Abortion

[Aardvark]

No, the fact that self-awareness comes only through time is not a factor at all, I couldn't care less about the time it takes for the fetus to become self-aware. But it isn't self-aware as a fetus, that's indisputable. That is what I care about. The fact that it lacks the rudimentary capacities, like self-awareness, that make us human[/i'] mean that its not entitled to the same rights as you or I, in my opinion.

 

Not wanting to seem faecitious, but a sleeping person is not self aware. That person has the capacity to become self aware through time, but is not self aware. By your reasoning, a sleeping person is not entitled to the same rights as you ascribe to yourself.

 

How do you deal with this ethical dilemma?

[In My Memory]

Not wanting to seem faecitious' date=' but a sleeping person is not self aware. That person has the capacity to become self aware through time, but is not self aware. By your reasoning, a sleeping person is not entitled to the same rights as you ascribe to yourself.

 

How do you deal with this ethical dilemma?[/quote']

Not wanting to shift the burden of proof, but how would you deal with it? Whatever reason you can come up with, the Singer-ite can probably come up with as well.

 

The reason why awareness over time is even relevant in the first place is because it means a subject can value its own preservation. In the Singer-esque sense, awareness over time is what you call when subjects have a concept of themselves as a continuing subject of experiences and mental states, and as contiuously existing beings.

 

The kind of argument that says something like "people in comas arent conscious, so we shouldnt worry about them" seems to me like contorted linguistics. In reality, there really isnt a reason that I can find that would tell me a person should stop valuing their own lives after a lapse in consciousness (sleep or coma) - provided of course the brain didnt become irreparable damaged in the process. When that much is realized, the ethical dilemma seems to be no less different than than shooting a person in the back without their knowledge.

[Mart]

a sleeping person is not self aware

Wouldn't it be safer to say that a sleeping person has less self-awareness than when they're awake.

This all or nothing stuff bugs me. Of course, if Nature is fundamentally digital then I'll have to rethink

[Aardvark]

Wouldn't it be safer to say that a sleeping person has less self-awareness than when they're awake.

This all or nothing stuff bugs me. Of course' date=' if Nature is fundamentally digital then I'll have to rethink [/quote']

 

No. i think a sleeping person is not self aware at all.

[Aardvark]

This all or nothing stuff bugs me. Of course' date=' if Nature is fundamentally digital then I'll have to rethink [/quote']

 

Agreed.

[Aardvark]

Not wanting to shift the burden of proof, but how would you deal with it? Whatever reason you can come up with, the Singer-ite can probably come up with as well.

 

By not basing my ethical system on the importance of self awareness.

 

The reason why awareness over time is even relevant in the first place is because it means a subject can value its own preservation. In the Singer-esque sense, awareness over time is what you call when subjects have a concept of themselves as a continuing subject of experiences and mental states, and as contiuously existing beings.

 

It is apparent that subjects lacking what we define as self awereness place a very high value on their self preservation. Creatures such as rabbits or foxes high very keen responses to threats to their lives. Yet i think we can agree that they are not what we would term self aware. The fact that these responses could be dubbed instinctive doesn't alter their existence with these creatures clearly experiencing emotions similiar to our own in terms of fear and pain amoungst others.

 

 

The kind of argument that says something like "people in comas arent conscious' date=' so we shouldnt worry about them" seems to me like contorted linguistics. In reality, there really isnt a reason that I can find that would tell me a person should stop valuing their own lives after a lapse in consciousness (sleep or coma) - provided of course the brain didnt become irreparable damaged in the process. When that much is realized, the ethical dilemma seems to be no less different than than shooting a person in the back without their knowledge.[/quote']

 

If you base your ethical system on the importance of self awareness then the logic does impell you to view people in comas as having fewer rights than conscious people. I note that you use the caveat of irrepairable brain damage. In this case fewer rights would be applicable. In which case the argument you dismiss as contorted lingistics becomes the argument that you are propounding.

 

 

On a slightly difference note, how would you define and measure self awareness? If it is to be used as an objective standard in a system of ethics it needs to be defined and measured to be of any meaningful use.

[Mart]

Creatures such as rabbits or foxes high very keen responses to threats to their lives. Yet i think we can agree that they are not what we would term self aware. The fact that these responses could be dubbed instinctive doesn't alter their existence with these creatures clearly experiencing emotions similiar to our own in terms of fear and pain amoungst others.

 

If creatures experience pain they would have to be conscious' date=' wouldn't they? Is it possible to [b']experience[/b] pain and be unconscious (not aware)?

[syntax252]

No. i think a sleeping person is not self aware at all.

 

Well now, I wouldn't be so sure about that.

 

I have had dreams when I knew it was a dream.

 

These dreams usually include people that I know are dead that are walking around and talking to me (in the dream). Also, I have a recurrent dream where I have parked my car and then cannot find it. I have had that one so ofter that about half the time, I realize that it is just a dream.

 

So, if a person is totally unaware of himself, how do you explain that?

[syntax252]

On a slightly difference note' date=' how would you define and measure self awareness? If it is to be used as an objective standard in a system of ethics it needs to be defined and measured to be of any meaningful use.[/quote']

 

Good question.

 

All this talk about animals not being self aware amkes me wonder how one knows that an animal like a fox is not self aware. What is required to be considered self aware?

 

Does a fox understand that he is a fox? He certainly acts like he does. He goes around doing all manner of "foxy" things, like catching rabbits and sleeping in the daytime, and when he breeds, he breeds with other foxes, so whaddya mean by "self aware?"

[Cadmus]

If creatures experience pain they would have[/b'] to be conscious, wouldn't they?

I don't think so. To experience pain requires only a brain to understand pain and a nervous system to transport messages that can be interpreted as pain.

Is it possible to experience pain and be unconscious (not aware)?

I think so. Consciousness is a higher brain activity. Pain is definitely a lower brain activity.

[Mart]

I don't think so. To experience pain requires only a brain to understand pain and a nervous system to transport messages that can be interpreted as pain.

 

I think so. Consciousness is a higher brain activity. Pain is definitely a lower brain activity.

Have you ever had an experience of pain that you didn't experience consciously. If you have, what was it like?

[In My Memory]

It is apparent that subjects lacking what we define as self awereness place a very high value on their self preservation. Creatures such as rabbits or foxes high very keen responses to threats to their lives. Yet i think we can agree that they are not what we would term self aware. The fact that these responses could be dubbed instinctive doesn't alter their existence with these creatures clearly experiencing emotions similiar to our own in terms of fear and pain amoungst others.

Rabbits show lots of signs of their own self-awareness - especially if you are a rabbit owner. They show affection to their owners, they recognize familiar people, they bond with other pets in the house like cats, and if you've had more than one rabbit they definitely have their own personalities - they behave in many unnatural and non-instinctual ways. Foxes are also very intelligent animals, I've never met a fox but they engage in some rather complicated decision making processes and communicate with other foxes - something they couldnt do without a sense of self or some level of conscious thought.

 

The difference between a rabbit's sense of self-preservation and an insect's self-preservation is that rabbits have a conscious interest in their preservation, and a conscious interest in maintaining their continuunious existence.

 

If you base your ethical system on the importance of self awareness then the logic does impell you to view people in comas as having fewer rights than conscious people. I note that you use the caveat of irrepairable brain damage. In this case fewer rights would be applicable. In which case the argument you dismiss as contorted lingistics becomes the argument that you are propounding.

I dont think you are understanding me.

 

I value a sense of self-awareness in my particular ethical system because things with self-awareness have interests and the ability to suffer (suffering isnt limited to physical pain). Having self-awareness and the ability to suffer is a prerequisite to having any interests at all, and therefore deserving of rights to be respected (this is why I dont feel a sense of dread by killing bacteria living on the food I eat or killing a bug which, in my opinion, suffer far less than a cat or a person). Causing things to suffer is morally intolerable - lots of people already feel that way, its just that people like Seditious and I are a peculiar type who apply our sense of ethics equally across the animal kingdom and dont give preferencial treatment to certain beings based on their species membership (that is no more rational than preferencial treatment based on race, gender, or nationality).

 

I only mention irrepairable brain damage because I figured I could save myself a post by clarifying specific scenarios now rather than later - I'm usually very aware of what I write, and how people will interpret it, so sometimes I try to include as much clarifying information as possible so I dont have to go back and forth with another person asking me very pedant questions (in fact, it wouldnt be unusual for someone to notice when I say I might kill insects, then ask me whether I consider insects in my day to day activities as much as other animals - I do, by the way). If you think that makes me one of the most compulsive people ever, you're probably right

 

Since you asked, people in comas with irreparable brain damage dont have fewer rights for the sake that they are unconscious, only because they have no ability to suffer and have no capacity to hold interests. These types of situations are rare, but they do happen - if the situtation comes up when it becomes necessary to weigh the interests of the patient against the interests of those who care for him, then ultimately what happens will favor the interests of the caretakers (without interests of the patient, there is really nothing else to take into account - I apologize if that comes off cold-heartedly).

 

I feel like the topic is beginning to derail a little, so I'll explain why this is relevant to abortion at all:

I dont want to minimize the rights of the fetus. I want to see everything treated equally, which is to say I want equal consideration of the interests of all things. However, a fetus doesnt have these interests, so it isnt obvious to me why a non-rational, non-sentient, being incapable of suffering should be granted more rights than a mother who is definitely rational, sentient, and very capable of suffering.

 

On a slightly difference note, how would you define and measure self awareness? If it is to be used as an objective standard in a system of ethics it needs to be defined and measured to be of any meaningful use.

Why not just limit the ethical implications of awareness to the capacity to suffer and hold interests?

[syntax252]

dont want to minimize the rights of the fetus. I want to see everything treated equally, which is to say I want equal consideration of the interests of all things. However, a fetus doesnt have these interests, so it isnt obvious to me why a non-rational, non-sentient, being incapable of suffering should be granted more rights than a mother who is definitely rational, sentient, and very capable of suffering.

 

Wouldn't the temporary nature of the discomfort of a pregnacy be subordinate to the permanent deprivation of a life?

 

In other words, to take away the chance of living a whole life so that the mother wouldn't have to endure the discomfort of 3 more months of a pregnacy seems like high price to pay, particularly when the one doing the paying had no input in the contract in the first place.

 

Not that there are not perfectly ligitimate reasons for abortion, but shouldn't a person have to have a pretty good reason to do it?

[In My Memory]

Wouldn't the temporary nature of the discomfort of a pregnacy be subordinate to the permanent deprivation of a life?

 

In other words' date=' to take away the chance of living a whole life so that the mother wouldn't have to endure the discomfort of 3 more months of a pregnacy seems like high price to pay, particularly when the one doing the paying had no input in the contract in the first place.[/quote']

That has occurred to me before, but I cant really find a reason how to justify it.

 

The argument to me sounds like "value of life is more important than value of convenience", so I'm really tempted to ask "why is it wrong to deprive a person of life?". When I ask myself that question, I genuinely have a hard time trying to answer the question outside of the fact that it conflicts with people's interests and causes them to suffer. So, I'm back to where I started, and I think to myself that it is wrong to coerce a woman to become a parent against her will whereas the unborn person wont suffer at all.

 

On the other hand, sometimes convenience really does trump the right to life. The right to life really isnt absolute, otherwise we might find ourselves in very unusual ethical dilemmas such as whether we should outlaw contraceptives because they deprive future humans of life. To a more apocalyptic extent, there is a problem of whether a government should take away everything people make above minimum wage for use in aiding starving people overseas, or whether we can harvest the organs of people against their will for use in the people who might need them (these apocalyptic examples are highly unlikely, but shed light on the fact that sometimes the right to life really doesnt come before security or convenience).

[Sayonara]

Rabbits show lots of signs of their own self-awareness - especially if you are a rabbit owner. They show affection to their owners, they recognize familiar people, they bond with other pets in the house like cats, and if you've had more than one rabbit they definitely have their own personalities - they behave in many unnatural and non-instinctual ways.

Ornate and sophisticated responses to stimuli are still just responses to stimuli. Having kept a rabbit with a particularly unique "personality", I have to say I never saw any evidence of conscious thought.

[Aardvark]

The difference between a rabbit's sense of self-preservation and an insect's self-preservation is that rabbits have a conscious interest in their preservation, and a conscious interest in maintaining their continuunious existence.

 

I'm afraid that i don't understand your distinction. In what way can you define a rabbit as being conscious whereas an insect is not? I think it is generally accepted that rabbits act on the instinctive and emotional level rather than the concious level, but even if this were not so, what objective grounds could be used to distinguish them from insects?

 

I value a sense of self-awareness in my particular ethical system because things with self-awareness have interests and the ability to suffer (suffering isnt limited to physical pain). Having self-awareness and the ability to suffer is a prerequisite to having any interests at all' date=' and therefore deserving of rights to be respected

Why not just limit the ethical implications of awareness to the capacity to suffer and hold interests?[/quote']

 

I think you still have left the definition of self awareness open and your phrase 'the capacity to hold interests' does not make any sense to me at all. Beings without self awareness have interests, for instance bees have interests in pollen, protecting the hive and reproduction. Your phrase 'hold interests' seems like an indefinable, ultimately meaningless slogan rather than the basis of a rigourous system of ethics.

 

I'm sorry if this seems rather argumentative, but it is essential to reach a clear understanding of the definitions. What exactly is self awareness? How can self awareness be measured?

 

I hope you understand that i am not arguing for the sake of arguing, but am trying to have a serious discussion on this matter.

[john5746]

Not that there are not perfectly ligitimate reasons for abortion' date=' but shouldn't a person have to have a pretty good reason to do it?[/quote']

 

I think so, you think so and many people think so. Now, it is a very different thing to have the government say so.

[Aardvark]

So, I'm back to where I started, and I think to myself that it is wrong to coerce a woman to become a parent against her will whereas the unborn person wont suffer at all.

 

I think you are mistaken on a point of fact here. Foetuses have been clearly shown to react to pain in a manner which demonstrates suffering. Pain is one of the most primitive parts of our physical make up, there is every reason to believe that it develops in foetuses at a very early stage.

 

 

To a more apocalyptic extent, there is a problem of whether a government should take away everything people make above minimum wage for use in aiding starving people overseas, or whether we can harvest the organs of people against their will for use in the people who might need them (these apocalyptic examples are highly unlikely, but shed light on the fact that sometimes the right to life really doesnt come before security or convenience).

 

You seem to assume that we will agree that these scenarios are obviously absurd. On the contrary, i can see a real argument to be made for them. As such i don't think that they work in backng your argument that security or convenience can come before life.

[Sayonara]

Foetuses have been clearly shown to react to pain in a manner which demonstrates suffering.

How?

[Aardvark]

Both by observation of foetuses reactions during ultra sound scans and by dissection.

 

The facts are,

 

It has been definitely established that by the 26th week of pregnancy all the pain receptors, the relevant nerve pathways, the spinal cord, the thalamus and the cerebrel cortex are fully operational. At the most conservative estimate by this stage the foetus will fully experience pain if hurt.

 

The pain receptors have developed by the 7th week of pregnancy, but as the brain is still not fully formed it is ambigous what the foetus will experience.

 

My hypothesis is,

 

Pain is one of the most fundamental senses, even when all other senses have failed to be developed, in babies born without sight or hearing, the ability to feel pain is universal. This would mean that it is reasonable to hypothesis that this sense develops relatively early in the womb.

[Cadmus]

Have you ever had an experience of pain that you didn't experience consciously. If you have, what was it like?

I think that it is fair to say that everyone experiences pain at an unconcious level. I don't know how to answer you what it was like.

 

Have you ever felt pain? If you remember your experience of pain, then I think that it is safe to suggest that you experienced that pain at a conscious level. However, did the pain go from non-existence to awareness instantaneously, like a car going from 0 to 60 instantaneouslY? By this, I mean to suggest that it is possible for pain to progress in such a way that your body is in discomfort and that there is pain occuring even before your conscous mind becomes aware of it. The degree of discomfort need not reach the level that you are consciously aware of it before it can be classified as pain, I think.

[Cadmus]

Not that there are not perfectly ligitimate reasons for abortion, but shouldn't a person have to have a pretty good reason to do it?

I agree that people should only have an abortion if there is a pretty good reason for doing so. However, I suspect that no one volunteers for an abortion without what that person thinks is a good reason for doing so.

 

Do you think that a large percentage of people who have abortions do not believe that they have a pretty good reason for doing so? I think that whether or not you personally agree that their reasons are good or not should not be relevant to their decision as to whether or not their reasons are sufficiently good.

[In My Memory]

Sayonara,

Ornate and sophisticated responses to stimuli are still just responses to stimuli. Having kept a rabbit with a particularly unique "personality", I have to say I never saw any evidence of conscious thought.

Are you a behaviorist by any chance?

 

Aardvark,

I'm afraid that i don't understand your distinction. In what way can you define a rabbit as being conscious whereas an insect is not? I think it is generally accepted that rabbits act on the instinctive and emotional level rather than the concious level, but even if this were not so, what objective grounds could be used to distinguish them from insects?

I'm not an animal expert, you'll have to ask someone who is to get a more technical answer than I could give. But from what I know, insects act like little automatons, they behave in pre-programmed ways. I've heard about insects having conscious experiences before - although I havent researched those claims to a great extent, from what I already know about insect behavior and how they operate I am a little skeptical.

 

Rabbits and higher mammals seem to have many of the same brain structures in common (they are almost physiologically identical), so I dont think its a stretch to assume they might have a conscious experience of the world. A lot of people seem to have a misconception that humans and human experiences are "special" (whatever that means), but the truth is that many other animals have much more acutely-tuned senses than humans, so I dont see an obvious reason to assume consciousness is unique to humans.

 

I'm not a neurology expert, so its difficult for me to be able to explain in my own words what grounds to detect consciousness. Off the top of my head, I imagine something is conscious if at minimum it can have mental experiences and understand its experiences (I hope that isnt circular logic).

 

I remember asking a friend who is much smarter than I am in topics about the brain and consciousness, and I was pointed to this article called Inner speech and conscious experience. It correlates the experience of human consciousness to a region in the pre-frontal cortex that is responsible for internal monologue (this is important because it allows you to say to yourself "I look nice today, my dress fits very well, I am me"). Its very difficult to develop a sense of self if you cant talk to yourself.

 

Again, I'm not an animal expert, but if rabbit brains are as similar to human and other mammalian brains, then they can probably talk to themselves. Checking for activity that appears organized passing through the internal-monologue regions of the brain is a possible indication of a sense of self.

 

I think you still have left the definition of self awareness open and your phrase 'the capacity to hold interests' does not make any sense to me at all. Beings without self awareness have interests' date=' for instance bees have interests in pollen, protecting the hive and reproduction. Your phrase 'hold interests' seems like an indefinable, ultimately meaningless slogan rather than the basis of a rigourous system of ethics.

 

I'm sorry if this seems rather argumentative, but it is essential to reach a clear understanding of the definitions. What exactly is self awareness? How can self awareness be measured?

 

I hope you understand that i am not arguing for the sake of arguing, but am trying to have a serious discussion on this matter.[/quote']

No worries, I dont feel like you are being argumentative at all.

 

I think I've answered what self-awareness is and a possible way to measure it above. So now, to explain what an interest is:

 

If you are familiar with some of the technial definitions that Peter Singer uses, he defines an "interest" at its most fundamental level as something that a being consciously desires or seeks to avoid (i.e. a cat has an interest in not being tormented because it does not want to suffer, at the same time it doesnt make sense to talk about the interests of a bee because supposedly they have no cognitive capacity). The semantics are interesting, but otherwise valid.

 

Of course, the above definition needs a little clarification: whether we should respect certain interests depends on their outcome (and how they affect the interests of other agents). That is why it doesnt make any sense to say that we should respect the interests of a serial killer.

 

I think you are mistaken on a point of fact here. Foetuses have been clearly shown to react to pain in a manner which demonstrates suffering. Pain is one of the most primitive parts of our physical make up, there is every reason to believe that it develops in foetuses at a very early stage.

Most abortions take place in the first 12 weeks, and almost none take place after 24. The earliest a brain can experience sensations of pain is about 30 weeks in gestation, before that time it is probably inappropriate to interpret some of the reflexes and movements of a fetus as genuine expressions of pain.

 

I think most of the very late-term abortions (after 20 weeks) take place if the fetus has died the womb, has a condition that it will never gain consciousness, or will severely disable the mother. In the first two cases cases, fetal pain doesnt become an issue, and in the last case fetal-anesthetic is admistered.

 

In actuality, I think some states like California require by law a special type of fetal-anestetic is administered before performing any kind of late-term abortion.

 

You seem to assume that we will agree that these scenarios are obviously absurd. On the contrary, i can see a real argument to be made for them. As such i don't think that they work in backng your argument that security or convenience can come before life.

Of course! The aforementioned examples arent meant to be an exhaustive account, just a general approach to considering what kind of practical limits there are to the sanctity of life (most people I notice find the examples unreasonable not because they are wrong, but because they are so wildly unbelievable).

[Mart]

I think that it is fair to say that everyone experiences pain at an unconcious level. I don't know how to answer you what it was like.

I think we're using the word experience in two different ways. My use means "what it is like" for me. When I say "I feel pain" I'm referring to an unpleasant experience that I can tell you about. I'm not referring to the source of the pain (the injury) or to the body's unconscious response to that injury. You can see my injury but you can't see my pain.

[Sayonara]

Are you a behaviorist by any chance?

You don't have to be a behaviourist to spot anthropomorphisation.

 

 

I'm not a neurology expert, so its difficult for me to be able to explain in my own words what grounds to detect consciousness. Off the top of my head, I imagine something is conscious if at minimum it can have mental experiences and understand its experiences (I hope that isnt circular logic).

... and ...

Again, I'm not an animal expert, but if rabbit brains are as similar to human and other mammalian brains, then they can probably talk to themselves. Checking for activity that appears organized passing through the internal-monologue regions of the brain is a possible indication of a sense of self.

If one is not even sure what consciousness is, and one has no empirical data or repeatable tests that in any way indicate that a rabbit or similar is conscious, then what reason is there to ascribe that characteristic to it as a means of supporting an argument?