or just the opposite, has still said nothing. She (or he) must say in which sense. Second point: Next to certain (scientific) facts that all camps must accept, it means that the discussion is about which interpretation is the best one. The question what means 'best' of course opens a complete new can of worms. Third point, not that easy: People come to very different practical conclusions based on their conception of free will, but the rational connections can be loose. Examples: None compatibilist determinists thinking that we should not punish criminals, but therapise them, because without free will they are not responsible None compatibilist determinists saying that for our daily life it makes no difference at all: in the end, society and its judges are just as determined as the criminal Libertarians defending that every individual is completely responsible for his life: if people are poor, then they made the wrong choices in their lives, no need to help them, independent of the country or culture they come from People who think their their lives have no meaning if they have no free will (eh.. which concept of free will?) Compatibilists taking as default position that people have free will, but there are people whose circumstances are so extreme that they cannot be held responsible; or they miss one of the necessary capabilities for free will, e.g. to rationally evaluate their options for actions (maybe Down syndrome as an example?) None compatibilist determinists who say that their position leads to more tolerance to others, and lift the heavy burden of absolute responsibility, like that concept of responsibility that can be found by especially the French existentialists. I have known people falling more or less in a depression because of those views. In the hope that this helps a little to get rid of the sharp tone of the debate in this thread.

But I answered it! Here the complete citation, not just the first part: But they are! But again you are using a vague word, 'responsible'. (you used 'driven' before, also vague). What is this 'responsible'-relationship? You say it is causation, I say it is supervenience. So my answer to your question is simple: there are no other variables. But there are different ways we can look: from the low levels like atoms, molecules, and neurons; or at the higher level of persons, (true) beliefs, actions, motivations, (free) will etc. The latter we are using in day-to-day life, the former by neurologists, biologists etc. And to epiphenomalism: In the fist place, I highlighted the important word: 'cause'. In the second place you left out what more is written there, immediately after your citation: So what is this: mental phenomena are caused by physical processes, but they miss the other half of what causality is: that events, mental events in this case, are caused, but cannot cause other events themselves? And isn't this just evading: I actually haven't. I've said "it depends on how you define it." If not causation, what is it? Or what is then the applicable concept of causation, according to you? I agree with your second sentence. But you have found another word to describe the relation between physical processes, which is again more vague, 'rooted'. I was more specific: it is a relation of supervenience. And everything you wrote about your views on the matter, show for me that you mean causality. And if you want it or not, this stance is called 'epiphenomanilism', with all its problems. From the same Wikipedia article:

Just as a side note: Elbow Room: The Varieties of Free Will Worth Wanting is also the title of a book by Daniel Dennett, in which he defends his compatibilist view on free will. He later wrote another book about it: Freedom Evolves.

Hmm, this might be confusing. You say 'the higher-level event (cognition or mentation) is not determined by the lower-level event (physical or biochemical process)'. I think it is, but not via causation, but supervenience. I do not know if my figurative language helps here: I would say that we can only speak about causation 'between peers'. A firing neuron affects another neuron. Maybe you mean that the same mental phenomenon can be based on different neural constellations. Just as text, text, text and text differ physically, but represent the same: the word 'text'.

That is an interesting point. Yes, that could be. Maybe for consciousness to arise, it is necessary that the processes are rooted in a specific physical substrate, e.g. electromagnetism. But that doesn't deny the idea of supervenience. It surely is not the case that everywhere where electromagnetism is involved, there is also consciousness.

OK, that is not the point I was making: the point I was making is that there is no difference in the physics of what we observe: there is only a difference in how we look at the pixels. In this case from nearby vs from a distance. From nearby we see pixels; from a distance we see text (or should I say 'text'). But we are looking at exactly the same physical object. But they are! But again you are using a vague word, 'responsible'. (you used 'driven' before, also vague). What is this 'responsible'-relationship? You say it is causation, I say it is supervenience. So my answer to your question is simple: there are no other variables. But there are different ways we can look: from the low levels like atoms, molecules, and neurons; or at the higher level of persons, (true) beliefs, actions, motivations, (free) will etc. The latter we are using in day-to-day life, the former by neurologists, biologists etc.

Do you have references for that? Special relativity, mind you. And please only serious sources.

@iNow No, it is not obvious. And it really seems you have some trouble understanding me here. (Usually you haven't). And I am sorry you wrote such a long exposé on something I did not mean. I should have omitted 'you are reading'. My point is the relationship between the pixels and the text. Here I have some pixels, greatly enlarged: Just some colours. In reality it is the cross point of the 'x' in the word 'text' above: (Yes, I have anti-aliasing turned on, therefore these colours). Now: is the word 'text' caused by the pixels, or is the word just the pixels seen from a distance? And that is the point I am making: our mental phenomena are the physical and biochemical processes, just observed from a very different perspective. By assuming that physical and biochemical processes cause mental phenomena, you are indeed entering the arena of epiphenomalism, and that is a dead end. It even leads to a form of dualism. (No I am not AIkonoklazt. But he is right on this point. Pity that he is not more polite.)

Good argument. Is there a causal relationship between the pixels of a monitor and the text you are reading on that monitor?

Remarks on @iNow's summary. Right, I argued for that too. It already means, that if we stand for a decision or choice, and that my action will be a determining factor of my future, I better think well about the consequences of my possible actions and how they fit to my interests. That is of no importance for my concept of free will. So you are attacking the position that consciousness is the primary cause of an action, i.e. you are attacking the concept of 'libertarian free will'. 'Driven'? You mean 'caused', or what? There is a subtlety here: there is no causal relationship between physical and biochemical processes and our mental phenomena. Mental phenomena supervene on these physical and biochemical processes. So yes, mental phenomena are determined, because the processes they are based on are deterministic. But they do not cause mental phenomena. Compare with a book: it is obvious that a book, without its physical existence, cannot exist. It needs paper and ink. But it does not follow that a book is 'just paper with ink' (compare your 'meat bags'). Even stronger, while it is true that books cannot exist without their physical substrate, the essence of the book is its meaningful contents. And these are not dependent on paper and ink: you can read a book on a monitor, you can have it on an ebook reader, you can even listen to it as audio book (or worse, a human reading it to you). But thinking about how to act, we also cannot do without meaning. It arises in the values that flow into my decision how to act. The importance of such narratives is that we identify with our actions: we recognise them as our actions. In some cases we don't identify with our actions: e.g. when I fall to the ground because I stumbled over a stone (this one should not be called an action at all, as there is no intention whatsoever involved). Or if I am coerced to do something: as I did not act according my own motivations, but those of somebody else's, I do not identify with them. Now this could have been a remark of a compatibilist. If it really changes nothing in our existence, we still can use the idea of free will in our daily life. We just get rid of its (meta)physical and ideological ballast. So for me it is not understandable why you stick to an outdated, ideological, inconsistent concept of free will: We had that already before: you are beating a dead horse. What is the fun in giving another proof that 1 does not equal 3? It is inconsistent, so not worth the effort. More important is to convince people that the idea of libertarian free will is inconsistent, and instead give a proper analysis of our behaviour which we call 'free'. You can give examples as much as you want. But the only thing you show, is that the future depends on the actions we decide/choose for. The 'elbow room' lies in the evaluating of the reasons to act in certain ways, in the availability of real options (beaming the survivors out of the jungle pity enough was no option). But this evaluating can be just as well a determined process. For what I mean with real options, see here: PS Why do we hear nothing anymore from you, @Anirudh Dabas? You started the discussion.

Does one 'fix' the temperature with a thermometer?

For the record, I do not say the world is determined: QM shows it isn't. But of course one can play intellectual games, like 'Assume the world is determined: does it mean that in principle everything can be predicted?'. Or of course: 'Assume the world is determined: does it mean that we have no free will?'. My position, maybe not very clear, for free will we need 'sufficient determinism', i.e. we can ignore random processes in the situation we are interested in. And by the way, your 'pun intended': do you see that your 'determine' has another meaning than 'fixed by preceding causes'?

PS this ambiguity can be found in at least the other languages I am familiar with: Dutch: bepalen, or vaststellen German: bestimmen, or feststellen If somebody know other languages in which this ambiguity exist, please post! Martillo, you mother tongue is Spanish, isn't it? Can you enlighten us? Of course! Wiktionary:

No. I think you smuggle in another meaning of 'determined'. Like in 'Can you please determine the temperature?', meaning, 'Can you please measure the temperature?' You could apply the same meaning of 'determined' to a real stochastic process. After a measurement is made, one could say that the value of an observable was determined. But still, the result was not determined, i.e. the result was not fixed by conditions immediately before. If a process is determined or not does not depend on if it is in the past, present or future. The only thing is that when it is in the past, it will not change anymore.

@martillo If it interests you, I once wrote a comment on an article by Hawking on free will:

So you belong to the masses?

Well, it is a fact that we live in a universe that is not deterministic through and through, quantum effects being the exception. However, this is not relevant for free will: free will implies that my actions are really my actions. Quantum jiggles would only be disturbing the connections between my self and my actions. Your other examples can be distinguished in two categories: (partial) ignorance: it is impossible to have a complete overview of all conditions that lead to an event deterministic chaos: microscopic changes in initial conditions lead to macroscopic effects But both these categories are still deterministic! So all three of your 'escape routes' lead to unpredictability, but do not contribute to free will. @iNow and @TheVat: We already had the topic of epiphenomalism: And about consciousness and free will: I listed the reasons why consciousness is an evolutionary advantage: These are all mental processes ('observe', 'see', 'anticipate', 'reflect', 'compare', 'choose'). I have no problem that all these processes run on a determined hardware. But I think it really is not possible to understand free will without taking consciousness into account. But the only thing really necessary to be able to speak about free will, is that I can observe that my actions are according my own motivations.

May I ask it then? Does consciousness play a causal role?

Still looking for words? You should look for definitions. Now "the faculty or power of using one's will" comes very close to my definition. So apply this definition on a will that is causally determined. Then still the question makes sense if we can act according our will or not. This question can be asked independently of how this will has arisen. And here you go again: "sometimes". What are these conditions? I get that. But in discussions it should be clear for everybody what you mean with those 'names'. Obviously you think 'volition' is more than "the faculty or power of using one's will". Nope. Do not use 'determined' in the same meaning as 'predetermined'. 'Predetermined' means that the future is fixed, and that nothing, not even my actions, can change anything. 'Determined', in a naturalistic understanding, means that everything is caused, but our actions are part of the causal network: they have causal impact. That my actions are caused too does not matter. So the key point is that the question if we have free will or not lies in the relationship between my own intentions, and the possibility to act according them. Everything else is either magical thinking, or metaphysical mumbo-jumbo. No: the future is determined and depends on our choices and actions. Do you get it (and TheVat too)? Our choices and actions are parts of the causal network. Our choices and acts matter, the future depends on it. Nope. The world is determined, or it is not. Our possibility to predict the future, even in a determined universe, has nothing to do with it. We in fact know that the future is unpredictable, even when the universe is determined: see chaos theory. Predictability has nothing to do with free will. It has to do with determinism: only in a sufficient determined universe, (scientific) predictions are possible.

Well, you are the one that says that consciousness plays no causal role. That means we could just as well be not-conscious, it would make no difference. This seems unrelated to my stance, so again I'll politely ignore it. Sorry, but again, you are saying that consciousness plays no causal role, so it follows it also plays no role in the big projects humans achieve. And where does the question if an action was free or not plays an essential role: in day-to-day experience. You said: So this is the context: day-to-day experience. Not some (meta)physical ideas about how free free will arises from the deeper layers of reality. It is the opposite: 'free will' is a higher order phenomenon, and the only context where it plays a role is the context in which also other higher level phenomena exist: persons, actions, wishes, beliefs, ideas, laws and regulations, etc. That's why you see only higher level phenomena in my definition of 'free will': the capability to act according one's own motivations. Applying the idea of 'free will' on levels where these higher level phenomena do not exist is a category error. It is not so that an electron has no free will: the concept of free will simply does not apply. Well, a libertarian free will concept would lead to such a conclusion. All I was saying is that for a naturalist a causal foreplay is not astonishing. So why people think these kind of experiments are 'shocking'? Simply, because they stick to a wrong concept of free will, thinking it must be rooted in physical reality, and therefore must be found on that level. And for @martillo: I do not see why the capability to act according one's own motivations is in contradiction with determinism.