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The "Necessary or Impossible" God


ydoaPs

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It's sometimes claimed that God is neccessary or impossible (this is the basis of some modal arguments). That is, if God exists, its existence is necessary and if it doesn't exists, its nonexistence is necessary. I got bored, so I decided to play around with that.

 

If we take the first conditional ("If God exists, it necessarily exists") to be true, we can break down all of the possible worlds in which it is true into three classes of worlds. If we take the second conditional ("If God doesn't exist, it necessarily doesn't exist), then we also get three classes of possible worlds in which it is true. If we take both to be true, then we get nine classes of possible worlds in which God is either necessary or impossible. When we do that, magic happens. In all but two classes of worlds, the worlds are inconsistent even assuming no world is accessable to any other world. But in the modal logic that deals with necessity, every world is accessable to every other world. From that, all possible worlds in which it is true that God is either necessary or impossible are contradictory.

 

For funsies, I made a chart:


post-570-0-72176600-1354912053_thumb.jpg

 

The arrows are where a proposition was taken from an accessable world. The lines are just "therefore" signs.

Edited by ydoaPs
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Didn't Russell deal with the question as it relates to the significance of the term "God"--that is, a problem of a term which has no referent, and, as such, one which fails to present a meaningful statement--other than when used in this sense, i.e. to point out that the term has no valid referent?

 

For example, "Is the Afkjirftrjvjkvrjgijhirhvrirhcumus necessary or impossible?" "Afkjirftrjvjkvrjgijhirhvrirhcumus," having no referent, fails as a sentence which conveys meaning.

 

Each and everyone can claim to have a notion of "God" but no one can know whether his notion corresponds to anyone else's notion, and there is no non-arbitrary referent or means for comparison or contrast by which to examine the term's vlaidity, is there?

 

What is "God"?---other than a term without a valid referent?, that is.

 

See: B. Russell, An Enquiry Into Meaning and Truth (1940)

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Didn't Russell deal with the question as it relates to the significance of the term "God"--that is, a problem of a term which has no referent, and, as such, one which fails to present a meaningful statement--other than when used in this sense, i.e. to point out that the term has no valid referent?

 

For example, "Is the Afkjirftrjvjkvrjgijhirhvrirhcumus necessary or impossible?" "Afkjirftrjvjkvrjgijhirhvrirhcumus," having no referent, fails as a sentence which conveys meaning.

 

Each and everyone can claim to have a notion of "God" but no one can know whether his notion corresponds to anyone else's notion, and there is no non-arbitrary referent or means for comparison or contrast by which to examine the term's vlaidity, is there?

 

What is "God"?---other than a term without a valid referent?, that is.

 

See: B. Russell, An Enquiry Into Meaning and Truth (1940)

 

Here, it doesn't matter what "god" means. "God" could mean "clicky pens" and the modal logic still doesn't work. If something is "necessary or impossible", it doesn't exist.

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Here, it doesn't matter what "god" means. "God" could mean "clicky pens" and the modal logic still doesn't work. If something is "necessary or impossible", it doesn't exist.

 

"clicky pens" though, is a term or phrase which refers to something : 'retractable-point ink-writing intrustments', no? Whether that is what "clicky pens" "means" is one thing, but once we have agreement about the item(s) to which the terms refer, there is a "rererent" which is identifiable---leaving "meaning" aside for the moment. You're expressing yourself loosely when, by writing ' "God" could mean "clicky pens" ' you seem in fact to intend to say, ' "God" could refer to "clicky pens" ' ...

 

But, if you'd been that precise, you'd have perhaps recognized that, on the contrary, no: under no reasonable set of circumstances could the term "God" refer to "clicky pens". But, if it did, at least then we could proceed to consider what we can say about these identifiable things (i.e. clicky pens) whereas attempting that exercise is made problematic (to say the least) since, unlike the terms "clicky pens," the term "God" does not refer to anything we can identify.

 

My point was that this is a factor which it ought to be seen to "matter" indeed for the exercise you're undertaking--though in its details, I admit that I don't follow it. But, even before I get to that point, I'm left doubting the pertinence of the exercise if, as I have tried to argue, there is in fact no referent for the term "God", neither "clicky pens" or any other indentifiable thing..

Edited by proximity1
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