Reg Prescott

You're an Ozzie, right? Forget Dawkins and buy David Stove's "Darwinian Fairy Tales" instead. Now that bloke is smart! Funny too.

Not quite sure how I could do better than than I did. What do you want: a page number too? Line number? Or should I haul Prof Weinberg over here to verify what he said?

The source is specified inside the quote. Look again, chum.

I suggest you stop making one ridiculous claim after another, and then balk at putting your money where your mouth is when challenged. As for, "Again scientific theories are never meant to find any supposed truth or reality" -- you Evidently, Steven Weinberg -- and countless others besides -- does not share your opinion. Haven't we been through this in another place? In the following link to Richard Dawkins' quotes, the word "truth" appears 17 times. Apparently he does not share your opinion either. https://en.wikiquote.org/wiki/Richard_Dawkins E.g. Gravity is not a version of the truth. It is the truth. Anybody who doubts it is invited to jump out of a tenth-floor window.

Oh gosh! Would you like to bet that (1) No one ever took Newtonian mechanics to be true? (I'll just need one counterexample, right?), and (2) No scientist has ever claimed that truth/reality is the object of scientific inquiry? (again, one counterexample should suffice, right?) Money for nothin' and yer chicks for free!! What do you wanna bet: how about everything you own? You can "straighten me out" any time you like, pal. This sure beats work

@ beecee As for quotes, I suppose I could mention Newtonian mechanics, which was regarded to be true with almost unquestioned certainty for two centuries or more. Now, we know better. Or J.C. Maxwell who proclaimed, roughly, that the luminiferous aether is the most highly confirmed entity in all of science. But instead, compare this (fairly typical) quote from the previous page... ... with your own assertion above that evolution "is as certain as anyone could wish for...and only a fool would deny that". You do see the tension? "As certain as can be" seems hard -- to say the least -- to reconcile with the claim that science always assumes itself to be wrong. This tension, I'd suggest, arises from a conflict between the following two intuitions: (1) Science is a fallible business. Everyone concedes this. Given the history of science, and its graveyard of abandoned theories, it is simply not plausible nowadays to claim that we, in this day and age, somehow occupy a privileged position; that our own most cherished theories will not one day also come crumbling down. And (2) When we forget about the larger picture sketched above in (1), and zoom in on any particular deeply-entrenched theory, evolutionary theory, say, it does appear that the evidence is "overwhelming" -- as it is typically described. How could it possibly be wrong? Only a fool would doubt it! Everyone admits to the fallibility of science; few are willing to concede that their own pet theory may be deeply flawed. It seems the fallibility always lies with someone else's theory. "Try the folks down the hall. My theory is just fine, thank you very much". "If there is one thing we can learn from the history of science, it is that the scientific theorizing of one day is looked on by that of the next as flawed and deficient. The clearest induction from the history of science is that science is always mistaken - that at every stage of its development, its practitioners, looking backward with the wisdom of hindsight, will view the work of their predecessors as seriously deficient and their theories as fundamentally mistaken. And if we adopt (as in candor we must) the modest view that we ourselves and our contemporaries do not occupy a privileged position in this respect, then we have no reasonable alternative but to suppose that much or all of what we ourselves vaunt as "scientific knowledge" is itself presumably wrong." -- Nicholas Rescher "The ephemeral nature of scientific theories takes by surprise the man of the world. Their brief period of prosperity ended, he sees them abandoned one after the other; he sees ruins piled upon ruins; he predicts that the theories in fashion today will in a short time succumb in their turn, and he concludes that they are absolutely in vain. This is what he calls the bankrupcy of science." -- Henri Poincare (Note: None of this is meant as a criticism of science. It is, rather, a criticism of what I see as your misrepresentation of science).

No one denies that science changes. It clearly does. The question here pertains to the nature of this change. An interesting parallel can be drawn between the more traditional, steady, gradualistic conception of evolutionary change vis-à-vis the punctuated equilibrium (PE) model of Gould and Eldredge. Popper's model of scientific change -- the one you appear to be defending -- resembles the former; Kuhn's model resembles the latter. On the Kuhnian model, as with PE, prolonged periods of stasis ("normal science") are typical. Orthodoxy, or mainstream theory, goes largely unquestioned. Challenges to mainstream doctrine (dare I say "dogma") are not welcome at all: cast aspersions on the reigning hegemony and one is liable to wind up very ill indeed. And judging by your own claims in various places on this site, beecee, to the effect that evolutionary theory has attained virtual certainty, as well as the often vicious hostility evinced to skeptics, I say we chalk up a point for Kuhn. But these lengthy periods of stasis in core doctrine -- on the Kuhnian account -- are punctuated by occasional bursts of crisis, sometimes resulting in massive conceptual change ("revolutionary science") when all hell breaks loose, criticism of orthodoxy flourishes, and a new orthodoxy eventually takes its place.

SamCogar mentioned above... ... to which Phi for All responded... I'll probably not win any friends by saying this, but I'd say Sam is, on this point at least, largely right, and Phi largely wrong -- with no disrespect intended to any of our members. Phi's sentiments reflect a vaguely Popperian view of science, one that is often repeated by scientists who, in many cases, quite understandably due to other commitments, are unable (or even unwilling) to keep abreast of developments in the history and philosophy of science. Popper's view goes something like this: Science can be described as a process of "critical rationalism" or "conjectures and refutations". Scientists are highly critical of their own theories, constantly subjecting them to "severe tests", and as soon as observation conflicts with theory, the theory is deemed falsified and must be rejected. There's a fascinating old black and white clip on Youtube of Richard Feynman teaching "the Scientific Method" in which he -- whether he knows it or not -- might as well have been reading directly from Popper. The last fifty years or so of research in the history and philosophy of science expose this view as woefully inadequate. Thomas Kuhn, for example, proposes a highly influential model, far more accurate than Popper's, in my view at least, under which science is bifurcated into "normal science" -- the vast majority of scientific work, and "revolutionary science" -- which, though rare, does indeed resemble the Popperian landscape. In times of normal science, in any given discipline, the overarching theoretical framework -- the "paradigm" in Kuhn's jargon -- is, by and large, not challenged (or "questioned") at all. Rather than being subjected to severe testing, it is simply taken for granted. Normal science is extremely conservative, dogmatic even. The word "dogma" is bound to ruffle feathers in some. For Kuhn, though, this dogmatic acceptance and defence of orthodoxy (i.e., the mainstream) is a key ingredient in what makes science so successful. It's precisely because scientists rally around the core tenets of the paradigm, discouraging dissent, that progress is made in what he terms "puzzle solving" -- reconciling recalcitrant evidence (cf. falsifying evidence) with theory. (As opposed to philosophy, say, where everything is up for grabs, a hundred flowers bloom, arguments seemingly never end, and progress is hard to discern) Scientists go to extreme lengths to protect their best theories from falsification. Examples illustrating this in the history of science are plentiful. What usually happens, as history attests, when observation/data/evidence appears to be at odds with theory is not abandonment of the theory (good theories are hard to come by, after all), as Popper insisted, but rather the theory is tweaked, blame is put somewhere else -- on background assumptions and so-called auxiliary hypotheses -- or else the intractable evidence is just left on the back burner as an "anomaly". In normal science, if anything is tested/challenged at all, it's not the reigning paradigm itself, but the scientist. If the scientist fails to make puzzling data/evidence fit the theoretical framework then that's her problem; the theory is just fine, thank you very much. (There's a marvellous clip of Richard Dawkins on Youtube where, unbeknownst to himself I guess, he says almost exactly this. Shout and I'll link). So is it true that mainstream science is "questioned all the time"? I don't think so. This is seen most starkly in the case of evolutionary theory (ET). Richard Dawkins -- him again -- is on record for claiming that to question evolution, one must be either "ignorant, stupid, insane, or... [wait for it] wicked". This is nonsense, of course. I could name several (non-religious) first rate thinkers who have expressed skepticism over the regnant neo-Darwinian hegemony. The reaction is invariably savage, to an almost staggering degree. The dissenter will be misrepresented (usually as a Creationist), ridiculed, and finally silenced. What Dawkins might have said instead is "Any ET skeptic will be portrayed as ignorant, stupid, insane, or wicked".

The problem with this claim, as I see things anyway, is that the imputation of religion to animals is based on entirely behavioristic grounds. And behaviorism, as a theory of mind, is more or less dead. Behaviorism flourished in the early and middle part of the 20th century, largely due to the prevailing intellectual zeitgeist -- exemplified in the Logical Positivism movement -- under which received wisdom held that anything not directly observable is not, or should not be, the object of good scientific inquiry. Consciousness, intentionality (beliefs, desires, hopes, fears, etc) were ruled out of court on either methodological grounds (methodological behaviorism) or logical grounds (logical/philosophical behaviorism). For example, a belief, say, that "it is raining" was construed not as a mental state, but as a manifestation of certain behaviors, or dispositions to certain forms of behavior (including verbal behavior). If Smith goes around holding an umbrella up, runs for shelter, covers his head with a newspaper, exclaims "Damn rain!", and so on and so forth, then -- on the behaviorist account -- he has a belief that it's raining. And that's that! (Of course, we could pay an actor -- who intuitively doesn't have a belief that it's raining -- to do exactly the same things. In the middle of the Sahara Desert perhaps, or in a TV studio with an artificial shower). Then came that upstart Noam Chomsky, the cognitive revolution -- and B.F. Skinner et al went the way of the dodo. The mind, consciousness, intentionality, once again, became respectable objects of scientific study. These days, by and large (with the odd exception - Daniel Dennett), a mental state such as a belief is -- surely correctly -- construed as the cause of the behavior in question; not the behavior itself. The guy holds up his umbrella because he believes it is raining. So back to where we started, I think we'd all agree there's more to religiosity than simply engaging in certain forms of behavior -- going to church on Sundays, praying, etc. Those behaviors must be caused by certain beliefs (remember that atheistic actor we could pay to do exactly the same things?) Now, there are some (e.g. Donald Davidson) who hold the implausible -- in my opinion -- position that animals have no beliefs whatsoever. I wouldn't go that far myself. But can animals have more abstract beliefs (as opposed to the "here and now and in-yer-face" variety) so typical of religion? Do/can those "grieving" elephants believe Nelly will proceed to the afterlife? Do/can chimpanzees believe in an almighty creator? I don't think so.

It's a good question, and one that tests our intuitions. My first reaction, counterintuitive though it may seem at first, is to say "yes!" (though interested to hear other members' thoughts) After all, what is the Grand Canyon, say, if not a great big hole in the ground? Yet no one seems to deny it bona fide ontological status. How about that hole in our faces that we use to speak and eat, and er, other things too? Ever been told "Shut your hole!" What is one supposed to reply? "Pfft! There's no such thing!" Then we could talk doughnuts... LOL You guys fill in -- pardon the pun -- the rest. Edit P.S. And consider this: If holes are not real, then a hole in your parachute is no cause for alarm. Right?

I think what you mean is "there is little or no evidence to support [the existence of] this beastie". Evidence for the existence of the Bigfoot concept is pretty overwhelming. You just deployed it. So did I. That makes at least two of us who have the Bigfoot concept. Again, we must try to avoid the pitfalls of confusing a representation with that which is represented. Here we run into the same problem as we had before, beecee: what does, and what does not, constitute evidence? Now, just to be clear, I'm not a Bigfoot believer myself, but to illustrate the point, I recently watched a documentary about the aforementioned hairy critter on Youtube. The scientific expert who was commissioned to commentate at one point told us "there is no evidence for Bigfoot". Twenty minutes later or so, the same expert told us "the evidence for Bigfoot is weak". (I'll post a link if you like, assuming I can find it again). I trust the problem is clear: on pain of contradiction or equivocation, the evidence for such-and-such cannot be at once non-existent and weak.

Nice thought-provoking topic, Acreator. My own take on this would be that concepts -- on pain of denying their existence altogether -- must be instantiated somewhere in the brain. Supposing you're six years old and Dad takes you to the zoo. He points to the first kangaroo you've ever seen, "Look, son. That's a kangaroo". You have now added to your inventory of concepts that of a kangaroo, and presumably this would be reflected by certain changes in the neurostructure of your brain. Now, one common mistake we must be wary of is to confuse a representation with that which is represented. For example, surely we don't suppose the concept heaviness is itself heavy, or that the concept immortality is itself immortal? And by similar reasoning, the concept Bigfoot, say, is not itself Bigfoot, any more than a painting of Bigfoot is itself Bigfoot. Can we agree that paintings of Bigfoot exist? Well, there's bound to be a few out there somewhere, I suppose. Can we agree that Bigfoot exists? Well, maybe yes, maybe no; but I hope it's clear that this is quite a different question from that of whether paintings (cf. concepts) of Bigfoot exist. I'd say so, unless you're willing to bite the Cartesian bullet and deny that concepts are part of physical reality. But again, we must be wary not to confuse the physical properties of the concept with those of that which the concept represents.

Many institutions are plagued by what is commonly referred to as an "Old Boy Network" wherein the top brass engage in a program of mutual protection and self-interest; overlooking -- perhaps even encouraging -- each other's transgressions at the expense of stifling merit and creativity in the lower ranks. Have you had any first hand experience of this? Discuss.

Swansont addressed the following comment to me in my thread on "The Scientific Method" which now appears to be locked. "But they [unicorns] exist as a concept, and you have just agreed that concepts are part of reality, so I do not grant that they don't exist. And neither do you, apparently." The concept of a unicorn is not a unicorn, any more than the concept of redness is red, or a painting of a unicorn is a unicorn.

OMG!!! That's makes all the difference!!!!!

Dude, you've made one silly claim after another. When I pointed them out, you got irascible. You even generously invited me to "go to hell" at one point. Discerning readers may have noticed I turned the other cheek. What do you want from me: to nod and smile at your absurdities?

Here's exactly what you said earlier: "If it doesn't exist it has exactly zero mass" Now, if it is indeed the case that "it" doesn't exist, then it is not tall, it is not short, it is not red, it does not wear frilly knickers, it does not weigh 5kgs, and it does not weigh 0kgs. "It" has no properties whatsoever. Geddit?

That's quite correct. If I'm right, and it is indeed the case that there is no such thing as The Scientific Method, then nothing true can be said of it, with the possible exception of the statement "TSM does not exist". (See, you've learned something from the thread already) (This is the mistake you were making in your logic earlier: attempting to attribute properties to non-existent entities. Non-existent entities do not have any properties, therefore the attempt to attribute properties where there are no properties is kinda futile.) The thing is, many people do believe in the existence of TSM, and who knows, they might even be right. Hence the debate, hoping to bring some measure of clarity to the issue one way or the other. Lavoisier felt the same way vis-à-vis phlogiston as I do about TSM. So, like any good seeker of truth, he presented his arguments for his own view, and against those of his opponent, poor old Joseph Priestly. And guess what? Progress was made. Perhaps, in our own modest way, we can do the same here. If that's ok with you?

Last sentence: "This is why Einstein combined space and time into space-time" Where there were two entities before, there is now one. You've been affirming the existence of three distinct entities. To refresh your memory... - you You see three entities as real.

Not what I said! You really must try to stop misrepresenting me, beecee. It's just not cricket. Here's what I said again: "If Einstein's general relativity is taken to be literally true (as opposed to a mere instrument of calculation), then one must claim that space and time as traditionally conceived do not exist. Our traditional concepts of space and time are replaced with a new 4-D spacetime manifold. Out with the old; in with the new." So, on the above account, first there were two entities (space and time); then there was only one (space-time). You've asserted your belief in the existence of three entities concurrently: space, time and space-time.

Thanks for the input, mistermack. I think much of what you say makes good sense; except, of course, for the use of the term "The Scientific Method" LOL. Does science work? Of course, it does; it works extremely well, in my opinion at least. But two things to say: (1) Scientific theories "working", in the sense that they, in many cases, yield accurate predictions and thus a certain degree of control -- which I certainly don't deny -- is a quite different claim from the claim that (our best) scientific theories are true, or approach truth. I don't discount the possibility, but the latter is a lot harder to argue for than mere instrumental success. There are some pretty powerful arguments, in my opinion, to caution against claims of truth. (2) Science works, we agree. You impute this success to what you call "The Scientific Method", though implicitly you seem to be very close to my own position, i.e., there is no single, timeless, invariant method of science (if it "evolves" -- your word -- then it is neither timeless nor invariant). So how do we we explain the success of science? First, let me ask, how would you explain the success of the Beatles? Personally, I don't feel they were privy to any unique "Beatles Method"; I think they were just four very talented young lads who came up with one great song after another. Oh, and the occasional stinker too. So why does science succeed where astrology fails miserably? Again, I see no need to appeal to some unique method of science. Perhaps your average scientist is just a bit smarter -- or a lot smarter -- than your average astrologer. Oops, now I've lost all my astrologer friends too

See in particular the bottom of page 91 and page 92: https://mechanism.ucsd.edu/~bill/teaching/philsci/fine.realism.pdf The weird position is your own, I'm afraid. In claiming that space, time, and spacetime are all real (as you did three posts ago), you have one foot in a Newtonian universe and the other in an Einsteinian universe. There is no scientific theory -- that I'm aware of, at least -- which countenances the existence of all three.

Seems to me like a contradictory position. If Einstein's general relativity is taken to be literally true (as opposed to a mere instrument of calculation), then one must claim that space and time as traditionally conceived do not exist. Our traditional concepts of space and time are replaced with a new 4-D spacetime manifold. Out with the old; in with the new. As I said, Einstein himself changed positions on this from an earlier antirealist stance ("GR is not to be taken literally"), to a later realist position ("That's the way things really are").

Again, you're making a blanket statement. The realist would wholeheartedly endorse what you just said. The anti-realist, on the other hand, would likely balk.

Coming round? I haven't taken a stance on the realism-antirealism issue. What I've done is compare what a realist might claim vs an antirealist. You'll find antirealist sentiments prevalent in thinkers such as Mach, Hertz, Duhem, Poincare, Bohr, etc. I'd still guess it's a minority position through scientists across the entire spectrum though. You'll be lucky to find an ornithologist antirealist ("birds don't exist""), for example. And everyone's hero, Einstein, made a celebrated switch from his earlier Mach-inspired antirealist stance to a realist position in later career due his dissastisfaction with the prevailing Copenhagen antirealism.