Eise

So this means a particle is completely defined by its interactions?

I know what you mean, but in my opinion you go, methodologically seen, too far. What you can see is that the period of the clock has become longer: compared with a clock in rest in your inertial frame it is slower. So in fact you are comparing two processes. And of course because all processes slow down (compared with your local clock), one can say time has slowed down. But one cannot say that the slower time causes processes to slow down.

I think I agree: definitions must be circular in the end (per definition ). I said the same elsewhere. And it is impossible to define time without referring to change, and one has a hard task defining what change is without referring to time. But the operational definition of time is always attached to a 'standard changer'. And one refers to the duration of other processes by comparing them with the standard changer. And as you can use different kinds of changes to define a standard duration, it seems to me that time is the abstract notion, which we can only access by referring to change. I know, but in my opinion it is not enough. Where e.g. an electrical current can have effects, we can use these effects to measure the current. So we measure by means of causal effects of the current. This is definitely not the case with time. The cause of the moving pendulum is gravity and inertia, not time. We cannot remove time, and then the clock stops. I do not think so. In the first place, it is a consistent use of language: space is to time, what length is to duration. Or if you want: space is to length, what time is to duration. We can use lengths and durations to make operational definitions of space and time. But not the other way round.

This is pretty useless, don't you think? "What is a photon?" "It is what a photomultipier measures." Would you be satisfied by such an answer? There is no way you can know it. And what is the meaning of 'time is occurring'? I would say that events occur. In my opinion it is impossible to say what time is, or even measure it, in the absence of events. Again, you can't know. All clocks or based on cycles or ticks: we only know that until now we can treat time as continuous. The comparison is not quite apt: a ruler measures length, or distance, as you say. But the time-equivalent of length is duration, not time: a fixed time interval between two ticks. The equivalent of time is space. And I have really no idea what space would be when there were no distances and lengths at all. Yes. This makes time's existence something different from physical things, or better events, that can cause something. I somehow agree that time exists, but it exists not in the same way as physical objects and events. (Yes, that would be materialistic.) Well, Einstein explicitly referred to clocks and rods in his 'On the Electrodynamics of Moving Bodies'. I think he did because without reference to concrete clocks and rods, by using operational definitions, he could clarify what he meant. He had to go back to the most basic points of what it means to measure time and space. Comparison with standard durations and lengths is such an operational definition.

So for you there is no difference between totally random, meaning 'event can happen any time and anywhere' on one side, and statistical 'event can happen according a certain limited chance distribution in time an space.' The interference pattern of light (or any other quantum particle) in a two slit experiment is exactly predicted by QM. So where particles arrive is totally random? Of course you don't think so. But it is your Newtonian notion that every event must have a cause that convinces you there must also be causes for quantum events. QM explains the build-up of atoms and molecules, explains phenomena like superfluidity and superconductivity, it is the basis of electronics by describing and predicting the behaviour of semiconductors etc etc, without caring about the question if there is a hidden reality under the chance processes. But if we do the experiments as in Bell-testing experiments, it turns out that a hidden reality with local causes is excluded. And that is an empirically proven, scientific fact. Yes, and this: How do you reconcile these? Didn't Swansont describe here how nature behaves? We do not 'really know' what is going on on the quantum level, but we know how nature at least does not behave in Bell-like experiments: it does not behave according to local causes. Do you thinks Swansont's statements are inconsistent?

This is a physicist saying. I would say, follow the link of the quotation (bent arrow on the right of the quotation), and join in in the discussion there.

AbstractDreamer, I think you just repeat the same phenomenon one metaphysical level deeper. If the local function is also indeterminate, then you have gained nothing. I even think that you must think classically here: by doing so, you see that our classical concepts do not work anymore, i.e. our classical concept that causes must be local and determinate. Of course you know that metaphysics is not physics. My 2 cents.

So you propose: everything is determined but we cannot describe it, i.e. formulate it as a theory How can you find out if some event is determined, when there is no regularity in its occurrences? Or which kind of regularity cannot be described with a theory. (BTW, you are using the word theory again: what does it mean now? Idea? Notion? A set of related laws of nature? An opinion?) You should react on my mentioning of probabilistic causation. QM makes predictions. But not exact predictions for every single event. This is an empirical rule. And there is a cause for it: the energy levels in the carbon-14 nucleus. The structure of the carbon-14 nucleus is so that on average a nucleus decays in 5730 years. The logic that people think that they can apply Newtonian logic in the realm of QM, makes people think that QM events must be determined exactly.

Wikipedia (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bell's_theorem): Well, how you normally do it: finding no regularities, no absolute repetitions, etc etc. Let's assume it passes all statistical tests. Now, is this random generator totally random? Say, the possible range of values is between 1 and 100. Can I predict that its value lies between 0 and 1? Does random then mean that the value is not determined at all? Maybe you find some interesting ideas here: Probabilistic Causation. Because QM: - gives definite and unambiguous statistical predictions - these predictions are correct The question of completeness is a different one. And that is what we are discussing here.

Well, it is necessary, because Bell's theorem only excludes the possibility of local variables. Again and again, you want to be less precise than necessary for a clarifying discussion. No, I only put in the word 'pseudo' because it is not possible to make a real random generator with a perfectly deterministic machine. And you missed what I really asked: Can you criticise that it is not a good random generator on the ground that it only produces values between 0 and 1? Because there are no 'inner workings' of electrons and photons, and because Bell's theorem excludes that there are such that are responsible for the exact attributes a single particle has. If you would understand QM, you would see that this is correct. The problem you have is that you just can't believe that QM defies our daily understanding of the world. We are not capable of understanding how an object can have particle attributes and wave attributes at the same time. The problem is not mathematics or logic: QM is mathematically and logically sound. But we cannot picture exactly what is going on. But that is what you are doing: you apply your daily, intuitive understanding of the behaviour of macro objects to quantum objects: So this applies perfectly to you. Me too: they light my way. Greene is pointing to the many worlds interpretation of QM. (In the end with 'hidden reality' he means the multiverse, not a reality under the events we measure.) The Schrödinger wave function is deterministic: the problem is however that we can only measure single events. And about these the wave function says nothing, except their chances to occur. It does not predict exactly what we will measure. The many worlds interpretation assumes that all events that are possible according to the wave function occur but in different universes: the universe, together with its observer, split in so many universes as there are possible outcomes of a quantum measurement. That is a bit extreme theory, but it is consistent with the mathematical formalism of QM. As said before, you can accept that there are non-local variables. But then you get Bohm's implicate order, in which events depend on momentary events at other places in the universe, possibly lightyears away. I am not aware of any other theories that are consistent with QM, and are strictly deterministic. So this is it: either you accept the many worlds theory or Bohm's implicate order; or you accept that quantum events are not completely determined.

You mixup local variables and non-local variables. So if I have a computer with a (pseudo-) random generator, then you say it is not random because its value is always between 0 and 1? Is that a valid criticism that my number generator is not random? No idea what you are saying here. Chance of absorption is 1/2. This simply means that if you send 1,000,000 photons through the polarisation filter about 500,000 go through, and the other circa 500,000 are absorbed. So you cannot predict if a single photon will get through or not. As a photon is not a composite particle, there is nothing in the photon that determines if it gets through or not. Ah. But now you are not talking about local variables. Now you are talking about Einstein's 'spooky action at a distance', or Bohm's 'implicate order'. Somehow you do not seem to understand the statistical character of QM. The wave function (ok it's square) gives you the chance distribution of measuring a photon somewhere. But you cannot predict where a single photon will arrive: it will be somewhere where the chance does not equal zero. Do you understand what a chance distribution is. The presence of some hidden connection is everywhere in QM: but not of local determinism. The video of Brian Greene has not much to do with what you are talking about.

Because 1 x 9 = 9 and 2 x 8 = 16. Last time I looked 16 > 9.

Of course I ask for it. Because I want to clarify what you mean. For you obviously 'theory' means 'any opinion somebody has'. I know about a lot of thoughts and thought constructs that are called 'theories'. But we need to clarify what you mean with it. (And of course, as academic philosopher, I know what philosophical theories are). I am also pretty good in recognising unsubstantiated ideas, and distinguish them from empirically justified ideas. This is just plain wrong. I won't discuss this with you anymore. You can only convince me by linking to reliable sources. But I already know. No physicist will agree with you. Ask here. Enough physicists around. 'Controlled randomness' is an oxymoron. The only two possibilities I know of are 'pseudo randomness' and 'real randomness': latter category is the domain of QM. That is not what we are discussing here. We are discussing if there is real randomness. And exotic interpretations of QM aside (Bohm's implicate order, or Everett's many worlds interpretation), there are QM events that are really random. Your unsubstantiated idea has no roots in actual physics. Made the important abbreviation bold. Your opinion contradicts experiment.

Philosophy already has that covered. No need for redundancy. No, no, philosophy does not cover 'truth'. At most it is concerned with the concept of truth, which is something different. Philosophy does not find true propositions about the world. That is science' business. But it does formulate true propositions about our thinking about the world. So it can clarify about methods, concepts, etc of our thinking, also the thinking in science. So my 2 cents as philosopher: the concept of 'truth' suggests as if it something 'out there'. But it isn't. It is a relationship between propositions and praxis (that can be empirical, or ethical, maybe even aesthetical). In the case of science these propositions refer to empirical facts. But as mentioned above, the model behind the facts is just that: a model. Its success lies in the possibility to make predictions, not in that it is a perfect image of reality. No better illustration than the succession of scientific theories, which empirical predictions become more and more comprehensive. But 'The Truth' is a mirage we should get rid of.

... and we have based technology based on it. And you, Randolpin, are using it now. The models made in science make empirical predictions that can be tested. That does not necessarily mean that these models are 'The Truth': but the empirical conclusions from it are confirmed experimentally. That means you can trust these empirical results. Of course you need belief. You must belief that thousands of physicists are not lying; that they did their work correctly. And one reason is what Phi for All so clearly stated: experiments are repeated, especially when they are nearly unbelievable, like Bell tests. Remember cold fusion: many groups tested Fleischmann's and Pons' claims, because if it were true the chances for our civilisation would be enormous. It was not enough just to say: "We don't believe it because it does not fit to our present models". So there is a 'cleansing mechanism' in science, especially in the hard sciences. It may not take effect immediately always, but in the end false claims will be unmasked or corrected. Throwing over a general accepted central theory in science will guarantee you a Nobel-price. (Oh so different in ideologies and religion...)

Of course. I did not say such a thing. I said that you can expect that when posting on a science forum people interpret 'theory' as 'scientific theory'. And so that you should be clear in your language. Take an electron as example: measuring the spin of individual neutrinos is notoriously difficult, as measuring neutrinos itself is already extremely difficult. The point is that we know that the absolute value of the spin of an electron is always 1/2. But dependent on the circumstances we will find different directions. If we measured it before in the up direction, and it was +1/2, then we know we will measure +1/2 again if we do it again in the up direction. But if we measure it exactly 90⁰ left, we will have no idea what we will measure. Chance of +1/2 is 50%. So in that case it really is completely random. And the Bell theorem shows that there are no properties of the electron that will determine if the value will be +1/2 or -1/2. So any local variable theory is doomed to fail. There is order in the universe. QM predicts very precisely in which limits there is a bit of randomness. I still don't understand why you conclude from 'a bit of randomness' to 'no order at all'. I have no idea what you are asking. So to guess a little: we have a lot more knowledge than zero. But there are some limits in the domain of QM, and we know exactly what these limits are.

Here you are again. If you want to philosophise, you must use your terms clearly. As you are posting in science forums, you can expect that people think about a scientific theory. I criticised you weeks ago already for ambiguous use of words ('effect'). If you want to have a discussion about a viewpoint of yours, then you must present it clearly. 'The theories' are obvious just opinions of people. Well, whatever people may think about local (hidden) variables, they are wrong: because science has proven that there are no local hidden variables. You cannot agree with Bell's theorem, and say that there are local hidden variables. This idea is scientifically proven wrong. If you have any other reasons, bring them in. It does not bring much if you just say something like that, and then keep silent about it.

What you fail to understand is that the empirically proven knowledge of physicists is that not any theory (already thought of or not) that contains local variables, hidden or not, can replicate the predictions of QM. It simply is not the case that some ideas, pet- or good theories, were falsified by Bell's theorem: any theory with local variables is ruled out definitely. Do you understand this? And if so, why do you still hold to the opposite?

Just as I thought. And here is the problem. QM does not comply to common sense. I find it OK if you have troubles with that. But it is a pity that you move to remarks as 'I provided these links already' or that I would understand little of QM and Bell's theorem,

Reliable sources of: - Which concrete theories were refuted by Bell's theorem? - that Bell's theorem says 'the theorem states we can't explain QM with our knowledge of physics'? Please refer to the post(s) where you gave these links.

Well, if you could support your ideas with reliable sources, then it would be OK, but otherwise... wise decision.

Again: which hidden variable theories? Name them! (But of course if there are any, they are unscientific. Because we have already proof that they cannot work. You are contradicting yourself.) Here you go again: the theories. You are fantasizing some story about the history of QM, but you fail to mention the theories. Which theories were proposed that contain local variables? What a bare nonsense. Name the theories that explicitly were disproved by Bell's theorem. Who was proposing them? When and how where they refuted? Why does Bell's theorem proved these wrong? And where is the link that says that 'the theorem states we can't explain QM with our knowledge of physics'? Slowly you are beginning to look like a troll. You evade my questions, and you do not give scientific sources that support your position.

You said: I asked: You answered: So you give a in my eyes wrong interpretation of Bell's theorem, and if I ask you for a link that supports your interpretation, you cannot give one. I am also wondering what you mean with 'The local hidden variable theories'. Which ones? Can you name a few?

Please give some more or less authoritative link for this. THX

You do not understand how strong Bell's theorem is. It is valid for any particle that behaves according QM. If it is possible to create entangled pairs, you can create Bell like situations: local variables cannot explain the correlations between measurements. (Or QM is false...) It doesn't matter if they would be made of smaller components. There is no presupposition about the precise buildup of the particles in Bell's inequalities. The only presupposition is that some attribute of the particle itself (e.g. one of its constituents, or of an attribute we not yet know of) determines what we will measure. As QM is not consistent with Bell's inequalities, we can conclude that there are no such local attributes.