Giles

Then you'll be fine.

If the main consideration for consumers was efficiency, then the comparison would be valid, but more usually its "whatever is easiest in the short term".

i lost 30 seconds of my life to this thread.

Depending on conditions, sometimes it pays a virus to use the host to produce more virus particels, and sometimes it pays to just sit in the host genome and be replicated along with it. the (bacterio-)phage lambda virus is a simple example of this. There are non-functioning relics of HIV-like viruses in some mammalian genomes - it seems that such viruses eventually just become a permanent resident of the host genome, a sort of evolutionary equilibrium between host and parasite.

apparently the difference between your head and feet would allow about .1 seconds of pain if you fell feet-first into a black hole...

"more evolved" is a very vague term, but i'll tackle a few perspectives: - The idea of some organisms being "more evolved" or "higher" than others is really nonsense. No organism can be more evolved than any other, since they are all held to have an equally long evolutionary history. Nevertheless, the term 'higher organism' is used by biologists to describe either eukaryotic organisms (those whose cells have internal membranes) or true multicellular organisms. - The use of DNA is a more advanced (in limited temporal terms) adaptation than RNA in the sense that it appeared later in evolutionary history. - However, just because DNA is double-stranded does not mean that double-stranded RNA is 'more advanced' than single-stranded, except in the limited temporal sense mentioned already. DNA is usually double-stranded because of the mechanism of replication used, and so that it remains inert when not in use (at which point the helix is temporarily unwound to reveal the seperate strands). - Double-stranded RNA is found in HIV because of the way it works. Most viruses want to get into a cell, and immediately start reproduction, for which single-stranded RNA is useful because it is what is used to make proteins. - It is possible that the genetic material used by viruses is actually a simplification of more 'modern' systems, as viruses may have evolved from cell components (such as bacterial plasmids) which "went rogue". Viruses are parasites, and parasites tend to cast off anything not directly related to reproduction if they can get it from the host instead. note also that the size and nature of the genome is likely to be limiting to the generation time of the virus, whereas other factors are more important in 'higher' organisms. i can go into more detail if you want. biologists tend to use language in sloppy way when describing evolution, which can be misleading. it is best just to think in terms of adaptations being gained and lost.

assuming we can agree a quantitative definition of EQ, IQ, importance and success then you may be right.

If you multiply shoe size by hat size you get a consistent index, but what real quantity are you measuring? It is the same with IQ.

Is that true of all damaged regions? My grandfather has recently suffered short term memory loss due to a series of minor strokes.

Actually that only makes quark matter, electrons and photons 'etheric', which isn't everything. And it desn't explain what you mean by etheric. Developing a medical model which includes physics not in the standard model is probably a bad idea. Finally, this doesn't actually define etheric. While that would follow from your previous post, i don't see what being "ultramolecular" (i assume this means on a molecular scale or larger) has to do with it. How can you claim it is undetectable if it has a detectable effect? If it interacts with RNA, for example, we could measure it by looking for non-standard results in gel-electrophoresis. If it produces effects no different from currently characterised behaviour, which is explained by current physical theory, then you notion of ether is excluded from the model by occam's razor, and excluded more generally from any empirical system. Those are all seperate, empirically defined phenomena or terms in mathetical equations describing them , which may not be percepitible to humans in the same way as a brick or its mass, but have the same kind of existence. Everything else you said I can't follow because i'm a biologist not a... whatever you call youself.

Considering that the history of life on earth, it seems likely that most ecosystems will be in a primitive, 'simple' state. While big complex ecosystems can be detected by, for example, spectrographs which show an atmospheric composition that is not chemically sustainable by normal geological processes (exceptional geological activity has its own distinct signatures), simple bacterial-type ecosystems (probably almost all of them) will only be picked up by sampling . Finding these will let us learn about exo-biology. Even if you don't care about that per se, it will help us discover more complex ecosystems.

How does 'symptom recognition' work? Antigen recognition is well documented. How do disease-causing agents (or other recognisable effects) cross the blood-brain barrier to reach the 'homeostatic centre'? How do you account for known causal pathways in well-studied disease organisms? How does the immune system signal the brain? How does this model account for the normal modes and functions of 'memory' in the immune system? Name one disease for which the 'homeostatic' disease mechanism is documented at the molecular level. Why do disease-causing organisms generate symptoms in tissue culture, or in other organisms without a central nervous system? Why, if the homeostatic centre operates on signals from the immune system, does 'resolution' depend on symptom discrimination rather than antigen discrimination? How does this model incorporate the concept of adaptation at all? etc.

The idea that recent changes in temperature could be attributed to the ending of an ice age has mostly been dismissed. Temperatures should be going up, but they should not be going up as fast as they have been. This is largely down to more comprehensive and accurate temperature data, but also partly down to the fact that temperature is not the only measure of the state of the climate. Global temperature averages conceal local effects, which will depend on local eco- and weather systems. Heat energy which melts ice, for example, doesn't make the air warmer at the same time. Furthermore, from recent changes in the behaviour of phenomena like el nino, it is pretty clear something is up.

Is something under the planck length forbidden from interacting at all, or forbidden from interacting in such a way that its size can be determined?

normally you would probably be right faf, but the polymerase should require a properly matched pair to synthesise a new chain on the end of (DNA polymerases can't start new chains without a free 3'-OH on the DNA or RNA "primer strand"). The problem is that page 249 of alberts et al. (4th ed.) describes an E. coli mutant with a 'defective' proofreading exonuclease, which apparently cause errors to accumulate, which implies synthesis is going on. (p. 242 of the same book makes it pretty clear it shouldn't) i wonder if this particular mutant has some other property too, which allows synthesis to carry on.

The important thing about the viewpoint i've been articulating is that statements are empirically (and/or logically) defined in the first place. Any statement without empirical or logical content is entirely meaningless. If something in a simulation is indistinguishable by any means from being in 'reality', then obviously there is no empirical or logical way to define 'reality' as seperate from the simulation, so any statement which depended on the distinction would neccesarily be meaningless. For example, "We don't live in reality, but in a simulation completely indistinguishable from reality", is like saying, "We don't live in reality, we live in reality, which is exactly like reality". Such meaningless statements are obviously excluded from any scientific model. I feel at this point i should point out that rigorous, reasonable and useful epistemologies (or indeed, languages) aren't neccesarily the same thing

It's a long shot, but does anyone know whether knocking out the associated mismatch-repair exonuclease (so it is present but non-functional) stops DNA synthesis by the main DNA replicase in its tracks when a mismatch occurs, or just slows down synthesis? I know the answer might differ for the various types, but i think i can cope with the shock... (I ask because the normally excellent MBoC seems to contradict itself on this : / )

EDIT: whoops, missed say's and MrL's posts. I'll leave this anyway 'cos it adds detail. "2+2=5" is clearly wrong, by the definitions of 2,+,= and 5. "I am a rhino" is clearly wrong, because the term 'rhino' describes an empirical phenomen, the features of which i do not have. "e=mc^3" is wrong, because it claims to describe all cases of the mass/energy relation, but if you actually measure that relation in any specific case it does not fit with that statement.

Yes, any of the empiricists, but Karl Popper is the generally accepted chappy. two points he makes that may be of interest to you - (i) Scientific theories are general propositions about (groups of) empirical phenomena, which can't be proven by evidence, but can be disproven. (ii) It is logically impossible to assign a 'probability of being correct' to such a statement using a finite sample of evidence (NB this is different from significance testing, which is about the probability of individual results coming about due to chance rather than the sought-after causality). these points are purely logically, so they cannot be refuted. as they form the basis of the scientific method, it is daft to suggest that the scientific method is a matter of faith. scientific conclusions, on the other hand, can be the subject of belief. However, i think the average scientist's attitude is better described as "provisional acceptance". For those in the habit of posting pseudo-scientific theories, remember that Popper's theorems do/ allow hypotheses to be certainly rejected.

Not all oxbridge colleges - indeed, not all interviewers even within one subject at one college - are looking for the same things. For example, maths proffessors prefer blondes.

Tom, insofar as you are making an evidential argument i completely agree. I thought you were getting at the logical possibilities for a designer. And I did say brain-analogue; i assumed it would cause the godlike mind much as our brains cause our 'mundane' minds. IDers are less likely to hide in the supernatural realm, but rather invoke other natural realms, possibly with other physical laws (possibly a "multiverse" or "cosmos" of which our reality/universe is just a part").

Tom, while I like your argument, I think it is "only" a novel subset of the general argument that complexity can't be expected to just happen*. Furthermore, if IDers are prepared to posit a non-corporeal mind i suspect they would be willing to posit a brain-analogue instead, which would then cause the mind. *This raises problems for non-design theories of course, which are only partly cleared up with the anthropic principle. __________________ one last try on sorting this out... Perhaps I should have said "sourced in external reality", but i hope that was clear from implication. I don't see that the rest can be argued with. As far as I can see, you are insisting on a completely certain method of obtaining knowledge to underpin science. This is impossible with any empirical method, because there is no way to go from a true specific statement to a true general statement. Induction would be such a method, but it doesn't exist. (see below) However, a true specific statement can falsify a general statement, because the two can contradict. As descriptive statements are defined empirically, they can be neccesarily true with respect to a single observation. If they contradict with a general statement which is also empirically defined, then the general statement must be false. Therefore, there is no innate flaw with checking for falsity in any empirical statement. As I have said, this might never actually lead to us finding an even remotely precise and accurate theory, but, (possibly for anthropic reasons) it has. ...with respect to your specific charges... The only generalization I have made so far is " No one takes induction seriously anymore.". What I meant was this: Induction was among the earliest western theories of scientific knowledge, but it was fatally flawed. Many of those who understood the problems with it - even figures such as Kant - tried to patch it up instead of abandoning it. The vienna circle did take induction seriously, but their most prominent members - popper, wittgenstein, and godel - all rejected it, offering instead their various critiques of knowledge. The cambridge school was forced to follow their lead. Subsequent debate has centred around "kuhn vs. popper", and while popper remains popular with (physical) scientists, and kuhn with scholars of the humanities and social sciences, there is growing recognition that the dichotomy is false. Of course my statements employ rhetorical devices to some extent, as i'm trying to structure my argument so it is clear and precise. I freely admit i'm writing to persuade too. As for the twit comment, I don't make such remarks lightly. I stand by it for now - but it is just a theory so feel free to prove me wrong. While feynman had much of worth to say on the practical side of the scientific methodology, his philosophy of science isn't (in my view) as coherent, rigorous, precise or subtle as popper's. He's not really authoritative on non-physics topics, you should stop using him.

Feynman's theories aren't 'sourced' in reality you twit, they are sourced from his head. No one takes induction seriously anymore. They describe reality.

Yes, he developed several theories which said reality had certain (empirically defined) properties. So far his theories appear to be sound, but they are open to falsification. ergo, they are scientific.

I really don't think that it matters that the definition of reality is a metaphysical rather than scientific proposition, because that statement 'that object is real' is a scientific proposition as i've outlined above. The first sentence is correct. Assigning probabilites to statements like "e=mc^2" or "the mechanism of evolution is darwinian" is a logical fallacy. Science works because it makes statements that can't be verified but can be falsified. I've already explained empiricism. There are good reasons why Karl Popper is considered the definitive philosopher of science. jakepi, showing that darwinian models can work in nature isn't the same thing as showing they account for the history or life on earth, which is the contested point.