Eise

20 hours ago, iNow said:

More specifically, the rhetorical shorthand we use when introducing the term "consciousness" only muddies the waters. It's too ill-defined, too ambiguous, and differs in understanding from person to person. Ask 10 different people what conscious is and you get 10 different answers.

I do not agree. In the first place it is not 'rhetorical shorthand', at least not for neuronal activity. Scientists and philosophers use the word 'consciousness' already an eternity, without having any idea about how the brain works. If it is shorthand, then only for what all experiences (seeing, hearing, thinking) have in common.  In the second place even if we have no definition everybody agrees upon, we still all know more or less what we are talking about. E.g. if you say that consciousness has no causal impact on the brain, you seem really to be saying something meaningful.

20 hours ago, iNow said:

If we are to assert that consciousness has a causal impact in the world, then it's more precise IMO to do so by reverting back to a description or model rooted in the hardware and software you yourself previously referenced.

Maybe you did not understand what I was expressing with the hardware/software comparison. E.g. I work as a database administrator, and so I work with 'databases', 'tables', 'indices' and 'user accounts'. I could not do my work if I had to understand it in terms of the movements of electrons and electron-holes through semiconductor circuits. The higher, more abstract level is the essence of my work. An Intel-Engineer would not understand a single thing of what I am doing, if he had to understand it on the level he daily works with. But no question that without his semiconductor chips, my databases could not exist.

So, yes, consciousness is rooted in in the hardware of the brain, but we will never be able to understand it, if we stick to the lowest neuronal level. We must be prepared to move to higher and higher levels, where small networks of neurons have functions, further networks of functions give rise to networks of networks that at the highest level even have meanings, intentions, and in the end consciousness.

20 hours ago, iNow said:

Similarly, we could argue that love changes the world, ...

Except that 'love' is no conscious person. In your comparison there is no need to explain a phenomenon ('love changes the world') that needs explaining. But we want to understand consciousness.

20 hours ago, iNow said:

I maintain that we can, in fact, both be right here and that it's all a matter of perspective. I'm convinced we agree far more than you realize.

Maybe, maybe not.

I am saying:

- consciousness has causal impact (because it is implemented in the physical brain)

- we have control over our environment

- we have free will (because we often can act according to the wishes and beliefs I am myself conscious of)

(None of the three is meant to read as absolutes: it does not mean that we are conscious of everything, that we have absolute control over everything, or that all we do is based on free actions. (Just in case dimreepr shows up here...))

But I do not think you see this just as a question of perspective. 

On the other hand, we share our naturalistic viewpoint. We don't need a soul or any kind of magic for understanding consciousness.

13 hours ago, iNow said:

Except, this is the precise opposite of the actual stance I've been putting forth.

Yes, of course. Explicitly you of course do not believe in a soul or something. You are a naturalist, just as I am. We do not allow for 'magical interventions'. The problem is that epiphenomenalism, the view that consciousness is caused by brain processes but has itself no causal impact in the world (your viewpoint), and your question to me ('by what specific alternative mechanism can consciousness itself have the type of causal impact on the actual world around us?') presuppose consciousness as separate entity.

If you see the brain and consciousness as just different stances to the same processes, the problem is gone. But then we are justified to say that consciousness has causal impact, not on the brain (that would be saying that rain affects water falling from the clouds; that makes no sense of course, rain is water falling from the clouds), but on what we do. And then it becomes relevant for the topic of free will, (which in the end this thread is about).

8 hours ago, iNow said:

If you move away from the chemistry perspective I've been treating as both central and foundational to this issue, then by what specific alternative mechanism can consciousness itself have the type of causal impact on the actual world around us you're mentioning above?

By  being implemented in the hardware of the brain. If this does not satisfy you, let's rephrase your question to the terrain of computers:

If you move away from the silicon physics perspective I've been treating as both central and foundational to this issue, then by what specific alternative mechanism can software itself have the type of causal impact on the actual world around us you're mentioning above?

Nobody denies that computers are based on sound physical principles. Nobody denies that the pattern of pixels on the screen are caused by the program running on the computer. 

The problem you still have is that behind your question lies a presupposition: that consciousness is somehow separate from the brain. It isn't, just as the running software is not separate from the processes in the computer. There is just one system, seen from different stances.

On 10/12/2017 at 3:11 AM, iNow said:

It feels in many ways we can both be right here, that it’s largely about where we place our gaze and which perspective we take... so long as we describe our approach up front.

No, we can't be both right. I say that consciousness can have causal impact, and you say that it cannot. 

On 12/6/2017 at 3:59 PM, iNow said:

My suspicion is that you have a flawed premise here. You assign "consciousness" some sort of agency, but consciousness is a collection of other "transactions," and the agency is rooted instead in those transactions. I think it's a mistake to suggest that "consciousness has impact" and that you're assigning some sort of ownership to it that doesn't belong.

Italics by me.

No. It is the conclusion one must draw from the mere existence of the article. 

Let's slow down: epiphenomenalism states that the brain causes consciousness, but that consciousness in itself causes nothing. If that is true, it means that if humans are not conscious at all, we would not notice. We would have what is called a philosophical zombie. A philosophical zombie is a human that behaves exactly as we do, but has no consciousness. But of course this cannot be: the authors try to explain consciousness, so they know they are. A philosophical zombie would never write an article about consciousness because he doesn't have it. (At most what he could do, if he is a scientifically inclined zombie, is trying to explain how humans use the concept of 'consciousness' in their discourses.)

So what I state is that the mere existence of the article can only be explained by the fact that consciousness has causal impact in the world: otherwise nobody would write such articles. The article defends a self-refuting standpoint. So the only possible conclusion is that consciousness exists, and has causal powers. 

But that does not mean we must look for a soul in the brain, for some unexplained source of causality which has no causal foreplay on its turn. we must only state that certain classes of processes in the brain are consciousness; the processes do not cause it. A comparison would be a movie on TV. If I ask you, after the movie, if you liked the story of it, you would not answer with 'which movie, I only saw coloured pixels changing their intensity very fast'. Now that is not an argument that there is not a physical basis of the movie in the changing pixels. Of courae there is. Without the physical TV-device we would not be able to see the movie. But the movie is not added magic to the TV-pixels: it is seeing the pixels on another level. And except if you are a TV-engineer, it is the only level we are interested in.

Same with the brain: of course its all just firing neurons, but in its complexity they are representations. E.g I have a kind of representation of what I am going to cook tonight for me and my family. This representation is somehow implemented in my brain processes. Of course, physically seen, the brain is not an exception to the rest of the physical world. But seen at another level it is consciousness, and it is only by being consciousness that it can work the way it does: that I am able to really make my meal according my ideas. So consciousness is not causally effective while it somehow 'hovers' over the brain, but because consciousness is the functioning brain. But it is impossible that an organism like us can exist without consciousness. It just comes with the complexity brain.

On 12/6/2017 at 3:59 PM, iNow said:

My same challenge above applies here. The "rainbow" did none of these things you suggest. The authors are correct that the place to focus our gaze is to the individual interactions and transactions between light and raindrops / ice crystals.

My running outside because my sons held a picture in front of my rainbow detector cannot be explained by raindrops and sunlight. My detector reacts at 'looks like a rainbow', not on the physical cause of the rainbow. Therefore it can be tricked, but usually it works well. 

Thanks, Strange. Maeder does not give up.... I also saw (negative) comments of John Baez. 

Now I'll wait till we have found what DM really exists of. WIMPS, brown dwarfs, planets without stars, (primordial) black holes ....

On 30/11/2017 at 8:54 PM, iNow said:

You're making a lot of pretty broad assumptions there about me, my being, my rationality, and my willingness to have a quality discussion all based on one post. You should stop doing that, and I will acknowledge that I was a bit snarky when quoting you so some of this is on me.

Sorry, but I had to express my disappointment about just a sarcastic reaction from you after, I put some energy in formulating my posting. 

On 30/11/2017 at 8:54 PM, iNow said:

That said, you raised some valid critiques. I didn't author the article though, so didn't feel the need to defend each point. Seriously... I hadn't really considered even bothering as I've been busy with other things (work, holidays, kids, birthday parties, repair of broken furniture, clearing of brush, closing of end of quarter / end of year deals, ad infinitum).

You don't have to defend everything. For a dialogue between us it is enough to give your well-supported own stance about the points that I brought in. Having not so much time is of course a problem. But you could have just said so. It is a pity, but it is OK.

On 30/11/2017 at 8:54 PM, iNow said:

However, suggesting I'm a disappointment, irrational, or in any way incapable of participating in a mature discussion as you've done above is not conducive to achieving that outcome. Instead, it reinforces my frustrations with philosophy discussions in general. Maybe Menckins' idea that philosophy consists very largely of one philosopher arguing that all others are jackasses wasn't too far off the mark.

Now that is a too fast conclusion of you (from one post?). I am all in for a friendly argumentative discussion, in the hope of sharping my views (which can imply changing them, of course). In this sense, I hope that you eventually react on my posting above.

I think the faq is a good start.

On 26/11/2017 at 12:02 PM, geordief said:

A historical question perhaps but  is there any record of what gave Minkowski the idea for this representation?

Does this answer your questions? If not, just ask further.

On 29/11/2017 at 1:58 PM, Strange said:

A bit of commentary on this: https://gizmodo.com/dark-matter-is-not-dead-1820809277/amp

That is a pretty devastating critique. I looked up Maeder's background before I posted this, he seemed a kind of authority. So I didn't have to wait very long...

Thanks for the link.

18 hours ago, iNow said:

Thanks for letting us know. 

Now for a bit of levity:

Yes, funny. And now, iNow?

You linked an article, and I assume you brought it in to support your position, or at least that it makes an interesting read. And I read it, and commented on it. And then your only reaction is sarcasm? I am disappointed. I thought you want to be rational. But if you want to discuss rationally, but are not prepared to enter a rational discussion i.e. try to find out what the better arguments are, then better let it be. It seems to me that you are quite content with your gut feeling that we have no free will, and therefore do not want to investigate if you are really correct. 

On 11/23/2017 at 3:26 AM, iNow said:

Full paper here: 

https://www.frontiersin.org/articles/10.3389/fpsyg.2017.01924/full

OK, I read the article. And I am not impressed. In fact I find it a pretty naive article. Only one sentence in the introduction made it already clear where the authors stand:

Quote

The experience of consciousness is a passive accompaniment to the non-conscious processes of internal broadcasting and the creation of the personal narrative.

In philosophy, this position is known as epiphenomenalism. But alas, this position has debunked already a few times: it is self-refuting. Epiphenomenalism is the theory that something is effected by some (causal) conditions, but that itself plays no causal role. But this means that the authors could have written this article without any consciousness at all! But then how do they know about consciousness then? So consciousness has impact (so much that there are libraries written about it, including this article), or it has not. If it hasn't we are left clueless why the authors wrote this article. Later in the article they (consciously!) declare themselves as epiphenomenalists:

Quote

In our account, while never denying the phenomenal existence of consciousness (personal awareness), we adopt an epiphenomenalist view, whilst recognizing its acknowledged lack of intuitive appeal. We argue that subjective mental experiences are non-efficacious or “collateral” products of neurophysiological activity without an obvious proximal purpose in the same way that rainbows and eclipses are in relation to underlying physical processes.

Another point is that epiphenomenalism is a dualistic stance: There obviously is something caused by material phenomena, but has no causal impact on anything else. But in the material world this is never true: the law of causality says that every event has a cause, and that every event causes something (otherwise it would be impossible to detect). This also means that any attack on free will based on the ideas that (a) consciousness exists; and (b) that it has no causal impact whatsoever, is based on dualism. In a monistic view consciousness is part of the material world and therefore can play a causal role. 

The authors obvious struggle with this problem, even if you have to read more or less between the lines. Here is a subtle example:

Quote

In sum, we propose that consciousness (personal awareness) is a product of antecedent brain processes and has no functional role in itself for influencing subsequent brain states. As such, lacking an executive function, we consider the experience of consciousness as epiphenomenal. We accept that when we refer to, and talk about, personal awareness this reference is not caused by personal awareness itself but is part of the narrative generated directly by ongoing neural processes. For our part we defer the hard problem on the assumption that ultimately cognitive neuroscience, information theory and related disciplines will identify the processes that are accompanied by subjective experience and provide some insight into the underlying mechanisms creating the rainbow that is conscious experience.

'Antecedent' fits in a normal causal framework. So what they say is that consciousness is caused by brain processes. This fits perfectly to their epiphenomenalist position. However when they say that processes are accompanied by subjective experience, they take a more careful stance. I deny the first formulation, because it implies dualism, but agree with the latter. However we must define accompanied more precisely: and here I would say that certain types of brain processes are consciousness.

The authors take the rainbow as a perfect parallel to their view on consciousness. The rainbow is an optical phenomenon that is caused by the refraction (not scattering! ) of sunlight in raindrops. But the optical phenomenon has no causal impact back on the light or the raindrops. But it is not true that a rainbow has no impact at all! When there is a rainbow I walk to the window (or outside when it is not raining anymore where I am) to see it better: it is a beautiful phenomenon!

Imagine we build a rainbow detector: it is based on the analysis of forms (must be a part of a circle, has a certain broadness) and colour distribution. When the device detects one it signifies me. So it is not based on measurements of raindrop sizes and locations and calculations about the position of the sun etc, but on image analysis. Now my sons play a trick on me: they hold a picture of a rainbow in front of the detector, and yes, I run outside, for nothing. The point is that we can create devices that react on the optical phenomenon, not on the physics on which the phenomenon is based. And this, is my position: that the brain is such a system that 'creates rainbows', and also reacts on its own rainbows. Of course there is plain physics under all the neuron firing in my brain, just as there is for the signaling of my rainbow detector: but the brain works successfully, because neural configurations mean something for the brain itself. This is the basis of consciousness: we, our brains, are heavily loaded with meanings. And this is also why the authors are wrong that consciousness is no top-down process. If certain neurological configurations would not represent 'mental rainbows', they would not have the effect if they weren't.

Take the following computer program:

counter = 1

loop

counter = counter + 1

if counter > 1000000 then shutdown computer

end loop;

How would you explain that the computer soon turns itself off? By analysing its physical structure? Or by the program it runs?

I am convinced that there is a completely naturalistic explanation for consciousness. However, we will need soft concepts as representations and meanings (rainbows, so to speak) to understand it. Douglas Hofstadter has written a beautiful and playful book about it: Gödel, Escher Bach. (It is never too late to read it):

Quote

In response to confusion over the book's theme, Hofstadter has emphasized that Gödel, Escher, Bach is not about the relationships of mathematics, art, and music, but rather about how cognition emerges from hidden neurological mechanisms. At one point in the book, he presents an analogy about how the individual neurons of the brain coordinate to create a unified sense of a coherent mind by comparing it to the social organization displayed in a colony of ants.

One final note: the authors see no problem with free will, even that they defend that consciousness has no influence on the brain. But I think they are just flying over the problem. Or does it convince you?

Quote

 

As our account removes any self-serving controlling influence from the contents of the personal narrative and personal awareness, it could be seen to undermine the principle of personal accountability. We, however, consider personal responsibility, a mainstay of the cultural broadcasting architecture and a social contruct critical to most democratic and legal systems, as lying within non-consciously-generated actions and intentions transmitted into the personal narrative and in particular where these same contents have been publicly announced via external broadcasting. Both of these events are accompanied, albeit passively, by personal awareness (“experience of consciousness”)—thereby meeting the traditional moral and legal benchmark.

In our account, everyday constructs such as free-will, choice, and personal accountability are therefore not dispensed with—they remain embedded in non-conscious brain systems where their existence as near universal constructs serving powerful social purposes could well be seen in large part to be a consequence of cultural broadcasting impacting on personal narratives.

 

This all they have to say about it in the main article.

On 11/21/2017 at 5:40 PM, Prometheus said:

This was an allusion to Ryle's Ghost in the Machine which i thought was the idea of experiencing yourself as a homunculus behind the eyes, 'driving' the body. But maybe i misunderstood it.

Well, yes, nearly. It was Gilbert Ryle's expression for an absurd idea: that the soul somehow inhabits the brain, that it is the place where all sense data arrive, and where all our conscious actions are initiated. Consciousness is the 'spirit in the material world' (another phrase of Ryle). It is a view of what we are, Cartesian dualism. The only point I am making that I do not have the machine experience. But it is true, I also feel I am somewhere behind my eyes, between the ears.

On 11/21/2017 at 5:40 PM, Prometheus said:

Another part of my resistance is that you are trying to answer what i consider to be an empirical question with reason.

What question? If we normally have free will? Well, it might be an empirical question, but not in the way that many suppose here. If somebody acts free or not is by looking if he was forced to his actions, or if he has a heavy psychological dependence on somebody else, or misses some of the preconditions needed for free will (to be able to evaluate reasons for actions and have a realistic picture of the environment). But definitely not by looking into the brain and discover that there is no soul in it.

But yes, then I am using my definition of free will, and not the absurd notion that we can decide what to do uncaused by lower level level brain processes.

At least not according André Maeder, University of Geneva:

Quote

The consensus at present is that of a Big Bang followed by expansion. "In this model, there is a starting hypothesis that hasn't been taken into account, in my opinion," says André Maeder, honorary professor in the Department of Astronomy in UNIGE's Faculty of Science. "By that, I mean the scale invariance of empty space; in other words, empty space and its properties do not change following a dilatation or contraction."

(...)

When Maeder carried out cosmological tests on his new model, he found that it matched observations. He also found that the model predicts the accelerated expansion of the universe without having to factor in dark energy. In short, it appears that dark energy may not actually exist since the acceleration of the expansion is contained in the equations of the physics.

In a second stage, Maeder focused on Newton's law, a specific instance of the equations of general relativity. The law is also slightly modified when the model incorporates Maeder's new hypothesis. Indeed, it contains a very small outward acceleration term, which is particularly significant at low densities. This amended law, when applied to clusters of galaxies, leads to masses of clusters in line with that of visible matter (contrary to what Zwicky argued in 1933). This means that no dark matter is needed to explain the high speeds of the galaxies in the clusters.
 

Interesting. Let's wait and see.

9 hours ago, Endercreeper01 said:

Mathematics cannot be conscious in and of itself, so it cannot be the sole reason for consciousness.

It seems to me you do not realise that the mathematics, in other sciences than mathematics itself, are abstract descriptions of something empirical. Physics is not plain mathematics: it is mathematical models of matter, fields, energy etc. I agree with you that mathematics taken for itself cannot be conscious. But that doesn't mean that what is described by mathematics cannot be conscious.

9 hours ago, Endercreeper01 said:

"Life" is a concept which can be distinguished from consciousness. Not anything which can be considered "alive" can be considered "conscious".

Yes, of course. But that was not what I meant. I drew a parallel between consciousness and life. I can use the same argumentation for life, as you do with consciousness:

Mathematics is not alive, and because everything can be described by mathematical laws of nature, it cannot be the sole reason for life.

Or an even worse example:

Mathematics cannot fall. Laws of falling bodies are mathematical. So it cannot be the sole reason for falling bodies.

That is just BS. It is blind dogmatism.

Sorry for the late reaction, I was a away a few days.

On 11/13/2017 at 7:04 PM, Prometheus said:

You don't feel like you are a little homunculus 'driving' your body around? You don't need direct insight into the workings of the brain to experience this, it's quite natural, to me at least. I've a feeling we are talking about different things.

My objection was against the the 'machine' part. I do not experience myself as a machine: I have no direct access to my machine-layer of the brain. Because of science I know I have a brain, and know basic principles of its functioning. But I do not have access to this functioning of my own brain. I cannot decide to let neuron 1,435,460,822 fire at will. I think my own experience in this is that 'I' am somewhere behind my eyes, and between the ears¹. And I know I can move as I want, but I have really no idea how I do this. 

On 11/13/2017 at 7:04 PM, Prometheus said:

I don't understand about half of what you are talking about. Maybe i'm just uncouth and missing lots of nuances but this seems like an awfully long winded way of simply saying you have a different definition of free will.

Well, it is more than that: I try to show what this different definition of free will is. I try to show that it does not conflict with determinism and that it fits to my experience about what free will is. It does not fit to an ideological view of what free will is: the possibility to 'could have done otherwise under exactly the same circumstances', and that it is not caused by previous conditions. We are so to speak totally bathed in this ideological view on free will that we think we have such experience, where I am convinced that we have not.

Part of this change of view is what it means to have been able to do otherwise, therefore was my vegetarian restaurant example. In the vegetarian restaurant I could not have done otherwise, i.e. I could not choose for a beef burger. In a 'mixed' restaurant I could have chosen the beef burger. But I took the tofu-dish. But I could have chosen otherwise. This is a relevant meaning of 'could have done otherwise' that is still relevant in a determined universe. It means the choice depends on me. But 'me' is not a homunculus in the brain. It is me as a whole.

Does that help in understanding my previous reaction to you?

¹ A small funny anecdote: for about a year the company where I work replaced the telephone system with Skype. We could choose what kind of end-device we would use: an IP-telephone connected to the PC, or different kind of headsets. I chose a headset (so I can use the phone handsfree), but only with one earphone in it. I didn't want to hear the voice of some colleagues as if they would come from the middle of my head. It would place them in my head, where normally only my thoughts reside... Greetings from the Borg.

On 11/13/2017 at 7:39 PM, Outrider said:

Are you strictly deterministic? Do you think that given enough of the initial conditions of the BB and enough computing power that you could have predicted that I would make this post today?

If so why do you try so hard in the political (and other) threads to change things for the better?

What you describe is fatalism, not determinism. Fatalism does not follow from determinism. Fatalism means that what will happen is fixed, and nothing you can do will change it. But that is simply not true: what you do matters even if determinism is true. It will make the future different from what it would have been if you did something else. And what you will do depends on you inner mental activities, even if these are determined. 

On 11/13/2017 at 11:49 PM, Endercreeper01 said:

Because physical mechanisms are fundamentally systems based on mathematics, which in and of itself could not produce consciousness.

So mathematics is also not able to produce life, don't you think? Aren't we, and all other organisms alive?

41 minutes ago, Prometheus said:

We also have the experience of a ghost in the machine. 

No, we don't. Simply because we do not experience the machine. Or do you have direct insight of the inner workings of your brain?

43 minutes ago, Prometheus said:

Instead of saying we have the experience of free will, we could just as accurately say we have the illusion of free will. 

The only illusion of free will is that of libertarian free will: that under exactly the same circumstances, including my brain states, I could have done otherwise.

45 minutes ago, Prometheus said:

But we agreed it couldn't be otherwise given the same preconditions, so why is it a category mistake? The lightening couldn't have struck elsewhere, but as far as we can tell before the incident it could have struck elsewhere - this is just a limitation of our understanding of the exact conditions.

It is a category mistake because you are using the categorical meaning of 'could have been otherwise'. But there is also the hypothetical reading, as Parfit shows. Don't you see the difference? In the case of free will it means that there was nothing outside me that forced me to a decision. The brain cannot force me: I am my brain. But of course, because the brain is determined, we are too. So, as Parfit says, there is a way that I could have been struck by the lightning, because I was very close. If I know during a thunderstorm that I could get being hit by lightning, I try to get at a safe place. If then the lightning strikes, at the place where I was standing, it is perfectly valid to say 'I would have been struck if I did not decide to find shelter'.

So what I do depends on me. But there is no me inside me. 

Say I am in a vegetarian restaurant. I can choose between 5 dishes. E.g. I choose the tofu-burger with salad. When I look back afterwards, I can justifiably say that I could have chosen some of the other dishes. Why? Because they were on the menu card, and nobody forced you to take the tofu-burger. But being in this vegetarian restaurant I could not have chosen a beef burger, simply because it is not on the menu card. So there is a very relevant meaning of 'could have' completely independent of the question if I am determined. This is the 'could have' that is relevant for free will. 

For me the experience of free will is that I can act according my ideas. If something is obstructing me from acting as I want, I am not free. If I get the tofu-burger because I wanted it, it was a free action. If somebody points a gun at me and says that I should take the dish with the Brussels sprouts, then I am not acting according my ideas, and then it is not a free action. It has nothing to do with determinism.

53 minutes ago, dimreepr said:

FTFY

No, you fixed nothing. Slowly I am thinking you are not seriously interested in the subject. Your cursory one-liners don't show you are trying to think.

53 minutes ago, dimreepr said:

No one can control what culture we're born into, ...

Right. And? Still thinking that one needs Godlike capabilities to have at least some control?

53 minutes ago, dimreepr said:

... but that doesn't negate free will because we do have choices and can affect that culture (politically), however, we can't control what those choices will lead to.

You can control your own actions. The better you plan them, the better your strategy may work out. But of course life can suck. But again, you seem still to think that control per definition means complete control. Stop thinking in absolutes.

9 minutes ago, dimreepr said:

So, no control just choice?

A choice that does not lead to an action? With your choice you cause your behaviour: with your behaviour you exert at least some control over your environment. Again, if you would not exert this control ('I go the supermarket when my fridge is empty'. You have control over what is in your fridge. If you do not exert this control you will be dead soon (unless you go to a restaurant, where your decision also has some control over the situation: if you order the beef menu you do get it. Or do you never get what you order in restaurants?))

3 minutes ago, Prometheus said:

Isn't this just a case of different definitions of free will?

Yes, it is. In my opinion the western view on free will is still heavily loaded with Christian theology: that we have a soul, which can freely decide what to do, unconditioned by a causal history. Without such a soul, it is difficult to justify that souls could be damned to eternal suffering in hell. It makes us absolutely responsible. From a naturalistic point of view this makes of course no sense. The inheritance of of this view however is that we think that because we have no soul we have no free will either.

Still we have the experience of free will: that what we do in certain situations depends on what I will do, and what I will do I can consider. Do I take the schnitzel or the cordon blue? Of course this is all determined by brain processes, but in such situations I cannot just refrain from choosing. To say it a bit awkward: I still have to process the decision with my brain. And given who I am and the circumstance I will come to a decision (usually...). 

The point I am trying to make, is that I cannot be overruled by my brain processes, because I am my brain: I am not a soul that is forced by my brain. The element of free will is that I am not forced to choose something by some form of coercion. In daily life, I mostly know very well if I do something out of free choice, or was forced by somebody else. My slogan-way of saying this is: we cannot be what we want; but we can do what we want. 

17 minutes ago, Prometheus said:

I imagine it as asking given the exact same conditions in two instances,  would we 'decide' to do the exact same thing?

Yes, of course. If the conditions are exactly the same, including my brain state.

18 minutes ago, Prometheus said:

You seem to agree (in saying that you believe in determinism), but say that the process of coming to the determined decision is exactly what free will is - even though it couldn't be otherwise.

That is an error in what 'could be otherwise' means. I think somebody else explained that much better than I can so here it is:

Quote

Suppose that, while I am standing in some field during a thunderstorm, a bolt of lightning narrowly misses me. If I say that I could have been killed, I might be using ‘could’ in a categorical sense. I might mean that, even with conditions just as they actually were, it would have been causally possible for this bolt of lightning to have hit me. If we assume determinism, that is not true, since it was causally inevitable that this lightning struck the ground just where it did. I may instead be using ‘could’ in a different, hypothetical or iffy sense. When I say that I could have been killed, I may mean only that, if conditions had been in some way slightly different—if, for example, I had been standing a few yards to the West—I would have been killed. Even if we assume determinism,that claim could be true.

Derek Parfit - On what matters.

In this way we are perfectly justified to say that I could have done otherwise - namely when I would have decided otherwise. If there was nothing in the situation that forced me to decide what I wanted to decide, then the decision was free. I could have decided otherwise, but in the above sense.

Parfit again:

Quote

 

Someone might now object:

If all of our decisions, choices, and acts are causally inevitable,
we would have acted differently only if we had miraculously
defied, or broken, the laws of nature. It is pointless to ask
whether we ought to have acted in some way that would have
required such a miracle.

Such questions, however, can be well worth asking. What we do often depends on our beliefs about what we ought to do. And if we come to believe that some act of ours was wrong, or irrational, because we ought to have acted differently, this belief may lead us to try to change ourselves, or our situation, so that we do not act wrongly, or irrationally,in this kind of way again. These changes in us or our situation may affect what we later do. It does not matter that, for us to have acted differently in the past, we would have had to perform some miracle. If we come to believe that we ought to have acted differently, this change in our beliefs may cause it to be true that in similar cases, without any miracle, we do in the future act differently. That is enough to make it worth asking whether we ought to have acted differently.

 

So even if we are completely determined, it still makes sense to think about our decision.

26 minutes ago, Ten oz said:

1 - No free will is required for basic environmental interaction

2 - Again, no free will required.

Of course. But without control over the environment free will is impossible. So control over the environment is a necessary condition, but not a sufficient condition. So idf somebody can prove that we have no control over our environment at all, free will simply does not exist.

30 minutes ago, Ten oz said:

3 - I am me; brain included. When the brain dies I die. All genetic limitations of my body (Brain included) are limitation my "you" has. The "you" inside of us is purely ego. It is not capable of a single thing more than genetically designed for.

Right. There is no 'you' inside your brain. 'You' is just a function of the software running on the brain, its hardware. But we are surely not completely determined by our genes. Our upbringing, culture, books we read, and thoughts we have have all have influence on my actions. We are not dedicated computers that can only do the one thing for what is was designed. Our hardware allows a giant multiplicity of programs that are also rewritten every moment, partially based on internal functions only (e.g. when I change my plans for the future).

One of the chimeras about free will that it should be completely unconditioned. It is not. Such a kind of free will could only be chaotic, has nothing to do with what I am. 

10 hours ago, Endercreeper01 said:

There isn't any possible physical mechanism by which consciousness can arise from a machine such as the brain, which is just a unique arrangement of atoms and molecules.

Really? How do you know? You have an overview of all possible physical mechanisms? Do you so precise what consciousness is, that you can exclude that is implemented on any high complex system?

57 minutes ago, Prometheus said:

But a self-driving car does picture its environment, evaluates futures against its interests (not crashing), judges futures that might arise dependent on its actions, all it lacks is a self-image. Same as our spider. So it's this self-image which interests me. 

The self-image is the image of the own interests, motivations, reasons, beliefs etc the system has. A self-driving car does not have these. So I think what I essentially I am saying that consciousness is a necessary condition for free will. 

16 hours ago, Ten oz said:

1 - Organisms are born and hatched with this ability. Genetics leading the way and not conscious choice. Did you consciously choose to take your first breath?

2 - We do not have control over the whole system. One cannot control their genetics. A short person cannot will themselves tall, a bald person will new hair growth, will away cancer, will  20/20 visions, and on and on and on. There are many more things we can empirically say we do not have control over than there are things we can anecdotally say we do have control over. 

3 - This makes no sense.

4- What does and doesn't matter is purely relative. If the car is needed to travel at 130 mph than it wouldn't matter at all that it can travel at 120mph. 

1. This does not touch on the fact that organisms have control over their environment, and that was all what I am saying.
2. I was talking about control of the system over the environment, not some control over the system. 
3. It does. Is there a 'you' somewhere in the brain, controlling its functions? When not, does that mean you do not exist? For free will the same: there is no free will in the brain; free will can exist in the control the brain exerts on its environment.
4. Yes. But given dimreepr's position, only the God of the universe has unlimited control. He wouldn't even be content with a car that can at least drive with warp 10. Oh, no, that is a limitation too.

16 hours ago, Prometheus said:

A single cell organism can exert control over its environment, by chemotaxis for instance - a completely determined process. But that doesn't mean it has free will, does it? Is the only difference that humans have a self image?

I thought my list of conditions for free will's existence was a bit longer than just having a self-image. A single cell organism has no wishes, beliefs or a picture of its environment and its possible futures. 

16 hours ago, Prometheus said:

So you might say that a dog has free will, but that a spider does not (if we make the assumption that spiders do not have a self image)?

With a little bit of precaution, yes. The more an organism has the capabilities listed above, the better it is potentially able to have free will. Of course I am not sure where we can draw a line, even if we can draw a line, but given your examples, I would say yes.

16 hours ago, Ten oz said:

What is control; does a teacher have control over a students grades or do students have control over their grades? Sticking with that analogy studies show teacher to student ratio, parenting, school budget, and etc all impact grades so can any individual fact truly said to be control?

This tastes after dimreepr's 'absolute control'. The point is that every organism has some control over its environment. Stronger, every negative feedback system has control of some part of its environment. 

2 minutes ago, Prometheus said:

As far as i can tell, you would say a machine learning algorithm to choose photos with cats in it is exerting free will. Do i understand you correctly?

No. I am just arguing here against the idea that we have no control. I try to show that there is no contradiction between exerting control and determinism.

For free will a system must have some additional futures: the capability to picture its environment, to evaluate different possible futures against its own interests, how these possible futures might arise dependent on its own actions, have a self image. I other words, I think it is only possible to exert free will when a system is conscious.

1 minute ago, dimreepr said:

Can you control what choices are on the menu, if you're just a customer?

No. So what? 

2 hours ago, dimreepr said:

I'm not saying we have no choice, just that we don't control what those choices are.

This is a category error. Look at the menu card in the restaurant: there are the choices. What you choose if of course determined by your brain, but that does not mean you do not choose. The brain is exactly that: a mechanism that is able to evaluate possible paths the futures can take, dependent on how you act. Some of these choices can be completely driven by some unconscious processes (I have no idea why I hat Brussels sprouts; I do not exactly know if I would like, a schnitzel or a cordon bleu now. So I just pick one.), others are complete conscious ("Ups, I have only $20, so I can't choose the beef menu...").

Just now, dimreepr said:

Only if you'd starve without them.

No, I still would not like them. But I would eat them.