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Graded potentials & Consciousness


ahmet
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hi,

although my question is way clear,I could not find a proper written (academic) material to prove it.

Question/Query: " I (state/claim) that in order to obtain consciousness we would  definitely need an action potential,  but not a graded potential because ...

a graded potential is just along with a neuron rather than jumping over neurons one by one. because its name is graded potential. 

....."

I need a published material (academic please). Almost all of texts (articles , book chapters) I read mentioning with both descriptions but do not clearly use the sentence I would see ,like above.

I fear ,I am lacking..

but any help will be appreciated.

 

 

 

 

( similar meanings

1) graded potentials cannot cause perception. 

2) Action potential is mandatory in order to say "perception exists"

3) when a graded potential jumps over one neuron to another ,its name is not a graded potential anymore, its name an action potential )

 

Edited by ahmet
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  • 2 weeks later...

a comment: I asked the core particle of question to one of my old hodja's (professor) and she confirmed the information but did not specify any source. 

(she confirmed that graded potential could not cause "consciousness/perception" (but I do not remember which one consciousness or perception. )

maybe it is better to revise the question as in: "can graded potentials ensure anyone perceive anything" OR " are action potentials mandatory to perceive anything?

Edited by ahmet
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