3 hours ago, DrmDoc said:

If one is focused on the philosophy of consciousness rather than science of consciousness, then I understand why one may not understand how my definition of consciousness contributes to this discussion.

I think you should make clearer what the differences between philosophy of consciousness and science of consciousness are. Science should always take a 'third party' viewpoint. It looks at its object of interest from a neutral view point, i.e. knowledge it gathers, must be valid for other observers too. This, per definition excludes the 'me' and 'you' perspective, exactly the perspectives where consciousness is most 'visible'. So how you define consciousness is a methodological restriction to which all science is necessary subjected. Your definition, 'the awareness suggested by an organism's observed behavioral responses to stimuli', is so to speak a proxy for science to investigate consciousness.

Dennett suggests another approach: heterophenomenology, which opens a door at least to the 'you perspective'. And do not forget one of my disclaimers:

There is no such thing as philosophy-free science; there is only science whose philosophical baggage is taken on board without examination.

3 hours ago, DrmDoc said:

The philosophy of consciousness, in my opinion, perceives consciousness as some singular operant of our being or some etheral, overriding sense of self that comprise our individuality or nature.

Philosophy speaks with many voices, you pick out just one: and nowhere I mentioned an 'etheral, overriding sense of self that comprise our individuality'.

3 hours ago, DrmDoc said:

A tenet of evolution suggests to me that those complex physical systems you've described that give rise to complex behaviors are adaptions that likely evolved from less complex, earlier systems.

Sure: there must be an evolutionary advantage for this complexity of behaviour. But what is interesting is that this seems to lead necessarily to consciousness,in the first and second party perspective. At least it is difficult to see how a (human) animal can anticipate what will or might happen in its environment, and even more, can see what might happen dependent on its own possible actions, and then select its action dependent on the most advantageous action without being aware of itself.

4 hours ago, DrmDoc said:

I perceive the responses of the brain to homoestasis instability as something akin to noise-cancelling; whereas, other organs reponses appear to employ entirely different processes.

Really? The kidneys do this too, it is 'chemical substances cancelling'. But with the kidneys we can safely take the third party perspective: here this perspective is not a crutch to approach the object of research.

4 hours ago, DrmDoc said:

Simplistically, those areas receiving thalamic dispersals become neurally attuned to the frequency of those impulses, which is what I perceive as memory and learning, then those areas generate comparable neural impulses or feedback to the thalamus to effectively buffer or suppress the thalamus incessant impulses.

Eh? Well this is highly speculative. And why should I perceive this? Nothing in the purely scientific approach suggest that perception by 'I' plays a role, because it is excluded from the beginning, as an methodologically limitation of science. Unless one takes first- and second party perspectives seriously, one is far away from an explanation of consciousness. Heterophenomenology is an Ansatz to break this barrier.

18 hours ago, Eise said:

I think you should make clearer what the differences between philosophy of consciousness and science of consciousness are. Science should always take a 'third party' viewpoint. It looks at its object of interest from a neutral view point, i.e. knowledge it gathers, must be valid for other observers too. This, per definition excludes the 'me' and 'you' perspective, exactly the perspectives where consciousness is most 'visible'. So how you define consciousness is a methodological restriction to which all science is necessary subjected. Your definition, 'the awareness suggested by an organism's observed behavioral responses to stimuli', is so to speak a proxy for science to investigate consciousness.

Dennett suggests another approach: heterophenomenology, which opens a door at least to the 'you perspective'. And do not forget one of my disclaimers:

There is no such thing as philosophy-free science; there is only science whose philosophical baggage is taken on board without examination.

To clarify, science is a methodology by which objective evidence may be found that either supports or invalidates a hypothesis. The philosophy of consciousness suggest to me a perspective of consciousness that isn't grounded by the evidence good science provides. Espousing some fundamental nature of consciousness without a objective basis in science is philosophy and it's speculative at best, religion at worst. My definition for consciousness speak to an objective method in science for investigating and identifying whether an organism is aware, which is a quality essential for investigating whether an organism possesses that measure of consciousness that produces a mind.

19 hours ago, Eise said:

Philosophy speaks with many voices, you pick out just one: and nowhere I mentioned an 'etheral, overriding sense of self that comprise our individuality'.

True, and my apologies if my comments implied that you did. I was merely conveying the voice of philosophy I hear whenever it speaks in a science forum.

19 hours ago, Eise said:

Sure: there must be an evolutionary advantage for this complexity of behaviour. But what is interesting is that this seems to lead necessarily to consciousness,in the first and second party perspective. At least it is difficult to see how a (human) animal can anticipate what will or might happen in its environment, and even more, can see what might happen dependent on its own possible actions, and then select its action dependent on the most advantageous action without being aware of itself.

It really isn't difficult to understand anticipatory behaviors with an understanding of the likely path of our brain's evolution. Those behaviors are the effects our prefrontal cortex contributes to the thalmocortical loop--but I digress...

19 hours ago, Eise said:

Really? The kidneys do this too, it is 'chemical substances cancelling'. But with the kidneys we can safely take the third party perspective: here this perspective is not a crutch to approach the object of research.

The difference is that our thoughts and behaviors are exclusive to our central nervous system (CNS) rather kidney function. Kidney function regards what happens within that structure, while our CNS mediates what happens internal and external to the body.

19 hours ago, Eise said:

Eh? Well this is highly speculative. And why should I perceive this? Nothing in the purely scientific approach suggest that perception by 'I' plays a role, because it is excluded from the beginning, as an methodologically limitation of science. Unless one takes first- and second party perspectives seriously, one is far away from an explanation of consciousness. Heterophenomenology is an Ansatz to break this barrier.

As Sohan Lalwani provided in earlier comments, its called the thalmocortical loop in which the thalamus is believed to "largely acts as a relay and modulator". It's well established and well researched. My comments were simplified and provided my perspective of how that loop operates. There is no first, second, or third party to that loop, merely the neural contributions and exchanges between the thalamus and the cerebrum that modulate our thoughts and mediates our behaviors. I welcome your continued interest.

Hello All,

I began this latest round of discussions declaring the thalamus as the likely brain structure from which our sense of self arises. If it wasn't clear from my previous comments, my reasoning behind this is the well established, empirical truth that all sensory roads to the upper regions of our central nervous system (CNS) lead initially to the thalamus. From the moment in vitro, when our CNS developes the capacity to receive sensory data, it is the thalamus that receives the initial impact of that data and distributes that sensory information to all regions of brain structure.

Think about it for moment, everything that has a physical/materail impact on our sensory system is initially and primarily detected by the thalamus and what impacts us physically/materially is how we derive our physical/material sense of self. How we physically determine what we are and who are is dependent on our physical sensory and that sensory doesn't reach any region of the cerebrum without first impacting the thalamus; therefore, it is our thalamus that relays in total what impacts our physical sense of self and the thalamus that, uncontrovertibally and at a minimum, give rise to our physical sense of who and what we are. It's simple algebra--if a=b, and b=c, then a=c!