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Question regarding Daniel Dennett's quote


MattMVS7

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So which premise of assumption explicitly?

Where was I unclear? Each of those three sentences is inaccurate.

 

Where did I deny this, or where does my argument explicitly build on the idea that the brain would be a single, unified whole?

Here, where you keep asserting "It makes no sense to say some process is forced by itself. " You assert the brain cannot force itself. Sure, my but "the brain" is subject to underlying mechanisms and chemical processes. That chemistry does what you keep calling the "forcing." It is the subparts that are relevant, and your position that "the brain" cannot "force" itself seems to ignore this.

 

Yes, in some sense you are right. But my point is that the 'you' is not caused by this chemistry, but can be identified by it. The relationship between the low level physics and chemistry of the brain on one side, and the higher cognitive functions of the brain on the other, is not a causal relation, but an identity relation.

Yes, you keep saying this and I think you're mistaken. No sense repeating ourselves more.

 

Or do you think that 'you', or more general consciousness, is a recognisable subsystem of the brain? A place where everything comes together, but powerless against all the other parts of the brain, a spectator only?

Pretty close, yes. The sense of self is very clearly the result of what you call a subsystem of the brain, a subsystem that is itself at the mercy of underlying processes outside of our control. That said, I would not go so far as to limit it as a mere spectator since the complex interactions of all of these systems in aggregate make us who we are.

 

Can you explain this, please? What role does consciousness play in relation to freedom and control?

I see control over our choices (the context in which we're exploring these two terms) to be an active process, but the biology and chemistry strongly suggests these things happen passively. Ergo, based on my requirement that it be active, we lack control and freedom to choose. Again, I know you disagree and use a different definition of control and choice that does not require active conscious involvement. Hence, our seeming disagreement.

 

Simply said: Benjamin Libet could not have done his experiments if he could not instruct his subjects first. And for understanding instructions, one needs consciousness.

Of course, but this is tangential to whether or not your conscious self actively made the choice versus imposing a narrative to explain a choice already made... a choice that was influenced and made before the conscious "subsystem of the brain" was ever even activated. Edited by iNow
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Here, where you keep asserting "It makes no sense to say some process is forced by itself. " You assert the brain cannot force itself. Sure, my but "the brain" is subject to underlying mechanisms and chemical processes. That chemistry does what you keep calling the "forcing." It is the subparts that are relevant, and your position that "the brain" cannot "force" itself seems to ignore this.

 

Where did I say the brain cannot force itself?

 

This is what I said:

 

There is no 'you' independent of your brain processes. 'You' is brain processes. It makes no sense to say some process is forced by itself. Saying 'you' is forced by brain processes is like saying that something is forced to happen because it happens.

 

Yes, you keep saying this and I think you're mistaken.

 

I am not mistaken (this argument is as strong as yours).

 

Pretty close, yes. The sense of self is very clearly the result of what you call a subsystem of the brain, a subsystem that is itself at the mercy of underlying processes outside of our control. That said, I would not go so far as to limit it as a mere spectator since the complex interactions of all of these systems in aggregate make us who we are.

 

That is as vague as vague can be. If consciousness is always running behind, how then can it be more than a spectator?

 

I see control over our choices (the context in which we're exploring these two terms) to be an active process, but the biology and chemistry strongly suggests these things happen passively. Ergo, based on my requirement that it be active, we lack control and freedom to choose. Again, I know you disagree and use a different definition of control and choice that does not require active conscious involvement. Hence, our seeming disagreement.

 

Yes, I use another definition of control and choice: one that applies to persons as a whole, and not to some subsystem of the brain. To be free or in control we must be free and in control: not a subsystem of ours.

 

Of course, but this is tangential to whether or not your conscious self actively made the choice versus imposing a narrative to explain a choice already made... a choice that was influenced and made before the conscious "subsystem of the brain" was ever even activated.

 

Just to be clear: I am not defending that consciousness is in control over the brain. What I am defending is that all the processes that enable us to flee for dangers, think about what to do next, doing science, are consciousness. That everything we do has a 'causal foreplay' is for me clear. If neurologists can measure this causal foreplay, great. But would you say that e.g. theory building in science is a process that could occur without consciousness? If not, what then is the role of consciousness?

Edited by Eise
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