Reg Prescott

All I can say, I'm afraid, is that your understanding of falsification in science is woefully impoverished. What a naive falsificationist (e.g. yourself) calls "falsifying evidence", another person -- the "normal scientist" -- is likely to call "puzzling evidence" or an "anomaly" or some similar locution. There are simply no precedents for the kind of thing you're suggesting two posts above ("the refusal of mainstream scientists to accept newly found experimental and/or observational evidence that falsifies the incumbent model" - you), i.e. that certain experiments are conducted, or certain observations are made, which are inimical to (cf. falsify) the overarching theory, and the community in question concludes, "That's it, boys. The paradigm is false. Let's go to the pub". This kind of thing just does not happen, as the history of science bears witness. Whatever else we can say about falsification, a major paradigm is never pronounced to be false -- and usually not until much later -- in the absence of an alternative to supplant it. If you know of any counterexamples, gimme a nudge.

This has been covered. From my sixth post on page 1: "Of course, questions are being asked in science all the time. Where I'd object is to the claim that the mainstream, i.e., the overarching theoretical framework, or paradigm, is subject to constant questioning or challenge." In the case of natural selection, say, that I cited as one of two examples in my most recent post, it is indeed the case that the degree to which natural selection plays a role in evolution remains a matter of debate. I can, once again for the benefit of the less attentive among us, sportingly concede that this kind of thing is "questioned all the time". It's what Kuhn refers to "puzzle solving", the bread and butter of "normal science", that is carried out within the context of a paradigm which is, by and large, not itself questioned. On the other hand, show me someone who questions the very validity of selection or mainstream evolutionary doctrine itself -- someone who questions the paradigm -- and I'll show you a person who has very likely been marginalized, ridiculed, and, in all probability, accused of not doing science at all. This has also been covered. See my entire first post. In fact, see the entire thread -- as well as its now catatonic spin-off.

@ Studiot In response to the above, I can only say my understanding of "mainstream", with respect to science, would mean something like that which is generally accepted. This would include, but not be exhausted by, major theoretical frameworks or paradigms, of the type I've alluded to in the earlier sections of the thread. (e.g. Newtonian mechanics in a past age, natural selection in this age, etc.). Whether or not my usage is isomorphic with that of SamCogar is something only SamCogar can answer. Where'd he go anyway? Edit: And before anyone pounces with another accusation of "begging the question", I see nothing inconsistent in the claim "such-and-such is generally accepted, yet questioned all the time nonetheless". In fact, this would be quite consonant with the image that scientists commonly project of themselves. This image, I'm arguing, is spurious.

A little more... It has recently been suggested that my appeal to Max Born's expertise runs afoul of the "fallacy of argument from authority" (see swansont's most recent post - previous page). Appeal to expertise is somehow illegitimate. I've noticed that this very site has its own panel of resident experts. If appeal to the authority of experts is indeed fallacious, as swansont asserts, what function do your own resident experts serve?

Ah, so we're back to the old "logical fallacy" game, are we? Forty years ago or so, when John Searle first published his celebrated (or notorious) "Chinese Room" argument demonstrating that computation is insufficient for cognition, i.e., if a machine thinks it won't be in virtue of performing computation alone, the howls of protest from the A.I. community were predictable and vociferous. The argument was wrong -- fallacious -- they screamed. It had to be wrong. After all, their own research program would be jeopardized if it were right. While everybody agreed the argument was specious, curiously enough though, the critics seemed unable to agree on precisely what was wrong with it. Recent posts assert that my arguments commit the fallacy of (i) begging the question, (ii) polysemy, (iii) equivocation, and (iv) appeal to authority. Well, did you evah! (i) has already been refuted. (ii) Perhaps SamCogar does not mean by "mainstream" what I, and presumably everyone else, means by the term, this complaint asserts. Well, it's possible. It's also possible that when SamCogar says "undergraduate" he has in mind "Ali Baba and the Forty Thieves". In this kind of debate, though, we presume that our interlocutors are competent speakers of English who use words more or less the same way as every other competent speaker, and if a word is being used in a deviant, technical, or unorthodox manner, we expect this to be indicated. Otherwise the rules break down. (iii) Now we're told that a mixing of two uses of the verb "to question" leads to fallacy and the end of the world as we know it. Well, as with (ii) above, lacking direct access to other contributors' inner mental states and concepts, I have only my own concept of "question" to work with, which I take to be fairly standard. If it weren't, it's hard to see how we'd be communicating successfully at all. (iv) Were we to consult Max Born on poetry of the late Tang dynasty, say, his authority might indeed be suspect. I see nothing whatsoever fallacious, however, in appealing to an authority on matters that he is indeed authoritative about. Judicial courts call it an "expert witness". Does being an expert entail that he's right? Of course not, but neither can he simply be dismissed with a wave of the hand, and a "Buzz! Fallacy #37! Next!". Born is an expert and his testimony has to be taken seriously. Born's testimony constitutes only a small part of a case I've been building which includes theoretical and historical evidence, as well as expert opinion from various sources, amounting to good reasons for thinking that mainstream science is not "questioned all the time". Now, is the plan of attack really to go through the entire book of logical fallacies? Who knows, if you throw enough of them out there, some members less able to appraise these matters for themselves may even be persuaded.

There are several errors in your "logic" here. You distort what Born said -- in more ways than one! First of all, he did not -- contra your own misrepresentation -- say "science" simpliciter; what he said was "a scientific theory [that has become] firmly established and confirmed". Second of all, he did not say, as per own your distortion, that "[it] isn't questioned because it is dogma"; what he said was "it becomes dogma". Now, whether or not Born's assertion poses a threat to Phi for All's claim (see OP) that science is "questioned all the time" hinges on the meaning of the word dogma. If dogma connotes that which is constantly questioned, then Phi's claim needn't fear anything, from Max Born at least. I'm suggesting that on any standard usage of the term, dogma implies that which is, by and large, not to be questioned. If this connotation of the term is granted, and Max Born's claim is true, then it follows immediately that Phi's claim is false. Either way, there is no begging of the question. The execrable logic is your own.

The source is "Natural Philosophy of Cause and Chance" (1949), p47 -- M. Born "[Even] if correct", then the claim that mainstream science is being questioned all the time is false, granting that dogma, almost by definition, refers to those doctrines that are not to be questioned.

Nobel prize-winning physicist, Max Born, adds his voice to the list of those who, like myself, do not think it is true that mainstream science is being "questioned all the time".

Is it held that (all) copper conducts electricity? How did science arrive at that conclusion if not by induction? Is it true that Semmelweis postulated the existence of "cadaveric material" or what we would call bacteria? This is an abductive inference. As for ontology: Are you suggesting that no scientist (we did say science, after all, not physics) holds that molecules exist? Or tectonic plates? Or neurons?

The distinction is between: (i) making a deductive prediction (in the case of deterministic theories) or inductive prediction (in the case of statistical theories). In both cases your ontology will not -- cannot -- increase. No new entities will be added to your ontology. And (ii) Bringing a hypothesis to the data. This would be an abductive inference. E.g. hypothezing the existence of unobservable bacteria, say, to explain the prevalence of pregnant mums getting sick. Our ontology, supposing the hypothesis turns out to be true, has now expanded by one type of entity. Science has nothing to do with ontology? C'mon now. Scientists routinely tell us what does, and what does not, exist.

But your ontology remains precisely the same as it was to begin with. Deduction is not an "ampliative" mode of inference. It cannot expand your ontology. Neither can induction, in the strict sense of the term.

Of course you were allowed. The existence of the eighth planet, however, was not derived from the theory, in conjunction with the usual auxiliaries and background assumptions, of course. The background assumption was that there were seven planets. An eighth was hypothesized. And hey presto!

Well, not quite sure where this will lead, but first consider: Premise 1: 2x=6 ---------------------------- Conclusion : x = 3 No new terms have appeared in the conclusion. We still have numbers, "x", and an identity symbol ("="). Our ontology remains precisely as it was before. Did you have something different in mind?

First of all, a request to the mods. Several of the last few posts have been largely irrelevant to the thread topic, indeed irrelevant to anything remotely related to science or the philosophy thereof. Now, as I made clear earlier, I'm by no means averse to a little meandering so long as the discourse remains civil and pertinent to this site's proclaimed intellectual aims. That said, subjects broached recently include my alleged idiocy and other personality failings (Strange, Studiot, and Beecee), as well as my putative corruption of the site's youth (Beecee). Socrates, eat your heart out! One can't help wondering what the consequences would have been if I had said of my detractors that which they said of me. The double standards which not only obtain here, but judging by the "votes", positively condoned, are quite deplorable. Might I suggest another thread split -- perhaps entitled "Reg is a Jerk" -- so that those so inclined may discuss my foibles till their hearts are content? Now, back to business... Swansont and I have agreed that naive falsificationism is hopelessly inadequate as a model -- whether descriptive or prescriptive -- for science. In his most recent post, Swansont asked (of naive falsificationism): "Then why bring it up?" Several reasons. Firstly, it's commonly invoked for illustrative purposes in introductory texts in the philosophy of science, not only for its intrinsic heuristic value -- a first (inaccurate) approximation to how science works, if you like -- and also in order to expose its failings. Secondly, inadequate though it may be, it is clearly believed and espoused by a great many people both within and without science. Surely we've all seen something like the following on forums like this one and elsewhere -- and I paraphrase : "General relativity (or name your own fave theory) has never once been shown to be at variance with observation/experiment. All it would take is one piece of contradictory evidence and the entire edifice would topple". A strawman, you say? Well, remember I mentioned a Richard Feynman video in my first post? Here it is... At 0:40 mins, Feynman asserts, "If it disagrees with experiment, it's wrong. In that simple statement is the key to science. It doesn't make a difference how beautiful your guess is, it doesn't make a difference how smart you are, who made the guess, or what his name is, if it disagrees with experiment, it's wrong. That's all there is to it". Now, Feynman uses the word "law". I'd suggest, though, it would make little difference were we to substitute "law" with "theory" or "hypothesis". Feynman, as I said, might as well be reciting directly from an early Karl Popper text; this is an endorsement of naive falsificationism. And as we've agreed, naive falsificationism is simply not tenable as a model for what scientists actually do. With all due respect to the brilliant Prof Feynman, clearly that is not all there is to it. But that was 1964, you might say. No one still believes that! No one really believes that a mismatch between observation and theory/hypothesis entails a falsification thereof, do they? Well, a search for the word "falsified" on your site reveals (this is just a small sample): "Science looks for the best supported explanations, always. Ideas aren't "right" or "correct", they're either falsified or unfalsified, and the unfalsified ideas are constantly being attacked to see if they hold up under harsh scrutiny. These ideas MUST match what we observe in nature, as free from our human cognitive biases as possible." - Phi for All, "What is Faith?", page 18 "So if this is a testable prediction of your hypothesis then it is falsified. We don't see expansion between galaxies, even though there is a lower gravitational potential." - Strange, "An Observer's Local Clock", page 6 "As this is different from the measured value, your hypothesis/guess is falsified." - Strange, "Gravitation Constant or Not", page 1 "Again though it will take observational and experimental evidence to over throw GR and/or having it falsified" - Beecee, "When to use Special versus General Relativity?", page 2 "Special Relativity came later and was (largely) based on different evidence than that which falsified aether theory." - Strange, "Maths vs Belief", page 1 "The luminiferous aether theory was falsified by the Michelson Morley experiment because it was not Lorenz invariant." - Beecee, "Maths vs Belief", page 1 "Not only is there no evidence for it, but it is flat out falsified by the CMB." - Strange, "Religions influence on Science", page 1 "Some theories are falsified , but very few. Phlogiston is one of the few examples I can think of." - Strange, "Why is life after death really not possible?", page 2 My search yielded 37 pages containing the word "falsified". The selective sample above is taken only from the first four pages. Clearly, the naive falsificationist school of thought still holds sway in many quarters. Now, there are both historical and technical reasons for thinking falsificationism is something of a myth. In the former case, what we see time and time again when one paradigm replaces another is not that a so-called crucial experiment or a particular observation immediately reveals to all that such-and-such a theory is false. The widespread belief in such things, I would suggest, is due to those disturbingly common "Whig" histories of science; history written by the victors from the victors' perspective. Richard Feynman, to his credit, was quite aware of this phenomenon: Those who insist on crucial experiments and instant falsification must address the awkward question of why it is that proponents of the phlogiston theory and aether theories, for example, went to their graves unconvinced of their falsity. What was their problem? Too dense to see that falsification had occurred? Max Planck had this to say on the matter: Furthermore, as history makes clear, a major paradigm is never rejected (cf. falsified) until a replacement is available. There are no precedents, that I'm aware of anyway, where scientists performed such-and-such an experiment, or made such-and-such an observation, only to conclude, "Dang! Our overarching theoretical framework has been falsified. Looks like we're out of a theory, boys". Approaching the issue from the technical side, meanwhile, those familiar with the work of Pierre Duhem, later built upon by W. V. O. Quine, will be aware that scientific statements/ hypotheses/theories/laws are never tested in isolation. What is tested, instead, is more like a holistic package containing the hypothesis/theory supposedly under test, as well as an indefinite number of auxiliary hypotheses and background assumptions. When observation/experiment fails to comport with theory, all that can be said logically is "something is wrong somewhere" (in the package). Logic alone cannot tell the scientist how to distribute praise and blame throughout the package. (see the "Duhem/Quine thesis" for details). There is, therefore, no such thing as falsification in empirical science in any logical sense at least.

You're quite right that " "naive falsification" would have us dropping every theory with a single anomalous result". As a model for science, whether descriptive or prescriptive, it's clearly hopelessly inadequate. It's not what scientists do, and as you say yourself, it certainly does not appear to be a very sensible precept to guide inquiry. What you're not right about is my "pushing" it. I'm not pushing anything. As I tried to make clear earlier, what interests me is not what scientists ought to do, but what they do do. If you disagree, please point me to where I have endorsed a program of naive falsificationism. Seems to me the one attacking a strawman is yourself.

Because the point of the thread (split from another place) was to debate one particular dubious (in my opinion) claim made by Phi for All. Beecee and I got slightly sidetracked this afternoon. But hey, I'm not averse to a little meandering if the mods have no objection.

By the way, there is one specious argument on page two, where I make an inductive derivation. What I should have typed was: And an inductive derivation: Premise 1 : Most ravens are black Premise 2 :There is a raven inside the box --------------------------------------------------------------------- --------------------------------------------------------------------- Conclusion: The raven inside the box is black (A double line standardly indicates an inductive argument). The way I originally formulated the argument was inadvertently deductive. With this brand new shiny formulation the argument is now safely inductive, i.e. the truth of the premises does not guarantee the truth of the conclusion. What a relief! No one noticed.

Avoided? This has been a main theme of my arguments/non-arguments/specious arguments since Post #1. Didn't you see the bits about "normal science"?

@ Studiot "Can you tell me what happens to a new brick, fresh from the kiln?" I read your post on the previous page, and took the question to be rhetorical. Turns out it wasn't. Ok. Well, I assume it would cool down, for one thing. I'm not sure what you're getting at. "Once again the silence from Reg Prescott was deafening or drowned out by specious arguments with others." On the first page, back in the good old days when my arguments were still arguments, Phi told me (6th to bottom post), "It makes your arguments look like you're trying to judge the scientific merits by bouncing them in either hand." By the time we'd reached page 2 (third post), Phi admonished, "Haven't you realized it's not an argument but a misunderstanding? It's been explained to you, but you're being (purposely?) obtuse about it, and keep preaching instead of listening." How that which had previously been an argument(s) suddenly ceased to be so, I leave to those less obtuse than myself to figure out. Now you tell me, Studiot, that my arguments are "specious". Rather than simply assert this, why not show us your analysis of the specious nature of the arguments in question? I certainly have no intention of advancing specious arguments, so I'll be indebted if you can set me straight. "Do you have any personal experience of scientific investigation ?" No. I'm not, and never have been, a scientist. Unless cleaning toilets at NASA counts. (That was a joke, I hasten to add before dishonesty gets added to my other apparent sins).

And I think Thomas Kuhn would agree with you. On his account, it's precisely because scientists take the central tenets -- the "hard core" in Imre Lakatos' jargon -- of the paradigm for granted (i.e., by and large, not questioned) that science achieves the success it does. I must say I'm puzzled by the hostility I've seen evinced in this thread. Kuhn, among other things, is offering an account for the success of science; he's no anti-science crusader. As for myself, all I've said in this thread has been descriptive, not prescriptive. That is, I'm hoping we can get a handle on what it is that scientists do; not what they ought to do. What scientists ought to do is none of my business. What I do find fascinating, though, is to try and gain a greater understanding of how the scientific enterprise works through examination of the history and philosophy of science. I felt that a false claim had been made, and presented my reasons -- calmly and rationally -- why I believed it to be false. Isn't that the whole idea of a debate forum? All this talk of an "agenda" -- whatever the heck that's supposed to be -- and "preaching" leaves me bewildered.

No, I'm saying that Phi (not swansont) and you don't agree. You and swansont seem to be in agreement -- with myself, and contra Phi -- that mainstream science is not "being questioned all the time". Swansont told us gravity is not questioned, for example, and you said something quite similar ("there's not a lot to question").

Rather than condescend, why not just refute my argument?

Again, I have to respectfully disagree. Did you watch (the relevant one minute of) the Dawkins video I posted? Dawkins does not sound at all to me like a man hell bent on challenging natural selection theory. (Does he strike you that way?). Quite the opposite. In fact, if you continue watching, you'll hear him describe it as a "matter of faith" on his part. Now, I'm not here trying to overemphasize his use of the word faith. What I am suggesting, rather, is that the theory is simply taken for granted. There is not the slightest whiff that the theory is being questioned or challenged, contrary to your earlier remark that mainstream theories are "questioned all the time" Not this time apparently. Another example: Let's go back to the 19th century. The planet Uranus is misbehaving. Its movements are at variance with what Newtonian mechanics predicts. Once again, we have a situation where observation clashes with theory. On a naive falsificationist account, we should say that the theory has been falsified and must be jettisoned. On your account, we should say that mainstream Newtonian mechanics was being "questioned all the time". To my knowledge, it was never even suggested that Newtonian mechanics might be in dire straits. It was not "questioned" -- as you claim happens all the time. Rather, it was, once again, simply taken for granted. Instead, the anomalous orbit of Uranus was regarded as a puzzle or an anomaly, something that had to be reconciled with the paradigm -- exactly as Kuhn would have, and Popper would not have, predicted. (In this particular case the scientists were right. Mathematicians did some number-crunching, astronomers pointed their telescopes as directed, and hey presto! -- Neptune was discovered. Chalk up another one for the good guys.) Examples such as these could be adduced pretty much ad infinitum. It is simply not true that mainstream theories are being "questioned all the time", in my opinion. If what you say (in bold) is true, then Phi's claim that mainstream science is being "questioned all the time" is false.

Well, the original quote (from SamCogar), that Phi responded to, pertained to mainstream science, not science per se. Of course, questions are being asked in science all the time. Where I'd object is to the claim that the mainstream, i.e., the overarching theoretical framework, or paradigm, is subject to constant questioning or challenge. Let me post that Dawkins video I mentioned as an illustration... http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=tSU81p8fyhU See around 15 - 16 mins, as Dawkins discusses the evolution of the feather : "If you can't think of one [i.e. an adequate account for the evolution of the feather], that's your problem, not natural selection's problem." Now, supposing it's the case that no one has been able to come up with an adequate account for the evolution of such-and-such a trait, (i.e. observation/data/evidence is at odds with theory), then on a naive falsificationist account, the theory is falsified and must be rejected. The theory has been challenged/questioned and found wanting. Clearly, this does not happen. What we see instead is, it does not even enter Dawkins' mind that ET/natural selection theory might be in peril; the failure, rather, lies with the scientist ("that's your problem"), not the theory. The paradigm is not in doubt. It is not "questioned". Compare with what I said in the opening post (rehearsing Kuhn's ideas): "In normal science, if anything is tested/challenged at all, it's not the reigning paradigm itself, but the scientist. If the scientist fails to make puzzling data/evidence fit the theoretical framework then that's her problem; the theory is just fine, thank you very much." Now, Dawkins is just one man, and this is just one example, but I'd say this is fairly typical. The history of science is replete with similar cases. I'll provide more if you want.

Oh, I can agree with you that Dawkins is talking bollocks (re the gravity quote). I'm not an admirer at all. But let me remind you of your claim: "Again scientific theories are never meant to find any supposed truth or reality" Dawkins clearly is not of the same mind as yourself on this. And Weinberg. And a thousand others. (Please, oh please, don't make me compose a list, kind sir) Cough splutter!!! Get "The Devil's Delusion" by David Berlinski -- written precisely to combat the absurdities of Dawkins/Harris/Dennett et al. That Berlinski fellah is sharp as a knife, I tell ya. Very funny too, like the aforementioned David Stove.