Reg Prescott

A few cheery remarks inspired by reading through the posts above... Here Zosimus alludes to Carl Hempel's notorious "raven paradox". The uninitiated will no doubt find it explained on Google, and the problem it raises for any account of evidence and confirmation in science, namely, granting two rather innocuous assumptions [ (i) any instance of an F that is G constitutes confirming evidence for the hypothesis "all Fs are G", and (ii) any evidence that confirms a hypothesis H also confirms any hypothesis logically equivalent to H] we derive the disturbing conclusion that almost any observation constitutes evidence for almost any hypothesis. Hardly a trivial result! Given the overriding importance assigned to "evidence" by our members in appraising scientific claims to truth and knowledge, Hempel's paradox is ignored at one's own peril. Lacking any understanding of what evidence is in science, and exactly how it serves to support a theory or hypothesis (if indeed it does at all - Zosimus is skeptical), a "We have lots of evidence" defense is hardly superior to "It's all in scripture". Zosimus, cogent and intelligent argumentation notwithstanding, takes skepticism further than I'd be willing to go myself, though his presence here, in my opinion, constitutes a sorely needed corrective to the wildly inflated and frequently ill informed hyperbole of those raised on self-congratulatory Whig history of science and the simple-minded Dawkins/Krauss type pablum obediently and uncritically consumed by those who prefer their portraits wart-free. On a different note, to the myth of "the scientific method" we may now add the legend of the "unique self-corrective mechanism" of science often alluded to implicitly or explicitly. First, there is no unique "mechanism" of self-correction, that I'm aware of anyway. When scientists come across something they consider to be an error they amend it. Far from being unique, that puts them on a par with pretty much every other institution and individual on the planet. Second, the term "self-corrective" is wont to beguile us, implying as it does that what is incorrect is replaced with what is correct, or falsity gives way to truth. Taking the example of light again for illustration, it's far from obvious that light construed as a wave constitutes a "correction" of light as corpuscles, especially given that light as a wave itself subsequently succumbed to "correction". Finally, in spite of the usual panegyrics, proselytizing, and propaganda from the devout, scientific knowledge (more properly, putative knowledge) probably ranks among the least secure knowledge that we have, or think we have. The reasons for this are not hard to discern. First of all, surely the briefest reflection will reveal that simple everyday knowledge (e.g. "Donald Trump is the 45th president of the USA", "There are six Grolsch beers in my fridge") is far less vulnerable to the vicissitudes of time than, say, "The top quark has a mass of 173.34 ± 0.27 (stat) ± 0.71 (syst)10⁰ GeV/c²". (Take it up with google if my info is inaccurate). And which do you think is more likely to turn out true: the astrologer's "something will happen today" or the physicist's assessment of quark properties? Lest I be misconstrued, this is no criticism of science. It is, rather, simply to point out that scientific knowledge claims, in striving for accuracy, exposes itself to mutability. Just to help us keep our feet on terra firma... "If there is one thing we can learn from the history of science, it is that the scientific theorizing of one day is looked on by that of the next as flawed and deficient. The clearest induction from the history of science is that science is always mistaken - that at every stage of its development, its practitioners, looking backward with the wisdom of hindsight, will view the work of their predecessors as seriously deficient and their theories as fundamentally mistaken. And if we adopt (as in candor we must) the modest view that we ourselves and our contemporaries do not occupy a privileged position in this respect, then we have no reasonable alternative but to suppose that much or all of what we ourselves vaunt as "scientific knowledge" is itself presumably wrong." -- Nicholas Rescher "For in formulating the question as to how to explain why the methods of science lead to instrumental success, the realist has seriously misstated the explanandum. Overwhelmingly, the results of the conscientious pursuit of scientific enquiry are failures: failed theories, failed hypotheses, failed conjectures, inaccurate measurements, inaccurate estimations of parameters, fallacious causal inferences, and so forth. If explanations are appropriate here, then what requires explaining is why the very same methods produce an overwhelming background of failures and, occasionally, also a pattern of successes. The realist literature has not yet begun to address this question, much less to offer even a hint of how to answer it." -- Arthur Fine Personally, I think it makes no sense whatsoever to speak of evolutionary theory being true or false. The term is so hopelessly vague, and encompasses such a welter of heterogeneous claims, that an attribution of truth or falsity is misplaced -- much as it would be peculiar to characterize the Encyclopedia Britannica as either "true" or "false". Philosopher of science Elliott Sober frames the problem this way: "Creationists often talk of 'testing evolutionary theory', and biologists sometimes talk this way as well. The context of their remarks sometimes reveals which specific proposition the authors have in mind, but often this is not the case. It is important to recognize that the phrase 'evolutionary theory' is too vague when the subject of testing is broached. There are a number of propositions that evolutionary biologists take seriously. The first step should be to specify which of these is to be the focus."

It's hardly news that we can be fooled about these things, Sensei, mistaking a robot lemur for the real thing, say. Now, unless they're all robots, there are nonetheless veridical cases -- presumably the vast majority -- where we do see a real, flesh-and-blood lemur. And even if they all turn out to be robots, it's debatable whether we'd still choose to call them lemurs or not. Either way, we'd still be seeing an object of some kind or another, regardless of what we choose to call it, contra your assertion "You don't really see object" (3 posts ago). In typical cases, where the real McCoy lemur is directly in front of you (with all the usual caveats: standard lighting, normal vision, etc.), what do you think we see? Then you'd simply be mistaken. There is no lemur inside the device. Ditto. In cases (2) and (3), as you described them, I don't think people, by and large, are fooled. Most of us are perfectly capable -- except in the kind of deviant cases you alluded to -- of telling a real lemur from a picture of a lemur. Otherwise why waste all that hard-earned dosh on a trip to Madagascar? Now, it's your turn to answer my question: What do YOU think I see when there's a bona fide lemur sitting in front of me?

@ Sensei (post directly above) In cases (2) and (3), as you admit yourself, I do not see a lemur. For there is no lemur in front of me to be seen. In case (1) I do see a lemur. I see the flesh-and-blood cute li'l lemur right in front of my eyes. Granting all the physics of vision you've provided, you still haven't explained how this entails that in the veridical case (i.e. case 1) I am not seeing a lemur. All you've done is provide a scientific explanation for how I am able to see what I see. What do you think I see in case 1 if not a lemur?

There once was a man who said "God Must think it exceedingly odd If he finds that this tree Continues to be When there's no one about in the Quad." This all sounds confused to me, ALine. Is it your position, then, that prior to the discovery of the planet Uranus, say, it did not exist? Dear Sir, Your astonishment's odd. I am always about in the Quad. And that's why the tree Will continue to be Since observed by Yours faithfully, God

See also the proposition "In any given ecology, those organisms with traits advantageous to survival and reproduction will tend to ... er, survive and reproduce more successfully than those without". Oh gosh, now I've done it! Just when my neg-rep points had leveled off at a fairly respectable minus sixty-seven.

I disagree. When I look at a ring-tailed lemur, I'd argue, following common sense, what I see is the object itself - the lemur. (I'm planning a trip to Madagascar right now. Yippee!) The position is known as direct realism, sometimes pejoratively referred to as naive realism. Blame it on my youth. You're taking a great deal of theory for granted here. Two hundred and fifty years ago we were told light was composed of corpuscles. Later the story changed quite radically to light being a wave of one kind or another. These days photons are all the rage. But you think we've finally nailed it now? The buck stops here? But let's suppose for the sake of argument, Sensei, that everything you say above is true. Does this mean I don't see the lemur? I don't think so. What you've done is to provide a causal account of how it is that I see what I see; what you have not done is to refute that I see what I claim to see. To argue otherwise is, in my view, to run afoul of the genetic fallacy. Providing a causal account for why X obtains does not, in and of itself, refute X. I think what you're trying to articulate above is some version of the old "sense data" theory of perception. To wit, we never actually see the real world; all we ever see is our impressions, or sense data. And, whether you realize it or not, it's a recipe for skepticism; a sad farewell to knowledge of an external reality. I suspect Zosimus might like it; I don't think you would, though. Our old chum Bertrand Russell has a neat (but fallacious IMO) argument you might enjoy: Premise 1: Science presupposes direct realism Premise 2: Science shows that direct realism is false Conclusion 1: Therefore direct realism, if true, is false Conclusion 2: Therefore direct realism is false. But let's not forget how we got started on all this. You claimed "Electron's traces are observable in e.g. Cloud Chamber". So the trace is observable, even if the electron is not. Lately, though, you tell us: "Any observation is indirect. You don't really see [the] object". In which case, we do not even see the trace on the Cloud Chamber screen, right? (Let alone the cloud chamber itself) Well, which is it? Do we see the trace (and the cloud chamber) or not?

No, I'm saying observable means "can be seen".

Yes, the trace is observable. The electron is not (at least as van Fraassen defines "observable"). And here, of course, we assume the trace that we do see is caused by an electron that we don't see. A blip on a radar screen that we take to be caused an airplane may not be caused by an airplane. The salient difference here being we have independent means of directly verifying the existence of airplanes. We can see them.

Hi again, Leaving God aside for now, I think these (bold) remarks are mistaken, Francis, though it's a mistake that has been echoed by many other members both here and in other threads; part of the reason I started this thread in the first place. What you seem to be suggesting here is that, in the absence of demonstrative proof, one cannot claim or possess knowledge. Is that an accurate summary of your position? Other members have said similar things with regards (putative) scientific knowledge, particularly that pertaining to unobservable entities, mechanisms, etc., postulated in theories. I paraphrase: "How can we ever KNOW that what the theory tells us about unobservable reality actually obtains? We're not able to lift up the veil and peek". Yourself and other members seem to hold -- erroneously, in my opinion -- that lacking demonstrative proof, and thus certainty, knowledge is forever beyond our grasp. Remember, given our standard definition, the three criteria for possessing knowledge of a particular proposition are: (i) you believe that proposition (ii) you have good reasons for believing that proposition (iii) the proposition is true Notice that supreme confidence (certainty!) or demonstrative proof do not feature in these criteria. Neither does the demand to lift up the veil and peek. In a game of hide and seek, one may have very good reasons for believing Martha is hiding in the broom closet. Martha, for example, may not be very bright and always hides in the broom closet. Duh! (Ever seen "What's Eating Gilbert Grape"?) Now, if it is indeed the case that Martha is nestled among the brooms as usual, then you know that's where she is. You may not enjoy certainty; you may harbor certain doubts (perhaps Martha has wised up), as any reasonable person would. Nonetheless, just so long as Martha is where you believe her to be, and your belief is justified, this constitutes knowledge on your part. Opening up the broom closet door, in Martha's case, or adopting a God's-eye view to see what's going on under the veil, in the case of scientific theories, is not a necessary condition to possess knowledge. And I'll bet you a pint of Fosters, mate, that when you do open up that broom closet, you'll exclaim, "I knew it!"

Hi again, If you read through my last reply to you again, I think you'll see I'm saying pretty much the same thing, except eschewing that abominable term "absolute truth". What you call an absolute truth is what I call a true proposition. Thus: Well, these guys are an eclectic bunch. Some antirealists of an instrumentalist persuasion would say pretty much what you just did, viz., talk about unobservables (e.g. electrons) in scientific theories is not to be taken literally. Antirealism of this kind is based on semantic concerns: terms such as "electron" are not meant to refer, thus statements about electrons are not truth evaluable at all. Bas van Fraassen, on the other hand, whose constructive empiricism I'm sympathetic to myself, holds that talk of unobservables is to be read literally; the term "electron", for example, is not a metaphor. His particular form of antirealism is epistemic in nature. That is to say, the term "electron" (and all their brethren) is meant to refer, thus statements about electrons are truth evaluable, but the epistemic warrant -- on his account -- is insufficient for us to claim any knowledge of unobservables. Here you seem to imply that there are such things as good inductions. This being the case, is the production of true propositions, at least in some cases, not the result? We can all agree your Peruvian buddy's conclusion ("everyone 2+ years old speaks Spanish") is false. One of two tacks could be taken here, though: (i) Deny that his sample was large and varied enough. It was not a case of good induction. Or (ii) Concede that the sample was adequately large and varied, thus it was a good induction. But, alas, it was one of these good inductions that resulted in a false conclusion. No one is claiming that good inductions invariably yield a true conclusion; just some of them. Just to get clear here, Zosimus: Is your own position that induction never yields true conclusions? You did seem to imply earlier that there are such things as good inductions. Don't some of them, at least, yield true statements? Here I can certainly sympathize. Around these parts any attempt to correct grossly exaggerated or just plain false claims about scientific practice immediately incurs the wrath of Khan. One is liable to be accused of harboring some nefarious agenda, and in all likelihood will be labelled anti-science (an epithet thrown around as carelessly and irresponsibly as "anti-semite"), a Creationist luddite, a destroyer of rationality, and quite possibly the assassin of John F Kennedy to boot. It is indeed a cause for concern that so many people pick up catchy slogans from the likes of Dawkins and Krauss, slogans that are manifestly and outrageously false, then, without subjecting them to the merest whiff of critical analysis which would reveal their falsity, repeat them ad nauseum, ad infinitum, ad vacca come hometh. My own personal fave, from the sneering atheist to the Christian or Moslem, is "You're an atheist, too (with respect to Zeus, Thor, etc.). I just believe in one god fewer than you do". Parallel "reasoning" makes me a virgin ... with respect to Anne Hathaway.

Hi again, Not being familiar with Wolpert's theorem, I can't speak of its implications for scientific reasoning, though the final quietus for anyone out there who still believes in an inductive "method" of science is surely delivered by Nelson Goodman's "new riddle of induction" which I alluded to earlier. Suppose we have examined a thousand, or a million, emeralds and found them all to be green. Our emeralds have been collected from "a large and varied sample, taken under divergent circumstances in different times and places, and so on and so forth". Since the criteria for a "good" induction, as I've described it, have been satisfied, we might now be tempted to make the inductive inference to "all emeralds are green". Now, given that we're dabbling in induction here, the truth of the conclusion ("all emeralds are green") is not guaranteed by the truth of the premise ("all examined emeralds are green"), nonetheless we might like to think, in light of our impressive evidentiary base, that we have good reason to suppose the universal generalization is true. The inappropriately named Goodman now throws a gruesome spanner in the works. If we define the term/predicate "grue" as "green if first observed before the year 2020, and blue otherwise", then the two hypotheses (1) All emeralds are green, and (2) All emeralds are grue seem to enjoy precisely the same degree of evidential support; after all, the emeralds we've examined to date have all been green, and they've all been grue. Now, if science were conducted according to an inductive method similar to the kind of "good" inductive procedure I outlined above, there should be nothing to choose between (1) and (2). Both inductions are equally good and enjoy the same evidentiary support -- according to the method. But, of course, we know that no scientist in her right mind would entertain hypothesis (2), implying as it does that all emeralds dug up after 2020 will be blue! So what's the moral of the story? Ans: Unlike deduction, predicates matter. Some predicates can be "projected" and yield what we hope will be a reliable conclusion. Others, like grue, lead to absurdity. Why are scientists liable to endorse hypothesis (1) and pooh-pooh hypothesis (2)? Because, pace what the methodologists may claim, they're using good old fashioned common sense; not following a method.

Hi Francis, I have my own misgivings about evolutionary theory that are probably better not to expound on here, though to claim that knowledge "must be based on demonstrable facts", regardless of whatever claim is under examination, seems a bit over the top, echoing my reply to Zosimus above. Say, for example, we're told that 1000 balls in an urn are all green except one, which is red. One ball is selected at random and concealed from you. You now assert that the selected ball is green. Can it be demonstrated that the ball is green? Nope, not as things stand right now anyway (pending the unveiling). You're making an inductive inference; not a deductive demonstrative inference (which would be the case if all the balls in the urn were green). Do you know that the chosen ball is green? Well, if you believe it is (as per your assertion), and you have good reasons for believing so (I'd call 999/1000 a pretty good reason), and the chosen ball is indeed green, then I'd say you have knowledge, even before the grand denouement. Your belief is both justified and true.Therefore, you know the chosen ball is green. Of course, if you get that one-in-a-thousand red ball, then your belief wasn't knowledge after all. You didn't know the concealed ball was green. You believed it was green, your belief was justified, but it was not true.

@ Zosimus It was a pleasure to read through your thoughtful and intelligent post -- just when I'd almost abandoned all hope of such things in these precincts! (Where did Eise go?) You've provided us with a great deal to consider; parts of which I heartily endorse myself, other parts of which strike me as less compelling. I'd like to say a few things in reply for your consideration and criticism. But first of all, a warm "thank you" for inspiring me to re-acquaint index finger and keyboard. The kind of concern you raise over examples such as "Mary is sitting at her computer" is adequately dealt with, in my opinion, by appeal to what are commonly called "indexicals", i.e., terms such as "I", "you", "here", now", etc. whose referent varies with context. The statement "I am in Taiwan now" may indeed express various propositions depending on the time, place and person of utterance -- a true proposition if uttered by myself today; false (presumably) if uttered by you -- nonetheless each proposition thereby expressed is "indexed" to a particular person, time and place. The proposition expressed by my statement "I am in Taiwan now" is true when uttered here and now, and will still be true a hundred years from today. It will never be false that I was in Taiwan right here and right now. Properly indexed, the proposition thereby expressed would look something like "The utterer of the statement [Reg Prescott] is in Taiwan at the time of utterance [11/11/2018]". The truth value of the statement does indeed change; the truth value of the proposition expressed by the statement does not. If you'd just said "truth" I'd be in agreement. Once again, though, the addition of "absolute" seems to add nothing, with the exception of circularity (Cf. "One cannot consistently maintain it is super-duper true that there is no such thing as super-duper truth"). Yes. And see Note 1 below where I address accusations of my forcing an idiosyncratic definition on the downtrodden masses. Your (1) makes a substantive claim that can be argued -- as we will below. Your (2), on the other hand, seems viciously circular. In effect you're telling us science does not provide knowledge because science does not provide knowledge. Consider: (a) science is unable to provide us knowledge because we cannot know that the things science tells us to believe are actually true [Your words verbatim] = (b) science is unable to provide us knowledge because the things science tells us cannot be known = (c) science is unable to provide us knowledge because science cannot provide us with knowledge Granting the circularity of (2), if you do, we need now only focus on your first claim, namely: Science does not give us good reasons to believe in something. You describe David Hume's original problem of induction very nicely, Zosimus. As you've probably discovered yourself, the problem is often downplayed, or even ridiculed, by those who fail to grasp its significance. For example, a typical response is "Pfft! Only some damn fool philosopher would doubt that the Sun will rise tomorrow. I'll bet you everything I own that it does". Well, I'd bet everything I own that it does too, though this is to miss the gravamen of Hume's skeptical assault. The concern is not that the Sun will not rise tomorrow, but, as you correctly observe, that we have no non-circular justification for our belief that it will. It seems the only justification we can adduce for our inductive inferences (e.g. "the sun will rise tomorrow") is by appeal to induction itself. If the problem is not evident to all, consider being told by Gypsy Rose of reading in her crystal ball that certain catastrophic events are about to befall you; a three-day suspension from SFN perhaps. "And why should I believe what your crystal ball says?" you snort indignantly. "Because my crystal ball told me that crystal ball readings are reliable"!! In response, Zosimus, I'd just accept as a brute fact -- without justification (on faith, if you will) -- that in certain cases at least, our inductive inferences are reliable, though a whole panoply of qualifications must be added. After all, surely no newbie here infers from the fact that the first three members she encounters all have 7-letter names to the conclusion that all SFN members have 7-letter names. A "good" induction, then, would be a conclusion derived from a large and varied sample, taken under divergent circumstances in different times and places, and so on and so forth. And the conclusion thereby derived, needless to say, would be probable at best; never certain. This does not, however, preclude us possessing knowledge of propositions derived through induction, as I see things anyway. Having said all that, Nelson Goodman's gruesome "new riddle of induction" still grins at us mischievously from the murky depths. Are you familiar with it? In conclusion, then, I think we just have to accept the reliability -- in some cases -- of our inductive inferences, even if they cannot be justified in a non-circular manner. After all, no one seems to consider it devastating that our deductive inferences are in the same logical boat: justifiable by nothing holier and higher than deduction itself. We might look on induction the same way we regard Zeno's paradoxes: as more of a puzzle than a sentence to irremedial skepticism. Zeno tells us it would take an infinite number of increments to travel from here to the door. But surely none of us concludes, "Damn! That's it! I'll never reach the door now". Here you raise an excellent point. We're often told, somewhat naively, that if we don't trust what scientists are telling us, we can roll up our sleeves and verify for ourselves. On pages 1 & 2, another member (Sensei) says almost exactly this. Even 400 years ago or so such a claim would have been implausible: telescopes and air pumps were the property of a select elite; hard to obtain, construct and maintain. In our present age of "big science" the claim is even less defensible, as you correctly point out. The knowledge of the vast majority of us, then, assuming we have any scientific knowledge to boast of at all, is knowledge derived from the testimony of experts. The question then can be posed as: Is the testimony of scientific experts a reliable source of knowledge? Your own conclusion is that of a rather radical skepticism: science does not yield knowledge. It's a position I wouldn't want to have to defend myself, and you now must face the challenge of Ghideon in his response to you. Looking forward to it! I'd prefer to frame the question, instead, as: How much of what scientists tell us is worthy of belief? The answer "none of it" seems to me as preposterous as "all of it". And that, in a nutshell, is the central problem of the epistemology and philosophy of science. In particular, given the rather dismal historical record of abandoned theories, failed hypotheses, laws that turned out not to be laws, wildly inaccurate estimates (e.g. the age of the Earth) in science, one would be well advised to adopt a position of extreme caution in the appraisal of scientific claims to knowledge. Though I'm sympathetic to your shrewd circumspection, Zosimus, "Don't believe a word of it" might be a bit over the top, don't you think? Thanks again for an intelligent and thought provoking contribution. Note 1 ---------- "Re belief and knowledge. Given the standard definition (justified true belief) we can first of all say that one cannot know what one does not believe: if you know something you believe it, too." - me "The problem here is that you are trying to confine the conversation by defining things according to your own 'beliefs'. All this 'Do you agree that....' biases any conversation." - DrP in response (page 2) Various comments throughout the thread, typified by DrP's remark above, suggest that I've been guilty of a form of linguistic tyranny, attempting to impose on others my own idiosyncratic definitions, with the result that the conversation is "biased". What I'll attempt to show here, then, is that the accusation is unwarranted. When philosophers provide a definition, such as "justified true belief" for knowledge, they are engaging in conceptual analysis, with an aim to clarifying the way competent language employ our repository of terms and concepts, perhaps making explicit what was hitherto only implicit. A philosophical definition may or may not align with the less rigorous definitions typically found in dictionaries. The final tribunal on such definitional matters is not any supreme court judge, legislative body, lexicographers, or even yours truly, as DrP's charge suggests, but the language users themselves, including you, me, and all other adept speakers of English. If our own linguistic intuitions conflict with what Noah Webster says, so much the worse for Noah Webster. It's taken for granted, except in certain deviant cases (e.g. stipulative redefinition of vernacular concepts -- "fitness", say -- in science), that competent speakers use concepts in much the same way as one another. If or when it comes to light that a particular speaker is using a word or concept in an unorthodox manner, the assumption is that an error or misunderstanding is in play, and it is generally expected that the deviant usage will be corrected so as to conform to linguistic norms. Otherwise we're all just making noises. Take, for example, the child who asserts to an assembled adult audience that her nine-year old brother Johnny is pregnant. The grown-ups presumably do not thereby rush Johnny off to the nearest obstetrician; rather the child is corrected: "Sally, you're not using the word 'pregnant' correctly". Sally will be expected to, and in time almost certainly will, conform to standard usage. The adults, meanwhile, are unlikely to be accused of linguistic tyranny; i.e., "defining things according to their own beliefs" (see DrP above). Take, as another example, the Japanese exchange student in New York who declares, "I know that George Washington was the first president, but it's not true". Or similarly, "I know that George Washington was the first president, but I don't believe it". Once again, the normal response would be to inform Yukie that she is misusing one or more of the terms/concepts involved. Her native speaker friends might, for example, point out: "Yukie, it makes no sense to say you know something but that it's not true. If you really do know it, then it must be true", or "Yukie, it makes no sense to say you know something but that you don't believe it. If you know it, then you must also believe it. How can you know something you don't believe?" A charge of ex cathedra linguistic legislation would be bizarre. In all likelihood Yukie will issue a polite 'thank you', correct herself, and go on her way. Or, as a third and final example, what do you say yourself to the religious poster who asserts, "The evidence for God's existence is admittedly scant, nonetheless I know he exists. Furthermore, not only do I know it, but I'm certain of it" ? Need I say more? By and large, there are two kinds of people who hold that truth and knowledge extend only as far as our methods of verification: (1) philosophers of an anti-realist or pragmatic persuasion who know exactly what they mean, e.g. Michael Dummett, C. S. Peirce, and (2) the befuddled. Consider, for example, this profoundly confused quote posted by another member: "Knowledge is the theoretical or practical understanding of a subject. Truth is defined as “the true or actual state of a matter.’ It is generally considered to be the same as fact or reality. Many people may not have knowledge of the truth, while knowing something does not necessarily make it true". In other words, on this account, some people may have knowledge, but that knowledge is not necessarily of what is true. Well, what do you say to the fellah who announces: "Jim has lots of knowledge... but none of it is true" ?

Yes, of course. There are clear cases where everyone, or almost everyone, would agree that your tap is on or off. What to do about these pesky borderline cases though? We skirted with this a little earlier, and if it's a solution to the sorites paradox you seek, yours truly ain't got one. Bivalence is a bitch, if you'll pardon my French. The alternative, though, seems to offer even less succor. Denying any difference between the respective pates of Lemmy and Yul Brynner? You may even have to deny the rationality of science! *shudder* Worst of all, it might sound the death knell to my already beleaguered thread.

Good morning to you, too. Yes, you're right. I have no answer. I'm afraid I can't understand you, and not eager to lose more much-needed beauty sleep tonight. Perhaps another member can help (Eise?) Ok. Again, the purported demonstration eludes me. Sigh! If you need something done around this place.... Well, I did my own search. Over 5000 hits for the word "know". Here's a sample: "... everything we know about a black hole is "available" at the horizon." "However this drag has nought to do with the drags in the MMXs & MGX & the HX, these three Xs relate to a velocity based drag, & we know that the velocity based aetherdrag is 00%." "Just because we don't know everything it doesn't mean we don't know anything. Science is constantly updating itself ..." "No it doesn't. This shows a profound lack of knowledge of how the brain works. Pretty much everything you see is created by the brain, and largely created by the brain to fool you." [unlike others who do not lack this knowledge - RP] "We know a lot about dark matter (less about dark energy)." "True. Obviously, I was only referring to what we currently know." "Also if you would go to MACS0647 and send me a tweet it would make no difference in your argument. We detected it that means we know where it was billions of years ago." "But the way you phrase it makes it seem like you are thinking of the time dimension as completely separate from the others. This is not the case; we know they are all inextricably linked." Oh, and this one kept popping up for some reason... "Science is what you know; Philosophy is what you don't know"

@ Eise, I enjoyed reading your comments above on Daniel Dennett's philosophy. You clearly know his work well and are passionate about it, as I am myself. By that I mean, Dennett is a delight to read, a creative, clever, and witty observer, and as you note, never afraid to challenge orthodoxy. Kudos for all that. It's just that, at the end of the day, I find myself in disagreement with almost everything he says. Haha! Clearly, you feel differently, and that's hunky-dory too. It is intriguing that our intuitions are pulled to extremes on the topics we've touched on. Those sympathetic to the Dennett camp look on his views being more closely tied to hard-nosed science, sometimes dismissing those of a more realist persuasion (e.g. John Searle) as "mystics". Conversely, those at the Searle end of the spectrum, including myself, find it hard to take Dennett and his ilk seriously since they appear to deny the very data which is most indisputable, i.e., our own mental life and its concomitant subjective, qualitative states: "qualia" (see below), or for the uninitiated, consciousness. Stub your toe, poke your eye, put your hand in a fire, or listen to Barry Manilow's Greatest Hits. Yes, that's qualia, of the pain variety. This is -- among other things -- what Dennett denies is real. I believe some things you said above are mistaken, Eise, and will try to provide evidence below to support this. Before we get started, though, I do want to emphasize that "winning" or "losing" is of little moment to me. It's a rare pleasure just to discuss these things with someone as obviously passionate, knowledgeable and intelligent as yourself. As far as I'm aware, Dennett has never come flat out and asserted "consciousness does not exist". With good reason, too -- people might think he's stark raving mad! Haha! But I do think, as many other commentators do, that's exactly what he's saying, just not in so many words. On occasion, he comes ever-so-close to stating it baldly himself, though always seems to back off slightly as if not quite daring to confess his sins. Take this passage, for example: To repeat for those who may not be au fait with the jargon, "qualia" just are these subjective states, those "what-it's-like"states, those raw feels, that we're all so familiar with. Pains, tickles, itches, orgasm (!), sadness, euphoria, the smell of cinnamon, the taste of Grolsch beer... These are qualia. These are the stuff of consciousness. Those of you who have no such states are invited to join Dennett in Zombieland for a dirty weekend of water, British food, Korean soap operas, and other forms of emptiness. Take a look at this then: Finally... Hmm, good question. You must've betrayed your Dutch roots in the forums somewhere I suppose. Or else it was telepathy. By the way, I've enjoyed reading your input to other threads, Eise. Always insightful. What a clever clogs you are. Geddit!? Hey, and when you say Grolsch is "better" than Heineken and Amstel, I assume you mean it tastes better. But, but, buuuuuuuttttttt.....oh never mind. Let's just guzzle the beer. Dude (I assume), this is so manifestly false it almost beggars belief. Pardon da pun. Do an experiment. Enter the words "know" and "knowledge" into the site's search engine and see what you come up with. If not, I'll do it myself.

1. There's no such thing as "The Scientific Method". Add another myth to your collection. 2. The religious person, by and large, says "It's in scripture. Squawk!" The scientist or science fan, by and large, says "We have lots of evidence. Squawk!" But whenever I ask my interlocutor for an account of what does, and what does not, constitute evidence, and the precise nature of the relationship that evidence bears on theory, the result is generally deafening silence. How, for example, can people like myself know when the epistemic warrant purportedly supporting a particular scientific claim, theory, hypothesis, etc. has reached such a degree as to merit a commitment to believing that claim?

The response from another poster (DrP) makes clear that my remark above has been completely misunderstood. What I am not saying (but this is how you are reading me), is "You can have a belief that is so well justified, so indubitable, so manifestly obvious that only some goddamn pie-in-the-sky philosopher would withhold from claiming to know it." What I am saying is: "You can have a belief of whose truth you are so utterly convinced that your degree of confidence approaches, or even attains, certainty; nonetheless that belief does not enjoy the degree of epistemic warrant necessary for knowledge. There may indeed be no good reason whatsoever to support your belief, self-professed certainty notwithstanding". See madhouses with people who think they are Napoleon. See religion. See a few people on this site, too.

And this is precisely why, in a place like this, any thread challenging evolutionary orthodoxy -- as I've learned from personal experience myself -- is invariably an exercise in futility. The OP is not asking you to rehearse established dogma; he is asking you to question the presuppositions which underwrite that dogma. He's asking you to think for yourselves. And that's just what no one here has shown any willingness to do. Our chapel is sound, thank you very much. Consider yourself hoping -- somewhat quixotically -- to take a poke at established dogma on a Moslem website, for instance. Your suspicion is that the site members have never challenged the assumptions that underlie their own beliefs. What you do not want is for them to dutifully post a link to the Quran and say "It's all in scripture. You'll find everything you need to know in there. Go read it". And then when you demand that they do their own thinking, as opposed to simply reciting verse after verse from their holy book, you're told: "If the OP had a genuine question about the omnipotence of Allah, I would have thought a handful of scriptural verses explicitly explaining how his omnipotence has been explicitly shown would be a useful answer - but as was demonstrated it was a disingenuous OP and they were rejected out of hand. And I bet he didn't even read the Quran anyway. What a charlatan!" Disingenuous, you say? "Yes, disingenuous, the OP clearly has no intention of embracing Allah. He's just here to cause trouble." The OP is suggesting that certain assumptions are simply taken for granted, and asks for them to be examined. This being a science, and not a religious, site, one might have thought it a reasonable request. In return for his invitation to think critically, however, he is rewarded with links to sources that take the very same claims for granted. Then again, one might have known better. In one particularly insightful and intelligent passage, Francis suggests: "I come across this sophistry a lot. If you dig a little into such a claim, you will find that what is happening is this: Scientists discover certain facts pertaining to microbiology or genetics that prove useful in producing an effective vaccine. These same facts may also be used as evidence of common descent - ie, Darwin's tree. But then something strange happens in the minds of some of these scientists - they somehow CONFLATE the FACTS that proved useful with the THEORY that uses these fact as evidence. But the facts came first and their usefulness in producing a vaccine doesn't depend in any way, shape or form on the theory that came later. So in the case you allude to, the existence of the flu vaccine needed the useful facts, but the vaccine didn't need the Darwinian theory built on those facts - at all." It's a familiar fabric that the overzealous defenders of Darwinism spin a lot of, namely, taking credit for just about everything in the sublunar realm. E.g. "Oh look! They've found dinosaur fossils in Antarctica. Another prediction of Darwinian theory has been borne out. Another stunning confirmation of the prodigious explanatory power of the theory. Who could possibly doubt its truth now?" Seems to me that dinosaur fossils in Antarctica can be inferred using nothing more than simple induction (they've been found in every other continent, so why not Antarctica?), perhaps with a little continental drift thrown in. See this link, for example. Darwinian theory is (implicitly) being credited for a phenomenon that does not require Darwinian theory. https://www.geolsoc.org.uk/Plate-Tectonics/Chap1-Pioneers-of-Plate-Tectonics/Alfred-Wegener/Fossil-Evidence-from-the-Southern-Hemisphere These are the kinds of assumptions Francis is asking you to subject to scrutiny; not simply repeat.

Ah Studiot. I did my best, trust me, trying to bring some measure of clarity to what did not seem to me clearly articulated ideas (kept me up till 2:00am too! Haha!). I'm not blaming yourself for this. Probably my own fault. I was just trying to simplify in order to understand your intriguing example better; not with any intent to distort. Maybe I'll try again tomorrow, maybe not. Kinda sick of all the hypocrisy and nastiness on this site right now (this is not directed at your good self). But for now... This seems to me the crux of the issue. I don't think knowledge is that which materializes when a certain threshold of belief is attained. One can believe to the point of announcing absolute certainty yet still not KNOW, right? Anyway, be well. Ta-ta.

Francis said in an earlier post: "You made the claim, so now the onus is on you to back it up - instead of throwing vague examples at me, take just of these examples and explain in specific terms how it demonstrates that Darwin's tree has proven practically useful in applied science. I'd bet my bottom dollar that you can't." It is manifestly unfair that other members can simply hurl reams of sources, citations and linked articles, expect their opponent to not only read them all, but then spend his entire day constructing a defense, while they sit back and do nothing. I'd expect our members here to be able to mount their own defenses and argue their own positions, perhaps with the help of sources. Fairness surely demands that they be willing to put in as much work as their opponent. "Snowing" is certainly an easy way to win a debate, if you call that winning. Simply silencing an unpopular opinion is even easier. And I have a sneaking suspicion that's exactly what's going to happen sometime soon.

I hope Francis won't mind if I slip in a quick link here which might be of interest to our members. Philosopher of biology, Elliott Sober, in his "The Nature of Selection" examines the controversy raised by the model of punctuated equilibrium, and whether or not it poses a threat to the more traditional gradualistic understanding of evolution. Does the idea of species selection undermine the view that conventional micro-evolutionary processes can also be invoked to explain macro-evolution? Gould, Eldredge et al argue for (it does undermine this view); a whole load of other dudes argue against. See pages 356 - 368 (if the link works). https://books.google.com.tw/books?id=3KGSBgAAQBAJ&pg=PA359&lpg=PA359&dq=Rather,+we+have+here+an+ontological+claim+to+the+effect+that+an+item+at+the+macro-level&source=bl&ots=dws7k550_1&sig=Bt3eN9gbT86zXsZoiTrGSSkQfyk&hl=en&sa=X&ved=2ahUKEwj785fYp7XeAhULXrwKHd0QC0sQ6AEwAHoECAAQAQ#v=onepage&q=Rather%2C we have here an ontological claim to the effect that an item at the macro-level&f=false You'll find a similar exchange of views in a collection entitled "Contemporary Debates in the Philosophy of Biology". Now, let no man or woman ever mention it again.

Hmm, that troublesome "disproven" word again LOL. 1. Are you familiar with the Duhem-Quine thesis? 2. Max Planck... Now, Planck may be overplaying his hand a little, but I'd argue there's some substance to this. It's not so much that major paradigms are disproven, but that they just kinda... fall from grace. Edit P.S. -- Lol @ "hat-eating"

Paradigm shifts are not in dispute. Paradigm shifts are well documented. But that's not what you said. You said "If evolution were disproven tomorrow..." Paradigm shifts don't happen that way. (i) They don't happen that fast (as you have conceded) (ii) They don't happen at all until an alternative is available, and (iii) That worrisome "disproven" word

With all due respect to your professional expertise, sir, this comment is both philosophically naive and historically unprecedented. There are no cases at all, that I'm aware of, where all involved in a major theoretical paradigm gasp in horror at some new discovery or observation, concede falsification, and en masse abandon the paradigm, leaving themselves with no theoretical framework. Do you know of any? I'd provide sources to those who claim otherwise. Francis has declared it off topic, though. We can do it somewhere else if you like. I'm not defending their views per se, but more suggesting that what you're saying can be, and has been, challenged.