Davy_Jones

My own position would probably lie closest to that of Bas van Fraassen's "constructive empiricism". Roughly: 1. Scientific theories/statements are truth applicable (They are the kinds of things that can be true or false) 2. The epistemic warrant is insufficient to believe anything science says about unobserveable reality 3. Science aims for "empirical adequacy", i.e., saving the appearances. Hmm, information can be true or false, right? (One can get bad [i.e. untrue] information) Knowledge is, by defintion, true.

I respectfully suggest not, sir. You use the word as everyone else does. Your intuitions just need to be "teased" a little. Two pages ago I said this: QUOTE Well, guys, on your account--that knowledge doesn't imply truth--we should be able to say the following: "It was once known that the Earth is flat. It is now known that the Earth is (roughly) spherical. The Earth has been known to be both flat and spherical." Now, no one has dibs on how the English language has to be used. Speak any way you like. All is I can say is: if you'd be willing to give a lecture to 100 knowledge thirsty students and say that (above), your cajones are bigger than mine. UNQUOTE Would you feel comfortable saying something like that? Radical skepticism of the Cartesian demon or the brain in a vat type always lurks in the background. I'm not sure it can be refuted. That said, it's not a position that is taken seriously these days -- even by philosophers. (Though you can always count on one or two exceptions) Edit: You might say we all work on the assumption that we are not brains in vats or victims of a Cartesian demon or puppets in the Matrix. It causes me no sleepless nights. How about you?

What I said was: "It's like me saying to a baseball player "If you read some history of baseball you might understand baseball better." Notice the "like". It was offered as a comparison, an analogy. What I did say (non-comparatively) was indeed philosophy, in particular the philosophy of science, that is, the examination of what TheVat and myself have been calling metascientific issues (questions about science as a whole, as opposed to the nuts and bolts of any given theory). That is, there are people who devote careers to examining issues such as method, demarcation (how, if at all, is science to be demarcated from non-science?), confirmation, evidence, falsification, explanation, scientific modes of inference, scientific epistemology (are scientific claims to knowledge worthy of belief?), realism, antirealism, etc., etc. To my mind, it is the most obvious of platitudes, and by no means impertinent or condescending, that one who has devoted a career to studying X is likely to know more about X than one who has not, just as the professional historian of science is likely to know more about the history of science than the average working scientist. Were I, say, to stand up in front of a group of physicists and lecture on the ins and outs of some esoteric physical theory, I would no doubt make a complete fool of myself. It seems, however, that certain scientists (including some here) labor under the misapprehension that they can wax lyrically on philosophy--having read little or nothing on the subject--and not sound woefully naive. (ask Eise -- he/she appears to be philosophically literate) A few examples might help. Among other absurdities, the following views have been expressed during my short time here: 1. Science in general, or physics in particular, does not describe, or does not try to describe, reality. (How exactly is describing the trajectory of a cannonball, say, not describing reality?) 2. Knowledge does not imply truth. 3. Certain members continue to speak of "The Scientific Method". (I'll happily quote you philosophically literate scientists who say as I do -- there is no such thing; it's a myth). 4. The model is not the reality (er, true, but why does anyone need to be told this? No one--except the insane, perhaps--thinks a model Boeing 747 is a Boeing 747) I could go on . . . None of this is intended to be offensive to anyone. It's my own personal hope that we might all learn from each other. It's the reason I'm here.

@swansont How exactly is suggesting that a little philosophy might help you in understanding your enterprise better to be construed as me telling you how to do your job? It's like me saying to a baseball player "If you read some history of baseball you might understand baseball better." And him retorting "Don't tell me how to do my job!!" In other words, a non-sequitur.

Er, 'scuse me? Where did I tell you how to do your job?

Well, first of all, it was TheVat who said that (the blanket assertion thing), not me. Personally speaking, I believe a little delving into the philosophy of science would help scientists understand their own enterprise better . . . and perhaps avoid making very silly "metascientific" statements (i.e. statements about science) as people such as Richard Dawkins and Lawrence Krauss routinely do. I know it's a hard pill for many scientists to swallow that they may not be the most knowledgeable people when it comes to metascientific questions. No one does science better than scientists; it does not follow, however, that no one knows more about science than scientists. You would concede, I assume, that a professional historian of science is likely to know more about the history of science than your average working scientist? No one plays baseball better than the players themselves; it does not follow that the players are the most knowledgeable people about baseball.

It's far from obvious to me that philosophers of science, or philosophers of any kind, are trying to help scientists align a laser into a single-mode optical fiber . . . any more than a plumber is. What they are trying to do, I daresay, is bring some measure of clarity and understanding.

Speaking literally, to have knowledge of Harry Potter you would have to believe, or be able to say, some true things about Harry Potter. Now, anyone who has had the misfortune to suffer through a course in the philosophy of language will know that the first 34 years are devoted to examining the sentence "The present king of France is bald". The subject term ("the present king of France") fails to refer, as they say, on the grounds there is no present king of France.. There is some disagreement over whether such a sentence should be assigned a value of false, or neither true nor false. No one, however, at least no one I know of, thinks the sentence might be true. To even stand a chance of saying something true, the subject term must refer. Let's take "Donald Trump"-- a term that refers-- as our example: 1. "Donald Trump is American" 2. "Donald Trump is Canadian" The first statement is true; the second is false (as far as I'm aware). Now, try for yourself with a non-referring term: 1. "Pegasus [insert predicate here]" 2. "The largest prime number [insert predicate here]" I think you'll find--on the assumption that neither entity exists-- that nothing true can be said of either (with the possible exception of "Pegasus does not exist"). Since nothing true can be believed or said of Pegasus, one cannot have knowledge of Pegasus (note possible exception above). Same goes for Harry Potter. Now, any philosophy of language has to deal with fiction, i.e., non-literal statements. There is no consensus on how fictional sentences ought to be handled. John Searle, for example, will tell you that we simply suspend the normal rules. E.g. "Sherlock Holmes lives at 221a Baker Street" (if I remember the address right) is a true statement . . . on the understanding that we are not speaking literally. But if your daughter were to ask you, "Daddy, you mean there's really a dude with a deerstalker who lives at 221a Baker Street? I think we both know what you'd say. So, in short, do you have knowledge of Harry Potter the person? No, because there is no such person. Nothing can be known about a non-existent entity. There is nothing to know. Do you have knowledge of some kind? Yes, of course. We might say you have knowledge of literature. Just my 2 cents' worth. Probably a loada crap. No, I haven't.

@MigLand @beecee Well, guys, on your account--that knowledge doesn't imply truth--we should be able to say the following: "It was once known that the Earth is flat. It is now known that the Earth is (roughly) spherical. The Earth has been known to be both flat and spherical." Now, no one has dibs on how the English language has to be used. Speak any way you like. All is I can say is: if you'd be willing to give a lecture to 100 knowledge thirsty students and say that (above), your cajones are bigger than mine.

@beecee (post above) For all I know there might be people out there who use the expression "married bachelor". Taken literally, we have a contradiction in terms, as we do with "false knowledge". Such expressions, I suggest, have to be taken in a playful mood, e.g. "Our pal Jimmy is a married bachelor" understood to mean that Jimmy has not officially tied that knot, but he might as well have.

Forget Shaw and his razor wit. Go googling and see how many hits for "false knowledge" you get. And good luck!

Ah, I've heard that Shaw quote before and responded to it. You do realise that Shaw was a playwright (i.e. a dude that makes stuff up for a living), right? Noted for his wit. These guys are also noted for making liberal use of various rhetorical devices (metaphor, oxymoron, etc). I suggest this is one such case. "Most epistemologists have found it overwhelmingly plausible that what is false cannot be known. For example, Hillary Clinton did not win the 2016 US Presidential election. Consequently, nobody knows that Hillary Clinton won the election. One can only know things that are true." https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/knowledge-analysis/

Sir, there is no false knowledge. Ask around. False beliefs, yes, but not false knowledge.

No, it was (mis)taken to be knowledge. It was supposed to be knowledge. (cf. your "supposed knowledge") On the assumption that the Earth is not flat, it is not, and never was, knowledge.

If whatever Ptolemy happened to believe/say is false, then whatever he himself and anyone else may have thought at the time, he did not have knowledge. They thought they knew but they were mistaken. Otherwise, you may find yourself countenancing absurdities such as "People once knew the world was flat".

Oh yeah? Gimme a few examples. Edit: Or consider . . . "Professor Cleverstein is a very knowledgeable man . . . alas, all his knowledge is false". Dude, that's either a joke or an incompetent English speaker.

Ahem. Knowledge is standardly defined as (at least - ignoring that Gettier pest) justified true belief. That which is not true cannot be known. I.e. One cannot have knowledge of that which is untrue. So, I'm afraid, if you're gonna claim knowledge--on pain of contradiction--you'll have to claim truth too. Edit: Consider: "Smith has lots of knowledge, Smith knows lots of stuff . . . but none of it is true" Does that make sense to you?

Uh oh. The old "agenda" thing again. Time for lunch then . . . . . . with my co-conspirators, of course

And I'd reiterate, this is almost certainly a minority view in science as a whole (physics being the apparent exception). Try asking a psychologist if he thinks consciousness is real. Try asking a geologist if she thinks tectonic plates are real. Try asking a paleontologist if he thinks dinosaurs are real. Try asking a chemist if she thinks oxygen is real. Try asking a neuroscientist if she thinks neurons are real. Try asking Richard Dawkins whether he thinks natural selection is real or merely a theoretical postulate, useful for predictive purposes, but not to be taken at face value. . . .

It's a logical point, beecee. It makes sense, on a road trip, say, to state "We're getting closer to Adelaide" . . . because the exact location of Adelaide is already known. It makes far less sense to say "We're getting closer to X even though no one knows where X is".

Quite so, Mr Vat. I often hear it claimed, for example, that science is gradually converging on the true age of the universe. Er, if the exact age is unknown, how can one possibly know one is getting closer to it?

"Good" here means conceptually more bird-like than other birds. It does not refer to survivability. Edit: I have little doubt the same holds for our concept SCIENCE, even though we routinely see attempts to encapsulate the essence of science in a definition. For example, show a group of people two pictures: One of a dude collecting bugs; The other of a slightly mad-looking dude with unkempt hair in a white labcoat mixing dangerous-looking chemicals together My money's on the subjects identifying the latter as doing science more quickly. They'd probably take a bit longer with that poor beetle collector, assuming he's even granted scientist status at all.

Re above: Well, simply put, if our knowledge of the universe is increasing, as you claim, then scientists must be discovering truths about the universe. (i.e. not only describing reality, but describing reality truly) Knowledge is, by defintion, true.

Er, pretty sure you also told us in that other thread that science/physics is not in the business of describing reality. If this is the case, how can our knowledge of the universe be increasing?

Well, that's what the story books tell us. Of course, the historical reality is somewhat different. Joseph Priestley, just to name one, went to his deathbed insisting on the reality of phlogiston.